Extensible Performance-Aware Runtime Integrity Measurement by Delgado, Brian G
Portland State University 
PDXScholar 
Dissertations and Theses Dissertations and Theses 
3-24-2020 
Extensible Performance-Aware Runtime Integrity 
Measurement 
Brian G. Delgado 
Portland State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Delgado, Brian G., "Extensible Performance-Aware Runtime Integrity Measurement" (2020). Dissertations 
and Theses. Paper 5425. 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations 
and Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact 
pdxscholar@pdx.edu. 
Extensible Performance-Aware Runtime Integrity Measurement
by
Brian G. Delgado
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Computer Science
Dissertation Commitee:
Karen L. Karavanic, Chair
Charles V. Wright
Wu-chang Feng
Bruce Irvin
Wayne Wakeland
Portland State University
2020
©2020 Brian G. Delgado
iAbstract
Today’s interconnected world consists of a broad set of online activities in-
cluding banking, shopping, managing health records, and social media while
relying heavily on servers to manage extensive sets of data. However, stealthy
rootkit attacks on this infrastructure have placed these servers at risk. Security
researchers have proposed using an existing x86 CPU mode called System
Management Mode (SMM) to search for rootkits from a hardware-protected,
isolated, and privileged location. SMM has broad visibility into operating
system resources including memory regions and CPU registers. However, the
use of SMM for runtime integrity measurement mechanisms (SMM-RIMMs)
would significantly expand the amount of CPU time spent away from oper-
ating system and hypervisor (host software) control, resulting in potentially
serious system impacts. To be a candidate for production use, SMM RIMMs
would need to be resilient, performant and extensible. We developed the
EPA-RIMM architecture guided by the principles of extensibility, performance
awareness, and effectiveness. EPA-RIMM incorporates a security check de-
scription mechanism that allows dynamic changes to the set of resources to
be monitored. It minimizes system performance impacts by decomposing
security checks into shorter tasks that can be independently scheduled over
time. We present a performance methodology for SMM to quantify system
impacts, as well as a simulator that allows for the evaluation of different
methods of scheduling security inspections. Our SMM-based EPA-RIMM
prototype leverages insights from the performance methodology to detect
host software rootkits at reduced system impacts. EPA-RIMM demonstrates
that SMM-based rootkit detection can be made performance-efficient and
effective, providing a new tool for defense.
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Introduction
Today’s interconnected world presents significant opportunities for digital
interactions. A broad set of online activities including banking, shopping,
managing health records, and social media rely heavily on servers to store
and transmit rapidly growing sets of personal information. Both the hardware
and software stack for typical servers have grown in complexity over the
past decade: Virtualization has added a layer of system software between the
hardware and operating systems; and multicore processors have led to a focus
on multithreading and unprecedented levels of resource sharing. Firmware
has taken a prominent role in system configuration and providing runtime
services to operating systems.
While researchers have made advances in improving the security features
of computing platforms, attackers have achieved extensive success with sys-
tem compromises and ability to persist undetected. The varied and dramatic
attacker exploits have caused a new realization: "Companies are beginning
to accept that they will be compromised, so the demand is growing to know
just how often and how deep. . . [98]" The trend towards increased focus on
intrusion detection is also reflected in corporate spending: "Enterprises are
transforming their security spending strategy in 2017, moving away from
prevention-only approaches to focus more on detection and response, accord-
ing to Gartner, Inc. [33]."
However, while increased focus is being spent on detection, there are
a variety of examples where current detection capabilities are lacking. In
December 2016, attackers calling themselves "TheDarkOverlord" contacted
the president of Larson Studios to tell them that their servers had been com-
promised and unless ransom was paid, the attackers would leak all of their
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data which included upcoming new episodes of the popular Netflix series,
"Orange is the New Black". The attackers also deleted the episodes from the
compromised servers. The company sent $50K to the attackers in an unsuc-
cessful effort to prevent the online release [98]. In a more concerning attack,
the same group compromised the Cancer Services of East Central Indiana –
Little Red Door, retrieved data, and encrypted the original data, demanding a
ransom for restoration. The agency declined to pay noting that they "will not
pay a ransom when all funds raised must instead go to serving families, all
stage cancer clients, late stage care/hospice support and preventative screen-
ings. . . [22]" These compromises are representative of inadequate computer
defenses and detection capabilities. The compromised organizations did not
detect the attack themselves, but rather from the hackers.
Attacks can appear in a variety of forms including computer viruses, ran-
somware, and rootkits. Rootkits present a special concern as they are designed
to evade detection and provide attackers with a direct channel into the sys-
tem to return undetected. Security researchers focusing on rootkit detection
have endeavored to provide new detection mechanisms at lower levels in the
platform to better observe malicious code while remaining protected from
it. These mechanisms can reside within the operating system, hypervisor, or
at an even more privileged level, system firmware (also commonly referred
to as BIOS). Recent years have also seen a growth in ransomware including
instances that leverage kernel vulnerabilities such as WannaCry, Sage, Locky,
and Bad Rabbit [87, 9, 63, 105]. These ransomware also modify privileged
operating system resources to gain control of the system and provide a place
for their malware to reside.
A key challenge with securing computer systems is that vulnerabilities
such as buffer overflows, integer overflows, improper input checking, and
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inadequate testing can allow an attacker to gain privileges such that they
can overwrite host software code with malicious code. This ongoing issue
facilitates rootkits as attackers can simply select a suitable code vulnerability
and extend it to facilitate greater control over the system or hide their traces.
These insecurities in host software design may never be completely resolved
as they are inherent in complex software. As details on kernel and hypervisor
rootkit prevalence are not readily available, we focus on survey data from the
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) database [19] to gather counts
of privilege escalation and arbitrary code execution vulnerabilities in Xen
and Linux from the years 2011 to 2019. This analysis provides the basis for
examining the scale of the software vulnerabilities that can breed kernel and
hypervisor rootkits. The data, as shown in Figure 1.1, clearly shows that the
scale of the problem has increased since 2011.
FIGURE 1.1: Survey of CVE Database for Privilege Escalations
and Arbitrary Code Execution for Xen and Linux (Years 2011-
2019)
These vulnerabilities are initial vectors that an attacker can weaponize by
inserting modified code into the host to gain persistence and stealth. With a
vulnerable system and rootkit techniques, the attacker has the two necessary
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requirements to obtain persistent control over host software. Attackers seek
out privileged data structures such as the System Services Descriptor Table
(SSDT) which contains a table of privileged handlers for Windows system
services similar to the syscall table in Linux. Compromising this data structure
would allow installation of malicious handlers to replace the original versions.
A similar attack can be made for the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) which
registers handlers for exceptions and interrupt routines. Patching the kernel is
another method of injecting attacker code so that when a given kernel function
is executed, the attacker code is also triggered. Filter drivers establish a chain
between several layers of device driver functionality and rootkits can insert
themselves between two of the layers to intercept traffic [40].
On x86 platforms, a special CPU operating mode called System Man-
agement Mode (SMM) typically handles important runtime platform man-
agement tasks including managing CPU power states, controlling low-level
hardware such as the CPU fans, handling thermal throttling, performing BIOS
flash updates, and handling memory errors, among other tasks [70]. Intel
introduced SMM with the 386 SL microprocessor [45]. SMM code operates
in a supervisory mode in which the CPU register state and memory are ac-
cessible to it. SMM also benefits from hardware protections over its memory
region that, when properly configured, prevent other code from viewing or
modifying it.
In recent years, some researchers propose a more active role for SMM, in-
corporating rootkit detection capabilities below the hypervisor and operating
systems. SMM’s desirable properties such as broad visibility and protected ex-
ecution present an intriguing approach to better detect host software rootkits.
SMM would represent a new layer in the system hierarchy with the ability to
perform this detection (Figure 1.2). The SMM-based rootkit detectors, which
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we term SMM Runtime Integrity Measurement Mechanisms (SMM-RIMMs),
monitor operating system or virtualized environments for rootkits. They
accomplish this by preempting execution periodically and inspecting the
interrupted state, looking for unexpected changes compared to a previously-
gathered baseline. The baseline is established based on initial measurements
of presumed static resources which are gathered at a time where the system is
considered to be in an uncompromised state.
When rootkits compromise the lowest level of host software, e.g., the
kernel or hypervisor code that controls the system, they become very difficult
to identify as the detection code is at risk. Security compromises at this level
would have significant repercussions as this privileged layer as well as all
software layers above it are vulnerable. SMM-RIMMs benefit from operat-
ing from within an isolated and hardware-protected SMM memory region
(SMRAM). They also are privileged to look into host software’s memory and
register state which presents a very useful property for a rootkit detector
as these resources are typically changed by rootkits. Beyond this, once an
SMM-RIMM is triggered via an SMI, all host-side execution is paused for
the duration of the inspection which presents the opportunity to interrupt
malicious code or detect traces of its past operation. As x86 platforms broadly
support SMM, there is no additional hardware required or significant modifi-
cations needed for host software to take advantage of an SMM-RIMM. For
these reasons, SMM-RIMMs present intriguing possibilities for adding new
detection capabilities to combat host software rootkits.
However, there are challenges. The entry into SMM is accomplished by a
System Management Interrupt (SMI) which typically takes all CPU threads
out of the operating system environment and into the BIOS’s SMI handler.
This can be a disruptive asynchronous operation from the perspective of any
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code executing outside of SMM as it would be unexpectedly preempted for
the duration of the SMI. Neither the hypervisor nor the operating system
layer is aware of time spent in SMM. The disruption of an SMI is further
magnified in a multicore platform, since all of the cores are preempted from
the time an SMI occurs to the SMI’s completion.
Proponents of SMM-RIMMs have provided limited measurements of
performance impacts on applications [7, 113] or provided a brief treatment
on system calls [119] but did not extend this analysis further or establish an
upper bound on SMM time.
These approaches [7, 119, 113] would spend up to 233x the amount of
time in SMM compared to the SMI latency guideline [23]. Our investiga-
tions [23] found significant negative impacts of this amount of time spent
in SMM including performance degradations, subtle correctness issues, and
problematic impacts on device drivers. Improperly scheduled SMM activity
has the potential of creating highly perceptible degradation as well as subtle
but negative effects.
As the proposals for utilizing SMM for runtime integrity measurement
may result in fundamental changes over the utilization of SMM, devising
methods of scheduling potentially long security inspections has become
necessary. These scheduling methods bring order to what would otherwise
add uncertainty over platform performance and correctness.
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FIGURE 1.2: Usage of System Layers Over Time
A second key limitation in the current SMM-RIMM state of the art is
that there are no architected methods for adding new inspections at runtime
to SMM-RIMMs. This capability becomes critical as attackers develop new
rootkits and the detection mechanism needs to be able to detect these new
attacks. Additionally, rootkit malware may seek to hide from RIMMs and a
non-extensible set of measurements would not provide adequate detections.
The ability to dynamically vary the set of monitored resources helps keep
malware unaware about what is being inspected and would raise malware’s
difficulty in avoiding evasion. Operating systems are also more dynamic
today as techniques such as kernel space address layer randomization vary
the locations of kernel code sections further challenging static approaches.
Our reformulation of the SMM-RIMM concept requires a new method of
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guiding the SMM-based inspections without building in specific operating-
system or hypervisor details into SMM. Updating hard-coded values in SMM
at runtime is not possible as SMM is flashed onto a hardware chip that
requires a system reboot in order to update and supports a finite amount
of write cycles. Compounding the challenge of providing a usable SMM-
RIMM, no SMM-RIMMs have been publicly released which significantly
limits research into the SMM-RIMM concept. Beyond these challenges, the
increased potential for SMM as an interesting attack surface also presents
challenges for SMM-RIMMs.
To address these limitations, we developed a new approach, EPA-RIMM
(Extensible Performance-Aware Runtime Integrity Measurement Mechanism).
EPA-RIMM targets these key challenges for SMM-RIMMs. Using the results
of our research into these new capabilities, we show that it is possible to
implement an SMM-RIMM for servers that is extensible, performance-aware,
and effective. We also demonstrate methods of addressing the security of
the SMM-RIMM with our architectural design that enforces encrypted and
signed communications for our SMM-RIMM and leverages the principle of
least privilege.
For the extensibility requirement, we provide a flexible mechanism to
dynamically vary the integrity measurements and provide developers with
the necessary access to design their own measurements. To ensure that the
SMM-RIMM is performance-aware, we provide a method of bounding exe-
cution times in SMM. The approach is in sync with the unique performance
properties of SMM and decomposes large security checks into shorter tasks
that fit within the timing constraint. These tasks can be scheduled indepen-
dently without severe system performance degradation. The performance
foundation for our approach is informed by our extensive characterization of
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SMM impacts. The amount of security checking can be increased in times of
attack or decreased to reduce system impacts, providing a balance between
performance and needs for security inspections. By removing impediments to
real-world deployments of SMM-RIMMs, we enable a powerful new tool for
identifying the presence of malicious persistent rootkit software in sensitive
environments. Providing rootkit detection allows discovery of malicious code
that facilitates data leaks and lateral movement in the network.
Section 1.1 provides details on scope of attacks we address. We describe the
key challenges for SMM-RIMMs and how we address them in Section 1.2, our
contributions to advance the state of the art in SMM-based runtime integrity
measurement in Section 1.3, and provide an orientation to the remainder of
the document in Section 1.4.
1.1 In-Scope Attacks
We focus on persistent in-memory rootkit and ransomware attacks that com-
promise presumed-static operating system and hypervisor resources. Rootkits
are malicious software that hides their traces and also provides an attacker
with the ability to control the system. Rootkits often include one or more
of the following techniques: interrupt hooking, changes in low level CPU
registers that control paging and permissions (e.g. CR0, CR3, CR4 CPU regis-
ters), changes in the operating system kernel or hypervisor code, exception
handlers, and other similar resources. While there may be some applicability
of our mechanism to detect malicious application code, we consider this out of
scope. We also focus on monitoring resources with contents that are accessible
at provisioning time. Our priority is to first ensure adequate inspection of
the host software resources in an effort to strengthen the lowest levels of the
platform. Without a strong foundation, securing the upper layers of software
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becomes infeasible.
Ransomware attacks can leverage similar rootkit techniques such as kernel
code compromise to gain control and then begin to encrypt the user’s data,
requiring payment before a decryption key is provided. These attacks are also
in-scope as the kernel resources they compromise can also be detected with
EPA-RIMM.
1.1.1 Sample Rootkit Techniques
1.1.1.1 IDT Hooking
One technique that allows the attacker to hide traces of their presence on
the system is to modify the Interrupt Delivery Table (IDT) mechanism [52].
The IDT is a data structure that links interrupts on the system with the code
that handles each of these interrupts when they are triggered. Several attack
variants are possible. One attack changes the value of the IDTR which is a
CPU register that provides the address of the IDT table. An attacker could set
up a fake IDT in memory with malicious code in it and then adjust the IDTR
to point to this fake IDT. Once a system interrupt would be triggered, for
example, after a page fault, malicious code would automatically be executed
in place of the original code. Another possible attack would be to keep
the original IDTR but insert malicious code into one of the handlers in the
IDT. When this compromise interrupt handler would fire, malicious code
would transparently execute. SMM-RIMMs can readily detect these attacks by
watching for changes in the IDTR register or hashing the IDT table memory.
1.1.1.2 SMEP Disable
One important CPU-based security feature is Supervisor Mode Execution
Protection (SMEP). This prevents supervisor (Ring 0) code from being able
to execute instructions from user-mode (Ring 3) pages. The SMEP feature is
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enabled by setting bit 20 in the CR4 control register. The Sage ransomware
utilized a Windows vulnerability (CVE-2015-0057) to transition from Ring 3
to higher Ring 0 privileges, disable SMEP, and modify the LDT.
1.1.1.3 Kernel Rootkit Code Injection
The Snakso rootkit appeared in 2012 and targeted 64-bit Linux kernels. The
WannaCry ransomware leveraged leaked versions of the NSA exploit, Eter-
nalBlue, to attack other networked computers with a kernel-code exploit. The
Locky ransomware compromised Windows kernels with vulnerabilities to
CVE-2015-1701 to execute payload code with kernel privileges. In a write-up
of Bad Rabbit, security researchers are fairly confident that this ransomware
used the EternalRomance exploit to do arbitrary reads and writes to kernel
memory space. These attacks rely upon modification of kernel code which
could be accomplished by kernel vulnerabilities such as CVE-2013-2850, CVE-
2017-12188, or CVE-2016-8633 [19].
1.1.1.4 System Call Hooking
This attack searches for the location of the system call table in the System.map
file, clears the write-protect bit in CR0, modifies the system call table to insert
a new attacker-provided function, then re-enables the write-protect bit [29].
1.1.1.5 Xen Venom Rootkit VM Escape
The Venom vulnerability in QEMU’s virtual floppy disk controller (FDC)
was discovered in 2015 and affected multiple hypervisors including Xen,
VirtualBox, KVM. It enables a VmEscape attack in which an attacker could
escape the constrained environment of the virtual machine and gain execute
permissions on the hypervisor [21].
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1.1.1.6 Xen Exception Handler
Examining one in-scope rootkit attack in detail, we refer to a Xen hypervisor
compromise from Invisible Things Lab [40]. This attack leverages any avail-
able buffer overflow or logic error that resulted in Ring 0 privileges. Once
this access was gained, the hypervisor attack begins with the installation of a
stealth backdoor by replacing the hypervisor code for one of the privileged
interfaces for a virtualized guest to communicate with the hypervisor (Xen
hypercall) with malicious code. When the hypercall is triggered, the attacker’s
code will execute in place of the original code. The attack also alters the debug
exception handler to detect and executes code contained in malicious packets
instead of handling the debug exceptions. The attack takes advantage of a
higher priority for debug exceptions than firewall rules as the code is executed
prior to the firewall inspecting the packet [40]. This attack would be difficult
to detect from a compromised hypervisor but could be detected by measuring
Xen’s hypercall handling code and debug registers.
Table 1.1 summarizes these attack techniques.
TABLE 1.1: In-scope Attacks Detectable with EPA-RIMM Checks
Attack Example Cmd Operands
IDT Hooking Phrack IDT RegVM
IDTR
IDT
CR4.SMEP Disable Sage Reg CR4
Kernel Code Injection
Snakso,
WannaCry,
Locky,
Bad Rabbit
VM Kernel Code
System Call Hooking sys_call_hijack VMReg
Kernel RO Data
CR0
Xen Code Injection
Xen Exception Handler
Venom
Xen Exception Hooking VM Hypervisor Code
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1.2 Key Challenges for SMM-RIMMs
Despite the promise of SMM-RIMMs, five significant challenges remain. In
this section, we describe these fundamental challenges (C1-C5) that greatly
reduce the effectiveness of SMM-RIMMs.
C1 : SMM-RIMM Security: SMM-RIMMs operate with high privileges.
Mechanisms are necessary to ensure that they are not compromised.
C2 : SMM-RIMM/OS Semantic Gap: The SMM-RIMM is not aware of
which resources should be inspected and where they reside.
C3 : SMM-RIMM Performance: Existing SMM-RIMMs greatly exceed SMI
latency guidelines which would result in significant performance degra-
dations and performance impacts.
C4 : SMM-RIMM Measurement Variability: SMM-RIMMs lack measure-
ment variability. They do not vary the sets of measurements over time
or adjust measurement frequency dynamically.
C5 : SMM-RIMM Code Availability: No SMM-RIMM implementations
have been published which significantly limits researcher access to this
technology.
1.2.1 C1 - SMM-RIMM Security
Research Question 1: How to design a more secure measurement agent?
While SMM has promise for host software rootkit detection [7, 113, 119], other
researchers have raised concerns over the privilege granted to SMM by high-
lighting security issues [99, 53, 78]. Security researchers have leveraged SMM
vulnerabilities to implement SMM rootkits and other compromises [59, 15, 67,
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53, 14, 20]. Some compromises have resulted from improper platform config-
urations. Others resulted from SMM coding errors. One promising path for
reconciling the need for a privileged SMM layer for security monitoring with
the concern of the broad reach of SMM is shown by STM PE [84] (indepen-
dent concurrent work) and EPA-RIMM-V [110] (concurrent work within the
EPA-RIMM research group). These approaches use the SMI Transfer Monitor
(STM), an SMM-based hypervisor that virtualizes SMI handler code, to apply
a protection policy over the handler execution. This policy prevents arbitrary
accesses to system resources, instead confining an SMM-based measurement
agent to a permitted set of resources. The STM’s protection capabilities go
significantly beyond a related UEFI effort that implements SMM page table
isolation to constrain SMI handlers accesses to host memory [117], by allowing
restrictions over other resource types such as CPU Model-Specific Registers
(MSRs), IO Ports, among others. The power of SMM also has the potential
to be misused. Therefore EPA-RIMM can be used with the STM to limit the
access of the measurement agent to a minimal set of resources [110, 84].
Securing the EPA-RIMM measurement agent presents special challenges
as there is a need to balance limited amount of available time in SMM and the
overheads of the STM as well as security features such as encryption, checking
message authenticity, and signature checks. The STM helps solve one security
issue, however, others remain. Attackers could attempt to mount several
types of compromises on the EPA-RIMM measurement agent as enumerated
below.
1. Attacks on measurement agent communications: There are several
key attacks on EPA-RIMM’s measurement agent possible:
(a) Communications spoofing: Attackers may try to construct measure-
ment requests to send to the measurement agent. This could cause
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it to spend time monitoring unimportant resources instead of re-
sources that could indicate signs of an attack. This attack could
also, optionally, manifest as a denial of service attack as described
below.
(b) Communications tampering: Attackers may try to intercept and mod-
ify messages while in transit. Examples of these tampered messages
would be changing the memory address to be measured or another
measurement guidance parameter to cause it to differ from the
intentions. The goal of such an attack would be to divert the mea-
surement agent’s attention from the intended measurement target.
Similarly, the attack would also be possible on the return of results.
The attacker could attempt to replace an alert with a message that
indicated that there was no detected issue. A successful attack of
this nature would obscure an attacker’s compromise of a monitored
resource, neutralizing EPA-RIMM’s detection capabilities.
(c) Denial of service: Attackers may attempt to cause a denial of service
by overwhelming the measurement agent with requests causing
the system to spend too long in SMM, preventing other meaningful
work. There are two denial of service scenarios:
i. An attacker is able to trigger measurement SMIs but is only
able to provide spoofed Bins.
ii. An attacker succeeds in compromising the signing and encryp-
tion keys.
For the first scenario, processing time for each of these Bins will be
minimal. Once the measurement agent identifies a problem with
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Bin correctness (e.g. problems decrypting the Bin or with HMAC in-
tegrity), it ceases processing of the Bin. For the second scenario, the
attacker would specify very large hash operations to be performed
to cause extensive time to spent in SMM. This attack attempts to
exploit a design consideration for EPA-RIMM, namely that the
primary method of decomposing large measurement operations is
done outside of SMM.
(d) Replay attacks: This attack "replays" a previous measurement re-
sult by first intercepting a valid measurement and saving a copy
of it. The attacker may block future measurements but pass off
previously-collected measurements in their stead.
(e) Breaking measurement and result confidentiality: An attacker may try
to observe the measurement requests and returned results while
they are in transit. This would allow the attacker to determine
what resources were being measured and whether the attack was
detected. This information could aid an attacker in determining
which system resources to compromise and also gauge the stealthi-
ness of their attack.
2. Use of EPA-RIMM as a side channel: Since the measurement agent
has deep visibility into the running operating system or hypervisor,
attackers could attempt to exploit this visibility into leaking information
about the running system. For example, attackers may wish to view the
contents of memory or register values to aid in later compromising the
system.
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1.2.2 C2 - SMM and OS Semantic Gap
Research Question 2: How can an SMM-based measurement agent
comprehend the host-side software layout without hard-coded layout
information?
An additional challenge results from a semantic gap between SMM and
the host software due to their disjoint operating environments. SMM does
not have a native understanding of the host software layout or what should
be measured. Building in host-software specific information to SMM as done
in SPECTRE [119] is not a feasible solution as it is brittle. Host software
layouts can change over time, updating SMM code at runtime is not possible,
and kernel address space layer randomization thwarts the scheme. Thus,
resolving this challenge requires a flexible mechanism to specify the set of
resources to be measured as well as where these resources reside.
1.2.3 C3 - SMM-RIMM Performance
Research Question 3: How can the performance impact of SMIs be
measured and analyzed?
Research Question 4: How can an SMM-RIMM be designed to minimize
time spent in a single session to meet SMI latency guidelines?
Research Question 5: What performance optimizations can reduce the
overall overhead of integrity measurements?
Performance is a major challenge for SMM-RIMMs. All SMM-RIMMs that
we are currently aware of exceed the published SMM guidelines by orders of
magnitude [7, 113, 119, 84]. As SMIs preempt all CPU threads, this can result
in significant performance degradations and correctness issues if too much
time is spent in a single SMM session. Our research demonstrated that major
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system impacts can occur such as significant perturbation of the kernel and
device drivers as well as clear performance impacts such as severe application
slowdowns [23]. Interrupt handling is delayed until the CPUs return from
SMM and latency-sensitive applications can be affected. System software
assumptions regarding scheduling regularity as well as task durations are
challenged by prolonged periods of time in SMM. SMM’s strong isolation
from host software also results in a lack of overall scheduling mechanism
between the two environments. While process scheduling is a key operating
system feature, the operating system’s scheduling mechanism is not aware of
SMM and there are no established methods of efficiently scheduling security
measurement events that span these two contexts. The operating system has
no mechanism to preempt an SMI during its execution. It is also not aware
that time was spent in SMM which impacts the accuracy of scheduling and
process time accounting. Additionally, CPU intensive workloads have no
mechanism to avoid the throughput loss as time has passed but no workload
computations were performed.
1.2.4 C4 - Measurement Variability
Research Question 6: How can variable integrity measurements be sup-
ported in SMM?
The fourth key challenge pertains to measurement variability both for
measurement type as well as frequency and durations of checking. Currently-
proposed SMM-RIMMs utilize pre-configured inspections that do not dynami-
cally alter the set of monitored resources, measurement frequency, or duration.
one approach hard-codes particular kernel addresses to measure [119].
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A key complication for variable integrity measurements is that the SMM
code is infeasible to modify at system runtime since they reside within a pro-
tected memory range and updating SMM code would require re-programming
the BIOS flash and a system reboot, thus incurring downtime. A lack of vari-
ability provides a significant complication for an effective SMM-RIMM for
three key reasons: 1. Kernel address space layer randomization (KASLR)
varies the addresses of kernel functions upon boot. Thus, statically hard-
coding addresses in SMM of particular kernel functions is infeasible in mod-
ern systems. 2. Continued malware evolution and response to SMM-RIMMs
implies that an unchanging set of measurements will not remain effective
indefinitely. Compounding this issue, a simplistic scheduling mechanism
would cause them to be increasingly vulnerable to the "scrubbing attack" [81,
112] that compromises the system but then cleans up traces of the attack before
an inspection would occur. An example of this would be a rootkit that loads
malicious code into a virtual memory page but then unmaps the page prior
to an integrity measurement. If malware were able to derive the inspection
times, it could readily remove its traces before the next inspection, avoiding
detection. 3. New operating system and hypervisor software updates may
change internal layouts which could invalidate previous assumptions over
locations and structure of kernel objects and functions.
1.2.5 C5 - SMM-RIMM Code Availability
The final key challenge is that no SMM-RIMM implementations have been
published. Previous approaches were closed-source and researchers could
not examine, evaluate, or extend them. This limits the feasibility of the entire
approach, preventing adoption of this protective mechanism.
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1.3 Contributions
EPA-RIMM constitutes an effective inspection capability that targets stealthy
host software rootkits. With an extensible, performance aware, and effective
SMM-RIMM, rootkit developers can not count on a lack of detection. Provid-
ing a usable scheduling mechanism for measurement SMIs also presents a
method to bring order to the scheduling of an important class of platform man-
agement tasks. As we advanced the SMM-RIMM concept, there were some
established system techniques that we were able to draw from, such as the
knapsack problem and real-time operating system schedulers, however, other
aspects required original thinking. As the prevalent approach of unbounded
time in SMM for rootkit detection was infeasible, we researched and identi-
fied methods of decomposing large measurements into smaller portions to
fit within an SMI time quantum. We demonstrate the merits of measurement
decomposition, priority-based scheduling, and aging to prevent measurement
task starvation. As entries and exits from SMM consume time that would
otherwise be used for processing, there is a risk of the overheads from transi-
tioning into and out of SMM becoming the dominating cost. Therefore, we
maximize the amount of work spent in an SMM session up to the specified
limit. With this approach, negative system impacts due to prolonged periods
of SMM execution can be avoided and effective rootkit detection performed
with minimal impact. We further optimize EPA-RIMM’s performance by
implementing an SMM-RIMM variant of Paradyn’s performance hypothesis,
instead focused on identifying rootkits.
1.3.1 First Linkage of SMI Latency Guidelines and Performance Impacts
to SMM-RIMMs
At the outset of this work, the state of the art for SMM-based runtime in-
tegrity measurement mechanisms consisted of: 1. SMI durations that greatly
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exceeded the Intel BIOS Test Suite (BITS) SMI latency guideline of 150µs,
and 2: Unbounded SMI time. This Intel-designed tool generates alerts if
detected SMI durations exceeded 150µs, however, SMM-RIMM developers
did not limit SMI time in their design and the consequences of exceeding
the threshold were not clearly demonstrated. In our paper, "Performance
Implications of System Management Mode", we tied the SMI latency guide-
line (LimitSMIBITS) for the first time to SMM-RIMMs and based on detailed
measurements, demonstrated a wide-range of negative impacts when the
guideline was exceeded which included kernel correctness issues, perfor-
mance degradations, and increased power usage [23].
Our performance analysis impacted the design of an HP Labs and Centrale-
Supelac SMM attack detection mechanism as they targeted their mechanism
to support the 150µs SMI latency guideline that we proposed adherence to,
noting "The Intel BIOS Test Suite (BITS) defined the acceptable latency of an
SMI to 150µs. Delgado and Karavanic showed that, if the latency exceeds
this threshold, it causes a degradation of performance (I/O throughput or
CPU time) or user experience (e.g., severe drop in frame rates in game en-
gines) [18]." Our SMI performance characterization also provided insights
for researchers from UCLA and Microsoft who referred to our performance
analysis of SMM [23], noting that "Delgado et al. . . . were the first to experi-
mentally expose the performance implications of Intel’s System Management
Mode (SMM), which is often used for memory error reporting (and which we
discuss in this work). They observed inconsistent Linux kernel performance
and reduced quality-of-service (QOS) from SMM on latency-sensitive user
applications [35]."
These citations reflect the new awareness of SMM performance impacts
that our measurements and analysis has contributed. The design of the HP
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Labs and CentraleSupelac SMM attack detection which adhered to the 150µs
SMI latency guideline demonstrates the impact of our SMM performance
measurement methodology and our linkage of the SMI latency guideline to
SMM-RIMM performance.
1.3.2 First performance-aware SMM-RIMM design incorporating measure-
ment decomposition
EPA-RIMM’s ability to flexibly schedule integrity measurements with sensi-
tivity to the current threat levels provides the ability to dynamically increase
the amount of security inspection during times where systems in an enterprise
are experiencing heightened attack activity. This allows system impacts to
be tuned to acceptable tolerances in the general case as well as providing a
new ability to increase the amount of inspections when needed. Our method
demonstrates that it is possible to take longer-running measurements and de-
compose them into smaller components that can be scheduled in accordance
with SMI latency bounds. To allow us to evaluate differing approaches in
RIMM scheduling, we created a scheduler simulator that allows the evalua-
tion of changing key scheduler parameters to investigate their impacts.
Our SMI latency system impact measurements establish guardrails that
help keep maximum SMM-RIMM preemptions at desired levels while also
allowing for additional headroom for enhanced detection when it is needed.
To accomplish this performance analysis, we created an SMM performance
measurement methodology and utilized it to conduct a detailed performance
characterization of SMM. Our analysis was the first in-depth study of the
impacts of SMM on hypervisors, operating systems, device drivers, and
applications. This performance analysis provided the necessary empirical
results to allow us to re-design SMM-RIMM scheduling and demonstrate
a mechanism of scheduling platform tasks in an orderly manner. Loutfi, I.,
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notes that EPA-RIMM is a "novel" way of using SMM for non-traditional
purposes [69].
1.3.3 First application of measurement triggers to SMM-RIMM
SMM-RIMMs have traditionally featured measurements that were timer-
based. EPA-RIMM’s approach allows for reducing the amount of measure-
ments required to evaluate hypothesis regarding the system state. This ap-
proach leverages measurement triggers that schedule less-intensive measure-
ments first to determine if more intensive measurements need to be run to
further evaluate the hypothesis. EPA-RIMM supports this capability using
the Diagnosis Manager and flexible Check descriptions. This new capability
is a first for SMM-RIMMs and can significantly reduce the amount of SMM
measurement time required to evaluate a hypothesis.
1.3.4 First SMM-RIMM Benchmark: EPA-RIMM Bench
Runtime security inspections have the essential property that performance
efficiency is a key concern. With a virtually unlimited set of resources to
measure and re-measure over time, the amount of security inspections that
can be performed without degrading the user experience beyond acceptable
tolerances requires quantification. As processor performance and degree of
parallelism increases, the achievable measurement increases resulting in a
reduced time to discover attacks. Additionally, EPA-RIMM could support a
variety of hashing, encryption, and message authentication code algorithms,
each of which has their own performance and security characteristics. EPA-
RIMM Bench provides the ability to directly quantify achievable SMM in-
tegrity measurement performance which would allow careful performance
analysis to support important design and implementation decisions.
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1.3.5 First Publicly-Available SMM-RIMM Prototype
Before our work, there have been no public release of an SMM-RIMM. We
constructed a functional EPA-RIMM prototype that allows research into SMM-
based runtime integrity measurement and accompanying performance mea-
surements. With this prototype, we have demonstrated its ability to detect
rootkit attacks and also quantified the impact of the RIMM’s fundamental
operations of register accesses and memory hashes. We provide our pro-
totype to allow researchers to build upon the framework. Taken together
these improvements remove key limitations that reduce the practicality and
effectiveness of SMM-RIMMs and show that the approach can be an imple-
mentable and useful mechanism for detecting host software rootkits. The
ideal outcome of this work would be the availability of the EPA-RIMM frame-
work that provides this new capability to aid in the detection of rootkits and
a community of security researchers who would develop and share checks
for the architecture.
1.4 Document Organization
The remainder of this document is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides
background on the current security threat landscape, treatment of varied
approaches for securing computer systems and data, describes the urgent
need for runtime measurements, identifies EPA-RIMM’s scope, and provides
details about the system impact of SMM. Chapter 3 examines related work
covering a variety of approaches in performing runtime integrity measure-
ment including software, discrete hardware devices, and firmware among
other approaches, allowing an understanding of how EPA-RIMM compares
to existing techniques. Chapter 4 describes our SMM performance measure-
ment methodology that we used to perform performance sensitivity testing of
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varying degrees of SMIs which provides the performance underpinnings of
EPA-RIMM. In Chapter 5, we provide a detailed performance study into the
system and application effects of varying degrees of SMM activity, as would
be incurred with EPA-RIMM. Chapter 6 presents the design requirements of
EPA-RIMM including two new requirements we propose. Chapter 7 presents
the EPA-RIMM architecture. Chapter 8 describes our EPA-RIMM prototype
including the design, examples of rootkit detection, and performance mea-
surements. In Chapter 9, we describe our SMM-RIMM scheduler simulator
which provides the ability to simulate the results of a variety of important
scheduler-related parameters that would improve the performance efficiency
of EPA-RIMM. Chapter 10 describes RIMM-Bench which provides a mecha-
nism for comparing SMM-RIMM performance between systems. Chapter 11
summarizes our research.
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Background
The attention to the need for runtime integrity measurement is driven by
current trends in which rootkits remain undetected for prolonged periods of
time. We discuss the contemporary threat landscape in Section 2.1, various ap-
proaches to preventing or detecting malicious activity in Section 2.2, describe
the urgent need for runtime checking in Section 2.3, and show performance
limitations of current approaches in Section 2.4. We describe information on
measurement triggers which fine-tune the of the approach in Section 2.5.
2.1 Threat Landscape
In recent years, the potential damage for system compromises has grown sig-
nificantly. Attacks have taken on financial and geo-political angles. Executive
assistant director of the FBI’s Criminal Cyber Response and Services Branch,
Robert Anderson, noted that "We’re in a day when a person can commit
about 15,000 bank robberies sitting in their basement [54]." Cyber-espionage
is also increasing with the majority of the attacks by state-affiliated attackers
(87%) and organized crime (11%). Of the attack methods employed by cyber-
espionage actors, 37% exploited software vulnerabilities and 24% leveraged
rootkits. Compounding these issues, a recent study by Verizon noted that
only around 20% of attacks in organizations were detected internally with the
majority of attacks detected by law enforcement and third parties [109]. This
low percentage of attack detection within an organization demonstrates that
timely detection of attacks continues to be an issue. Efforts to utilize external
telemetry information from third parties could also bring targeted expertise
to organizations that are less prepared to detect attacks.
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The retail sector in 2014 also experienced large-scale attacks with both
Target and Home Depot suffering broad compromises in their point of sale
systems. A survey by the Ponemon Institute showed that "the average cost of
cyber crime for U.S. retail stores more than doubled from 2013 to an annual
average of $8.6 million per company in 2014. The annual average cost per
company of successful cyber attacks increased to $20.8 million in financial
services, $14.5 million in the technology sector, and $12.7 million in communi-
cations industries [42]." The study also notes that "cyber attacks can get costly
if not resolved quickly" and the average time to resolve a cyber attack was 45
days. An examination of today’s threat landscape shows that there are large
financial consequences to compromises and quick detection and remediation
become determining key factors in the overall cost of the attack.
Attacks may arrive by a number of means. These can include: malicious
code that targets the application layer, denial of service, web-based attacks,
phishing and social engineering, malicious insiders, stolen devices, malicious
code that has entered a network, viruses, worms, and trojans that reside
on endpoint systems, and botnets [42]. Different attacks require different
detection mechanisms. Application-level attacks are very prevalent as these
are easier targets while lower-level attacks can have a broader impact on the
system and are harder to remediate.
2.2 Varied Approaches for Securing Systems
Efforts to secure computer systems and data fall into a number of categories.
One key approach focuses on improving the design of computer systems to
strengthen security in one aspect. For example, the Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR) feature helps prevent malicious code from being able
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to rely upon a consistent user-space memory layout across a number of ma-
chines by randomizing the locations of the "stack, mmap region, heap, and
the program text itself" [27]. This feature is also present in the Linux kernel
to randomize where the kernel’s code is placed at run-time. Kernel ASLR
(KASLR) could complicate the effort of certain runtime integrity approaches
that rely upon kernel functions being located at certain known addresses.
Secure Boot protects against an operating system being compromised early
in the boot process from a malicious boot loader [114]. Microsoft has added
integrity checks over the Windows heap and added Data Execution Preven-
tion (DEP) that prevents certain programs and services from executing from
memory regions set aside for Windows [79].
Formal Verification is a technique of logically checking whether a design
meets a set of given requirements, under a set of assumptions [56, 16, 111].
One of the most prominent approaches in this area is the seL4 microkernel that
has undergone a complete functional correctness proof for its code [56]. While
Formal Verification presents the ability to make strong claims over security
properties, the approach has scalability limitations due to limits in the amount
of code that can be reasonably formally verified. It also requires making
assumptions over system design and configurations that may not broadly
hold. For example, the formal verification of the seL4 microkernel assumes
that the widely-used Direct Memory Access (DMA) feature is not being
used, leaving users to formally verify their own DMA-capable device drivers.
Additionally, SMM presents serious complications to formal verification on
x86 platforms as it operates completely out of band of the formally verified
environment and has the privilege of modifying arbitrary resources. Azab,
et al. note that the impacts of SMM and firmware "could negate all seL4
guarantees" [6].
Chapter 2. Background 29
Another approach attempts to construct strongly isolated computation
environments on systems that may be less trusted [75, 6]. For example, Flicker
can provide strong isolation of running code even when the "BIOS, OS, and
DMA-enabled devices are all malicious" [75]. SICE leverages SMM protections
to protect running code from other code running on the system. Additionally,
when SICE-protected workloads are not running, their data is stored in a
hardware-protected SMRAM region. One new method of providing isolated
execution is Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) which leverages new
CPU instructions to construct protected environments for user code to execute
in. These protected applications ("enclaves") have hardware-based protection
against access from malicious software running at higher privilege levels
such as hypervisors, BIOS, or operating systems. SGX also protects the
confidentiality and integrity for the protected application’s code and data [76,
39].
A separate approach acknowledges that despite the efforts to construct
host software with improved security, computer systems will likely be com-
promised and that vigilant observation is necessary. This runtime integrity
monitoring approach mitigates the risk of successful compromises by peri-
odically checking the status of key resources in host software to determine if
they have been unexpectedly changed. This leverages the observation that
certain kernel data structures and code regions are generally static once con-
figured [50]. Runtime integrity monitors can quickly alert administrators to
alert them that a potential attack is in progress [7, 90, 119, 113].
2.3 Urgent Need for Runtime Checking
Currently, servers that host sensitive data for thousands of users typically run
without any checking of the low-level fundamental resources that control the
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system. Unlike antivirus programs which regularly scan user programs and
data, there are often no checks over a number of important security-sensitive
hypervisor and low-level operating system resources. Once attackers are
able to gain a foothold, they can often persist for extended periods of time
undetected. For example, the security analysis of the highly publicized attack
of Sony in 2014 suggests that attackers remained in Sony’s network for months
before unleashing a devastating ten minute attack [1].
Despite improvements in operating system and hypervisor security, rootk-
its continue to compromise crucial host software environments. Rootkits
provide attackers with the ability to hide all traces of their activity on the
system from host software, allowing for stealthy operation. Host software
rootkits compromise sensitive software and hardware resources that control
fundamental operations such as interrupt handling, memory access, and event
handlers. If a system is compromised at the lowest level, all code running
above it is at risk. Quick runtime detection of attacks becomes increasingly
critical to alert administrators so that they can prevent attacks from spreading
or information leaking. Currently there is little host software runtime integrity
measurement software actually deployed and the topic is largely limited to
the research arena.
SMM-based runtime security measurement mechanisms can reside out-
side of potentially compromised host software regions and provide ongoing
host software rootkit detection. However, the proposed runtime integrity
measurement mechanisms of today are not likely to be deployed. The current
simplistic scheduling of security checks, inflexible specification mechanism
for new checks, fairly predictable checking, lack of telemetry information,
and performance impacts reduce the attractiveness of the potential solution.
With a number of host software resources to check, the performance impacts
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of the design become crucial. The authors of one runtime security checker
note that they could trigger a security check on "every CPU instruction by
using performance counters in the CPU, thus guaranteeing that every state is
introspected [119]." Could this improve security? Probably so, if the mecha-
nism were sound. However, no user would accept this system due to severe
performance degradation, regardless of the additional security it provided.
Tolerances for security delays fall upon a spectrum. Some environments
such as stock trading are very sensitive to latency. A TABB Group study
"estimated that if a broker’s electronic trading platform is 5 milliseconds
behind the competition, it could lose at least 1% of its flow. That equated
to $4 million in revenues per millisecond. Up to 10 milliseconds of latency
could result in 10% drop in revenues. Today, latency is often measured in
microseconds (µs), with the current impact per µs commonly accepted by
many traders to be $100,000 per year [32]." Similarly, a Blackhat security
presentation explained why firewalls, routers with access permission lists,
and intrusion detection systems do not exist in stock trading environments:
"In the vast majority of interconnection scenarios, a few milliseconds is not
that much of a problem. In the case of low latency trading, it’s about 100,000
times too slow [104]."
However, not all environments are this sensitive to latency. The require-
ments for credit card processors (PCI DSS) prescribe the use of a firewall,
encryption of the transmission of cardholder data across public networks, the
use of antivirus programs, and monitoring of access to network resources and
cardholder data. Each of these requirements can improve the security, if prop-
erly implemented, however would come at the cost of system performance [3].
With a varied set of industry requirements and tolerances for security delays,
enterprises would benefit from the ability to dynamically vary the amount
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of security checking performed on their systems. Scheduling fewer security
checks may improve performance but could result in a less-secure system.
Likewise, performing extensive checks may uncover well-hidden malicious
code but could degrade the user experience significantly. An effective runtime
security checking mechanism should be designed to operate within the target
environment. To provide strong coverage, environments utilizing runtime
integrity measurement mechanisms should support increasing the amount of
checks as needed to respond to rapidly spreading attacks.
Current research on RIMMs is largely limited to the security of the mech-
anism itself and a canned set of attacks that can be detected. For these
mechanisms to become practically implementable in real computing environ-
ments, the mechanisms must be generalized to be made adaptable to newly
emerging threats and feature performance tuning knobs that encourage the
server administrator to not disable the mechanism and its protections.
2.4 System Impact of SMM
The key challenge with SMM-RIMMs is that their system impact may be
significantly disruptive to other processing on the system, depending on how
it is scheduled. When an SMI occurs, all CPU threads transition into SMM,
saving their interrupted state in an SMM memory region called the SMRAM
Save State Map. When SMM processing has completed, the interrupted
context of the CPU threads is restored and the threads return back to where
they were executing when the SMI was received. Thus, from the perspective
of the code, time has passed but the code was transparently interrupted. In
more recent Intel processors, an SMI counter will increment upon each SMI
but other than this mechanism, there is not a direct method of determining
that the SMI occurred.
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Given these unexpected preemptions, the time spent in SMM should be
short in order to not unduly preempt executing code for too long which
could result in performance degradations or correctness issues. Intel has
released a tool called the "Intel BIOS Implementation Test Suite" (BITS) [106]
that counts and measures SMIs occurring on a system and checks that their
latencies are within "acceptable" limits (currently defined as 150µs). This
rule of thumb has been the only available guideline for latency tolerance. At
present, none of the SMM-RIMM approaches that we are aware of has limited
their time spent in SMM according to SMI latency guidelines. Each of the
SMM-RIMM approaches dramatically exceed current SMI latency guidelines.
These mechanisms take between 27 and 267 times the current SMI latency
guidelines which presents concerns over their system impact. Table 2.1 shows
the stated time requirements for several prominent SMM-RIMMs.
Our previous work in understanding system sensitivities to prolonged
SMI delays shows a variety of impacts that result when SMI latencies are
increased well beyond the guidelines. The range of effects includes correctness
issues in process time accounting, jitter in interrupt processing, loss of timer
ticks, and significant performance degradations [23]. Balancing the tension
between SMM-RIMMs and other processing is a key focus of this work as we
investigate methods of enabling SMM-RIMMs without drastic system impacts.
We present our measurement results on the impact of varying degrees of SMIs
in Chapter 5.
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TABLE 2.1: SMI Time Comparison of SMM-based RIMM ap-
proaches
Approach SMI ms Frequency
HyperCheck 40 1 per sec
HyperSentry 35 1 per 8|16 sec
SPECTRE 5 to 32 16 per sec to 1 per sec
Delgado et al 1.5 Not specified
EPA-RIMM-Linux 0.26+ Dynamic
EPA-RIMM-Xen 0.28+ Dynamic
Intel BIOSBits 0.15 Not specified
2.5 Triggers
The Paradyn automated performance analysis tool implements a W3 search
model (Why, Where, When) that seeks to answer why an application is per-
forming poorly, where the performance problem resides, and when the prob-
lem occurs [80]. To reduce the performance overhead of this instrumentation,
Paradyn does not apply all available performance instrumentation at once.
Instead, it explores several hypothesis candidates to determine why a per-
formance problem occurs. It selectively refines the hypothesis by means of
Boolean functions. When one light-weight test indicates a potential perfor-
mance problem in a particular module, a heavier-weight test can be triggered.
By only invoking the heavier-weight test if the light-weight test indicated a
problem, Paradyn effectively explores the performance problem search space
with minimized system impact.
In Paradyn, transient performance overheads do not merit analysis as they
consist of a small fraction of total execution time which is not worth tuning.
However, SMM-RIMMs should detect attacks as soon as possible after they
occur to limit potential damage. Short-lived attacks that hide their traces can
possibly evade detection. Thus, this constitutes one key difference between
Paradyn’s approach and the requirements of SMM-RIMMs. However, by
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relaxing this constraint, the trigger mechanism presents a potential method to
reduce the overall overhead of SMM-RIMM measurements.
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3
Related Work
This section describes related work that most closely relates to our focus of
providing mechanisms to determine when an operating system or hypervisor
has signs of an attack. With this knowledge, a system administrator could take
various actions to reduce the ability of malware to spread further within the
environment. A key difference in these varied approaches is the location of
the measurement agent. Pure software-based approaches can more easily be
deployed than mechanisms that require special hardware or custom firmware,
however, attaining effective protection for the software-based measurement
mechanism is challenging due to running the mechanism in the same context
as potentially malicious code. Hardware-based mechanisms can achieve a
greater isolation from malicious code due to lower-level hardware protections
over their agent, however, due to their isolated contexts, gaining full access to
the necessary CPU and memory state can be challenging. Firmware presents
intriguing possibilities due to its leveraging of hardware-based protections
and also ability to gain access to a wide amount of system context. Open
challenges with this approach are how to provide the ability to properly
understand the host software environment and how to resolve potentially
significant performance issues.
3.1 Race to the Bottom
Researchers have proposed a number of runtime integrity measurement
modules. In the years 2000 and 2001, two kernel module-based rootkit de-
tectors called rkscan [4] and St. Michael were released [101]. Kernel-based
approaches benefit from native visibility into the kernel. However, there is
no protection from potentially malicious code operating in the kernel. If the
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kernel were to be compromised, a kernel-based security checker is also clearly
at risk due to running in the same context.
A more privileged layer became necessary in order to check the kernel
without being put at risk from other code running at that privilege level.
Hypervisors [102, 5, 73] and hardware [100, 65] provided a means to get
deeper observation capabilities. System firmware approaches leveraged the
powerful, widely available, but lesser-known System Management Mode
on x86 CPUs [7, 113, 119]. The choice of placement of the runtime monitor
presented a number of trade-offs, namely the degree of protection of the run-
time monitor itself, degree of visibility into host state, performance impacts,
extra cost required for additional hardware, and ease of monitor updates. At-
tackers are motivated to entrench their mechanisms deeper into the platform,
for example, into the hypervisor itself [31]. This correspondingly drives the
need for security checkers to obtain visibility from an even more privileged
location.
3.2 Software-based Approaches
One current example of a software module that performs runtime integrity
for the Windows operating system is Microsoft PatchGuard. This mechanism
was introduced in Windows Vista [77] and monitors operating system mod-
ules, the System Services Dispatch Table (SSDT), the Global Descriptor Table
(GDT), and the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT). However, as a pure software
mechanism, it is hampered by operating at the same privilege level as the code
that it is trying to monitor. This requires PatchGuard to modify the operating
system to protect itself against various attacks. One example is the setting
up of a new IDT to avoid a debug exception-based attack. PatchGuard also
employs a variety of advanced coding techniques such as "self-modified code,
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code obfuscation, self-integrity checking, and randomization" [82]. These
types of operating system modifications and advanced coding techniques
add complexity to host software and also work against the efforts of lower-
level runtime integrity checkers designed to identify unexpected changes in
the IDT. Providing a runtime integrity measurement solution that operates
outside of the operating system avoids the additional complexity of advanced
coding techniques and modifying the very resources the runtime integrity
monitor is designed to watch.
3.3 Hardware-based Approaches
Hardware devices generally improve the isolation of the measurement mech-
anism from the monitored code making them harder for an attacker to tamper
with. Additionally, they can offload security measurements from the host
CPU which could be a way to improve performance. The main challenges
with discrete hardware devices are that they do not have access to important
CPU registers that control the platform. Some discrete hardware devices may
also have their memory accesses to host memory blocked by an IOMMU
mechanism such as Intel VT-D. Besides these drawbacks, there is a financial
cost for another hardware component as well as a lack of generality since the
mechanism only works when the specialized hardware are present.
3.3.1 Discrete Devices
Researchers have proposed RIMMs rooted in devices on the PCI bus [90],
memory modules (MGUARD) [65], SOC [81], and the chipset [13]. The PCI
device approach, Copilot, utilized a PCI card with DMA (Direct Memory Ac-
cess) access to inspect the host’s memory in order to locate rootkits. While this
approach offloaded the inspection from the host CPU, it was unable to access
CPU register state causing its visibility to be limited. Today, IOMMUs (such
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as Intel’s VT-D) are prevalent on modern x86 CPUs which can shield host
memory from PCI devices (including Copilot) which renders this approach
less useful. Copilot also relies upon a System.map file built when the kernel
was originally compiled to locate kernel functions in memory.
MGUARD has the unique capability to detect SMM rootkits due to its
integration into the memory module itself. MGUARD receives direction on
what memory pages to monitor via a serial link. This allows customization for
different operating systems. MGUARD monitors activity on the memory mod-
ule itself to determine whether accesses fall into regions that it was directed
to monitor. Upon identifying accesses in the monitored area, MGUARD saves
copies of these pages to a private DRAM for later analysis. Key benefits of this
approach are the strong isolation from host software, continuous monitoring
(as opposed to snapshot-based approaches common among SMM-RIMMs),
and negligible performance overheads. The drawbacks include a lack of visi-
bility into CPU registers which hampers visibility into the current state of the
system. Additionally, new memory module hardware would be required for
each system to use this mechanism increasing the financial cost significantly.
The SOC approach, Vigilare, works by snooping memory bus traffic on the
system. One clear benefit from this approach is its ability to catch transient
attacks which compromise the system, but then hide traces of their presence
in order to avoid detection. However, as Vigilare lacks access to the CPU
registers, it is vulnerable to relocation attacks in which inspected code is
moved to a new location out of the view of the measurement agent. Without
CPU register access, Vigilare must also rely upon the System.map file that
is generated upon compilation of the Linux kernel to locate the address in
memory of the items that it should measure. Additionally, the performance
of the SOC may not be sufficient to keep up with high bandwidth memory
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busses.
DeepWatch can detect and remediate low-level virtualization-based rootk-
its by using chipset hardware out of band of the host CPU, for example, Intel
Active Management Technology (AMT). DeepWatch uniquely enables the
removal of rootkits while other approaches focus on detection. This approach
utilizes DMA to access system memory from an embedded CPU in the chipset.
The benefits include offloading inspections from the host CPU which would
reduce performance overheads, can scan host memory and the SSD while the
system is in a sleep state, and can identify SMM rootkits. A key drawback is
the necessity for chipset-specific implementations due to different hardware.
Nighthawk [120] is an updated approach that uses DMA from the Intel Man-
ageability Engine (ME) to detect rootkits in the operating system, hypervisor,
or in SMRAM. However, the ME lacks SMM’s ability to have direct access to
the CPU register state.
A recent study shows that these discrete hardware devices are vulnerable
to the Address Translation Redirection Attack (ATRA) [50]. Note: Nighthawk
has special handling for this attack by leveraging SMM’s ability to observe the
page table address. In one implementation of this attack, an attacker makes a
copy of page table data structures and configures the system to refer to this
non-legitimate version. External hardware-based monitors that lack access to
the CPU registers are typically unable to detect that this switch has happened
and continue to monitor the old location. However, at this point, the attacker
is in control of the host software memory and the runtime integrity code is
unable to detect the attack. This approach to runtime integrity measurement
would need to improve its resilience to the ATRA attack in order to remain a
viable approach.
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3.3.2 CPU Virtualization
Hardware-based CPU virtualization can also aid rootkit detection. Given
the wide availability of this CPU feature, there is no additional hardware
to purchase in contrast to the dedicated hardware approaches. However,
the performance cost of virtualizing the host software becomes a key factor.
One prominent example is McAfee Deep Defender which was introduced in
2011 [62]. Deep Defender utilizes a security hypervisor to monitor several
key Windows resources in a virtualized Windows guest. These resources
include the IDT, SSDT, DKOM list, kernel code sections, certain device drivers,
among others. When a change is attempted in one of the guest’s monitored
resources, the CPU’s hardware virtualization triggers a transfer of control
("VMEXIT") from the virtualized Windows guest environment to the security
hypervisor for remediation. This approach benefits from strong isolation
between the monitored environment and the security hypervisor and can
also provide quick detection of improper accesses as they occur. However,
DeepWatch requires placing a security monitoring hypervisor below the
user’s operating system which comes at a significant performance cost over a
variety of operations beyond the security inspection required [74]. It would
also require nested virtualization to secure a hypervisor which can incur a
heavy performance impact.
Hypervisors have also been used to build more secure operating envi-
ronments as opposed to being used for rootkit detection as in the case of
Deep Defender. Security Visor [102] places a small hypervisor below the
operating system to prevent unauthorized kernel code from executing. A key
mechanism of Security Visor is its virtualization of the operating system’s
memory in order to intercept potentially malicious changes. The mechanism
is rooted in the hypervisor as this has isolation from the kernel and would
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not be compromised even upon a successful kernel attack. This mechanism
is best suited for operating systems as placing a hypervisor under another
hypervisor can introduce an additional performance impact onto the system.
The performance overheads of Security Visor can be significant. Linux kernel
builds and unzipping the kernel source took 219% and 140% longer, respec-
tively, than when performed on a native Linux installation. The PostMark
mail server benchmark showed an 86% performance decrease compared to
native Linux. The authors note that application performance will be impacted
based on the frequency of kernel calls and the amount of change in the appli-
cation’s working set. These overheads are driven by overheads in shadowing
the CPU’s GDT, LDT, and IDT registers along with the shadow page table.
Advances in virtualization performance such as Enhanced Page Tables may
have beneficial impacts on these overheads.
3.3.3 CPU Performance Counters
One of the challenges of identifying rootkits and other malware is that their
authors can easily create a large number of variants that accomplish the same
results but with variations in the implementation to avoid detection. Tradi-
tional software checkers that look for signatures to identify malicious code
can be fooled by code that is implemented slightly differently. For this reason,
researchers are investigating new methods that do not rely upon static soft-
ware signatures but incorporate behavioral aspects. One promising approach
that incorporates behavioral aspects is work done by Demme, Maycock et
al. which leverages CPU performance counters to detect anomalous rootkit
behavior [25]. CPU performance counters can record a variety of detailed
processor metrics including number of instructions retired per second and
a variety of cache statistics. These counters can be combined with machine
learning techniques to identify anomalous behavior as running an application
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that is infected can have a different performance counter profile than running
the application without malicious code added in. The results show some
promise in detecting malicious threads of execution based on this approach.
An important challenge with this approach is that some infected applica-
tions can differ only slightly from the uninfected application which raises the
possibilities of false positives.
3.3.4 TPM
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is an international standards group
that develops specifications for technologies that "enable a safer computing
environment across platforms and geographies [107]." One technology the
TCG has developed is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) which is a small
hardware device that can perform hashing, encryption, and store secrets away
from malicious code running on the host CPU. In 2004, Sailer, Zhang, et al,
proposed a TPM-based mechanism that dynamically measured executable
content such as applications, the kernel, and kernel modules on a running
Linux system before they were invoked or used [100]. This allowed detection
of unauthorized changes done by operating system rootkits. The mechanism
supported three methods for invoking measurements: the file_mmap Linux
Security Module hook to trigger a SHA1 measurement of the file, the addition
of a measure function call in the kernel code path that relocates kernel modules
in memory, and an addition to the /etc/security/measure interface to trigger
a measurement on a given file descriptor.
As many files can be in use on a system at a given time, the mechanism
reduced some of the overheads by avoiding the need to use the TPM on
each file measurement, using a kernel cache of known measurements. The
mechanism only extended the measurement to the TPM if it was not in the
kernel cache (e.g. it had not been measured before.) A TPM extend operation
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writes a hash to a special register (PCR/Platform Control Register) on the
TPM device. Each hash is the result of a hash of a new value and the existing
PCR value. The heaviest latencies in this approach result from the use of
the TPM which is a relatively slow device. While a SHA1 hash could be
accomplished in 4.21µs, the TPM extend operation increased latencies to
5430µs. The authors note, however, that TPM extend operations are relatively
rare due to their optimizations so the ultimate performance impact from the
TPM operations in this approach should be minimal.
3.3.5 Late Launch
Both Intel and AMD have developed security mechanisms in their CPUs that
build upon the TPM, namely Intel TXT (Trusted Execution Technology) and
AMD SVM (Secure Virtual Machine). A key feature of Intel TXT is that it
can perform a measured launch of the operating system or hypervisor. This
capability allows inspections of the boot loader as well as key system files
and drivers before launching the operating system or hypervisor. If these files
have changed, one of the options available to set in the launch policy is to reset
the system, preventing further progress into a compromised environment.
This provides protection at boot time; however, it is still possible for the
system to become compromised after the system has been running for an
extended period of time.
In 2008, McCune, Perrig et al. proposed Flicker which represented a novel
usage of SVM and the TPM to execute a variety of applications in a context
that was isolated from the host CPU. One supported application was a rootkit
detector [75]. A primary benefit of CPU-based security mechanisms such as
TXT and SVM is that they support a functionality called "Late Launch". This
allows a secure launch at any time of a Virtual Machine Monitor or "Security
Kernel at an arbitrary time with built-in protection against software-based
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attacks." Thus upon the CPU issuing the instruction to launch the secure
environment, DMA is disabled to the memory pages to be used by the secure
environment, interrupts are disabled, and debugging access is disabled as
well. In order to demonstrate that the secure environment was properly
invoked, a measurement (hash) of the launched secure code is stored in a
TPM register (PCR). With this mechanism, Flicker facilitates a secure launch
of application code and can demonstrate that the code that was launched
was the code that the administrator expected to run. Flicker’s design limits
the securely-launched code to ring 3 (user-mode) applications to prevent
them from modifying the underlying operating system. While this provides
protection against an errant or malicious application, it also reduces the
visibility of a rootkit detector application running on Flicker.
The assurances that Flicker provides over the securely launched code do
come at fairly high system impacts. The cost of the rootkit detector’s hash of
the OS kernel (22 ms) is dwarfed by the time required by the TPM to securely
write the measurement ("quote") of the executed code and its arguments. The
latter took between 331 and 972 ms depending on the TPM manufacturer.
Beyond these impacts, Flicker also runs with the operating system "suspended
and interrupts disabled" [75]. For this reason, the authors note that the user
"will perceive a hang on the machine. Keyboard and mouse input during
the Flicker session may be lost. . . The most significant risk to a system during
a Flicker session is lost data in a transfer involving a block device, such as
a hard-drive, CD-ROM drive, or USB flash drive" [75]. While Flicker does
provide strong isolation from rootkits, there are several significant drawbacks:
large performance impacts and an unsupported ability to run rootkit detectors
at privilege levels greater than the operating system.
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3.3.6 ARM TrustZone
The ARM processor commonly used in cell phones and tablets does not
feature SMM, however, its TrustZone architecture has some similarities to
SMM. TrustZone is a set of extensions to the ARM CPU that provide for
a normal world and a secure world. Code running in the normal world is
unable to access resources that are limited to code running in the secure world.
The mechanism to transitioning between the normal and secure world is the
Secure Mode Call instruction. Similar to SMM, the secure world has full access
to host memory (normal world memory). The challenges of the TrustZone
mechanism are that compromises in the normal world may be undetected if
the secure world does not intercept malicious changes in system state. For
example, the secure world is unable to intercept page fault exceptions and
certain control instructions [8].
One enhancement to TrustZone is the TrustZone-based Real-time Kernel
Protection (TZ-RKP) mechanism. TZ-RKP routes certain security-sensitive
functions through the secure world for "inspection and approval before being
executed" [8]. This has similarities and differences to common SMM usage.
SMM can perform platform management tasks on behalf of less privileged
operating system code, however, it is not tightly integrated into the operat-
ing system in the manner done by TZ-RKP. TZ-RKP inserts hooks into the
operating system to call into the secure world to perform sensitive security op-
erations (e.g. specifying location of memory translation tables and exception
handlers) on behalf of the operating system in a more trust-worthy environ-
ment. TZ-RKP is presently deployed on Samsung Galaxy smartphones and
tablets, including the Samsung Galaxy Note 3 and S5 phones.
A class of attacks that TZ-RKP can not detect are those in which the
attacker tricks the kernel into modifying important data fields in its own
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memory. These attacks could compromise control flow integrity in which the
intended sequencing of kernel operations is changed. However, this would
not result in compromise of the secure world as this remains in a separate
non-compromised context and also state changes that require a call into the
secure world still would not be possible. TZ-RKP assumes that the kernel
can support a design in which pages are mapped exclusively as executable
pages or write pages. From the performance perspective, TZ-RKP incurs
overheads from 0.19% to 7.65% on a set of benchmarks surveyed by the
designers. These degradations are influenced by frequent transitions to and
from the secure world at the cost of 2,000 cycles for each transition. While
2,000 cycles on a 2.3 GHz CPU is not that large, there is additional work to be
performed in the secure mode which would add to this cost, and with frequent
occurrences, this has the potential to impose a noticeable performance impact.
The designers "recommend that TZ-RKP’s performance overhead should be
carefully examined before it is implemented in a production environment" [8].
3.3.7 SMM-RIMMs
Firmware-based mechanisms leverage a special execution mode on the x86
CPU called System Management Mode. This mode provides "an alternate
operating environment that can be used to monitor and manage various
system resources for more efficient energy usage, to control system hardware,
and/or to run proprietary code" [45]. AMD x86 CPUs also feature SMM [2]
and Intel’s Itanium CPU features a PMI that is similar in concept to an SMI [46].
SMM is designed such that neither privileged software nor applications can
inspect its memory (SMRAM) or directly detect time spent in this mode. SMIs
can occur for a variety of reasons including: reporting of hardware errors,
thermal throttling, power capping, and system health checks [70]. SMIs can be
synchronous via a CPU instruction or asynchronous from the chipset [26]. The
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potential exists for an SMI to preempt time-sensitive code (e.g. code holding
a global lock on one node in a cluster), resulting in delays well beyond what
the software developer may have expected. The x86 architecture features a
variety of different types of exceptions and interrupts. SMIs are unique in that
they are a higher priority interrupt than Non-Maskable Interrupts (NMIs) and
device interrupts. SMM has the benefit that other interrupts will not preempt
it, but has the side effect that other device interrupts will only be handled
after it has finished its work [7]. As SMM is broadly available on x86 CPUs,
there is not additional hardware to be deployed to take advantage of it and
developers can leverage it for new uses by modifying the BIOS.
From the perspective of RIMMs, SMM has several useful properties. SMM
has the ability to preempt running host-side code and any malware in that
region. Thus, even if host software is fully under the control of malware, one
SMI can cause all of the CPUs to exit SMM into an alternate context. Thus, any
malicious processing on any CPU thread is preempted for the duration that
the CPU threads are in SMM. Once there, SMM has the necessary privilege
to inspect and even modify host software, thus SMM has a high degree of
privilege. SMM has broad visibility as once an SMI occurs, each interrupted
CPU thread’s context is saved in SMRAM where SMM can inspect it. In
this way, it has straight-forward access to a very useful set of CPU registers
that control host software execution including the CR3 register that controls
paging, the IDTR that controls interrupt-handling, and the GDT that controls
memory segmentation. SMM-RIMMs also benefit from strong isolation from
host software. Even if an operating system or hypervisor is under full control
of the adversary, SMM is still intact. Transitions into SMM are quicker than
performing a TXT launch which can allow for more frequent transitions than
could be accomplished with TXT-based mechanisms.
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Several examples of SMM-RIMMs are HyperSentry [7], HyperCheck [113],
and SPECTRE [119]. HyperSentry’s developers created a mechanism to allow
for "stealthy in-context integrity measurement of a running hypervisor (or any
other highest privileged software)" [7]. HyperSentry relies upon a modified
SMI handler that works in conjunction with a measurement agent that runs
in the hypervisor. Each integrity measurement is triggered by an SMI that is
generated by a server management device (BMC). Upon receiving an SMI,
the CPU threads enter the SMI handler and the source of the SMIs determines
whether processing will be handled by the HyperSentry SMI code or the
standard SMI code. When the HyperSentry SMI code receives control, it
measures the content of the measurement agent to ensure that it has not been
compromised. Assuming the measurement agent is unmodified, HyperSentry
sends one CPU thread to the measurement agent to perform the hypervisor
measurement. While this measurement is in progress, the other CPU threads
wait.
By leveraging a hypervisor-based measurement agent, HyperSentry avoids
the semantic gap that results from trying to look in to the operating system
or hypervisor from outside of that context. While SMM has the privileges to
perform this examination, it does not have the knowledge to comprehend
most of the data structures in use by the host software. This presents a
quandary as RIMMs benefit from strong isolation from host software, yet, also
need the ability to comprehend their key data structures. While developers
could choose to make SMM aware of the set of data structures in use, this
dramatically increases the amount of code that must be brought into the SMM-
RIMM and would also necessitate updates when host-side data structures
were revised. At the same time, simply placing a measurement agent in host
software without a mechanism to check its integrity before usage, puts the
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RIMM mechanism at risk although it solves the immediate problem of the
semantic gap. For this reason, HyperSentry provides a very useful example
of a solution that achieves the benefits of SMM protections and also bridges
the semantic gap between SMM and host software.
HyperCheck is another SMM-RIMM that "aims to detect the in-memory,
Ring-0 level (hypervisor or general OS) rootkits and rootkits in privileged
domains of hypervisors" [7]. Unlike HyperSentry, HyperCheck places its
measurement agent entirely in SMM and also relies upon a PCI-based network
device. The SMM code performs measurements on CPU registers and the
network card gathers the contents of memory for analysis. Like HyperSentry,
HyperCheck is invoked with an SMI that gives control to the SMM-RIMM
and begins the measurement process. Because HyperCheck does not have
a measurement agent in the hypervisor, it relies upon statically compiled
locations of code in the hypervisor symbol table for IDT table, hypercall table,
and exception table locations. This makes it less dynamic but avoids the
need to measure a hypervisor agent, instead relying upon SMM memory
protections.
SPECTRE is a SMM-RIMM that examines hypervisors, operating systems,
and user processes for certain attacks such as heap spray, heap overflow, and
rootkit detection. One key feature of SPECTRE is that is resides solely in
SMM and bridges the semantic gap by rebuilding the necessary semantic
information for the operating system. For example, in order to comprehend
the Kernel Processor Control Region (KPCR) in Windows, it relies upon the
data to be present at a hard-coded virtual address (0xffddff000). The SMM
code can use the CR3 register to walk the page tables to determine where
in physical memory the hard-coded virtual address resides. Once the KPCR
is located, the SMM code relies upon a pointer at offset 0x34 that points to
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the KdVersionBlock. The code then checks offset 0x78 of this data structure
to get to the start of linked lists of pointers to executive process structures.
While this does avoid the need for an in-context measurement agent, it does
present challenges of closely relying upon the current definitions of data
structures. Future software changes could make changes that would break
the assumptions built into this SMM-RIMM.
STM/PE [83] is a new approach that utilizes Intel’s SMI Transfer Monitor
(STM) to virtualize a measurement agent running in SMM. The STM is an
SMM-based hypervisor that runs the SMI handler in a virtual machine with
the goal of constraining its platform accesses to what is allowed by adminis-
trator policy [48]. STM/PE uses the Xen Hypervisor Integrity Monitor (XHIM)
for its integrity measurements. This module is based off of the Linux Kernel
Integrity Monitor (LKIM) [88]. As STM/PE utilizes the STM, it is also able
to resolve SMM-RIMM Challenge 1 (C1-SMM-RIMM Privilege) similar to
Vibhute’s independent work [110] although with a different implementation.
3.4 Timeline of Approaches
Researchers have developed a variety of RIMMs using different software and
hardware devices over the years. While the implementations are varied, there
is a clear trend to leveraging hardware instead of earlier approaches that were
purely software-based. Additionally, alternate approaches that endeavor to
improve the security of operating systems and hypervisors represent alter-
nate approaches to improving system security. Figure 3.1 depicts selected
RIMMs and system security developments over time. One of the earliest
hardware-based RIMMs, CoPilot helped begin the transition from pure soft-
ware approaches to leveraging hardware for runtime integrity. This trend has
continued with the chipset, TXT, SMM, CPU virtualization, memory modules,
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System on a Chip, and TrustZone approaches. Table 3.1 compares selected
approaches based on where they place their measurement agent, whether they
have direct registers and memory access, their primary source of performance
overhead and whether they occur periodically or are event-driven.
FIGURE 3.1: Timeline of RIMM Approaches from 2001-2019
TABLE 3.1: Comparison of Selected Runtime Integrity Monitor
Approaches
Mechanism Location RegisterAccess
Memory
Access
Performance
Overhead
Periodic or
Event-Driven
PatchGuard OS Code Y Y OS Checking Periodic
CoPilot HW Device N Partial Memory/PCI Periodic
HyperSentry SMMVMM Y Y
SMM
transition Periodic
HyperCheck SMM Y Partial SMMtransition Periodic
Deep Defender VMM + OS Y Y VMMtransition Event-Driven
Flicker TPM N Y TPM Periodic
STM/PE STM Guest Y Y SMMtransition
Periodic
On-demand
3.5 Application Noise
The impact of SMIs relates to previous workload perturbation studies that ex-
amined the effect of noise from software heartbeats and system daemons [89],
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hardware interrupts [10], and network interrupts [108]. This is relevant to
our study since SMIs are the highest priority interrupt and take precedence
over other interrupt sources. This is an extension to the form of noise called
a detour that Beckman et al. describe that occurs when "an application is
temporarily suspended to process an OS-interrupt" [10]. In the case of SMIs,
however, the entire operating system or hypervisor and any running applica-
tions are temporarily suspended during SMI processing.
Ferreira et al. [30] found that noise’s effect on an application may be
reduced by absorption; but, the impact of noise can be amplified when it
occurs at a performance-sensitive time. While noise can be a significant factor,
its effect on the application may be reduced by absorption in which the full
impact of noise is not reflected in the workload as it is hidden by other factors.
An example of this is when MPI processes are in MPI_WAIT state, the full
impact of noise is reduced since the processes are in a waiting state. The
impact of noise can be amplified when it occurs at a performance-sensitive
time such as MPI_Allreduce, MPI_Bcast, and MPI_Barrier [89]. These factors
are relevant to SMIs as they could occur at performance-sensitive times which
would amplify their effect or at times when their impact would not be noticed,
e.g. while the application is blocked while waiting for the disk controller to
fetch data.
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4
Creation of Methodology for SMI Performance Measurement
At the outset of this work, there were no available SMM-RIMM implementa-
tions. This resulted in challenges in building a performance-efficient RIMM
leveraging SMIs. SMIs are unlike other types of interrupts as they occur
transparently to the operating system. This results in the operating system
scheduler not being aware of their occurrence and analyzing their impacts is
not trivial.
To better understand design trade-offs and design a performance-efficient
SMM-RIMM, we needed a methodology to characterize the system impacts
due to varying frequencies and durations of SMIs. The methodology would
need to evaluate scenarios that represented the current state of the art with
SMIs of 25-40ms duration similar to HyperCheck and HyperSentry along with
shorter durations that corresponded to a time-sliced integrity measurement
method. The methodology builds upon the observation that the time spent in
SMM would be equivalent to the impact of an SMM-RIMM as both take time
away from the running system. We needed a way to address potential chal-
lenges to this assumption, for example, CPU cache perturbation introduced
by activities in SMM.
In Section 4.1, we describe the SMM-RIMM performance methodology
requirements. As no existing performance methodology existed, we needed
to define one. In Section 4.2, we describe related work on SMI detection which
was the only related work pertaining to the performance methodology. In
Section 4.3, we present an overview of the development of these methods.
Section 4.4 describes our chipset-based method of generating a predictable
SMI load. Section 4.5 describes our method of leveraging the existing SMIs
on a platform to accomplish deterministic SMI loads. Section 4.6 presents
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our modified BIOS methodology in which we added a mechanism to delay
all CPUs inside SMM for a user-specified duration. Section 4.7 describes
our use of EPA-RIMM as a method of providing insights into SMM-RIMM
scheduling and system impacts. Section 4.8 summarizes our analysis of
these different methods. Section 4.9 demonstrates how we validate that
the generated SMIs take the expected amount of CPU cycles by analyzing
impacts on predictable workloads. Section 4.10 shows how we generate the
SMIs used by our various methods. In Section 4.11, we present our CPU
cache and prefetching studies that give additional insights into the degree
of determinism in measurement costs. Section 4.12 provides our conclusions
over our performance measurement methodology and its implications for
EPA-RIMM.
4.1 SMM-RIMM Performance Methodology Requirements
As the performance aspects of SMM-RIMMs have not yet been given a de-
tailed study, a methodology to understand their performance impacts had
not yet been created. This methodology would allow understanding the
performance impact on applications running while inspections are occurring.
It would also allow characterization of the operating system impacts resulting
from the inspections. These understandings would help guide the creation of
an SMM-RIMM without significant impacts on system performance, correct-
ness, or stability.
In creating the SMM-RIMM performance methodology, we identified
three key requirements. The first requirement, Rquantify, is the ability to
quantify time spent in SMM (Section 4.1.1). If the amount of time spent in
SMM cannot be measured, it is not possible to create a performance efficient
SMM-RIMM. The second requirement, Rcontrol, is that the methodology
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needs to be able to control the amount of time spent in SMM. If the time
spent in SMM is uncontrollable, there is no ability to bound execution times
(Section 4.1.2). The third requirement, Rvalidate, is that the performance
methodology must be able to validate that the time spent in SMM matches
expectations (Section 4.1.3). This provides assurance that SMI times are
repeatable and deterministic.
4.1.1 Ability to quantify time spent in SMM - Rquantify
Time spent in SMM has a different property than in the operating system
environment. In the latter, the operating system scheduler is able to schedule
CPU threads for specific durations and preempt them to allow another process
to run. With SMIs, the operating system is unaware that SMIs are occurring
and not able to preempt their execution. It also does not feature a mechanism
to quantify the time spent in SMM. In this section, we describe our method to
quantify the time spent in SMM.
Step 1: Calculate CPU cycles spent in SMM. To allow quantification of time
spent in SMM, we placed a starting CPU timestamp using the RDTSC
(Read Timestamp Counter) just before the SMI was generated with
an OUTB instruction. After the timestamp, the OUTB instruction is
executed and the CPU threads will transition to SMM ("Transition to
SMM"). While there, the work of the SMI is accomplished ("Process
SMI") and the CPUs will return back to the operating system or VMM
context ("Transition to OS/VMM"). When the CPUs return from
the SMI, they OUTB instruction is complete and they will log the
ending timestamp. Figure 4.1 depicts the flow. Next, we subtract the
beginning timestamp value (StartClock) from the ending timestamp
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value (EndClock) to obtain SmiDelta (the total number of CPU cycles
spent in the SMI flow.) Equation 4.1 shows this calculation.
SmiDelta = EndClock− StartClock (4.1)
FIGURE 4.1: Timestamp method
Step 2: Convert CPU cycles to a time measurement. Counting time on mod-
ern CPUs has become more complicated with CPU frequency scaling
features that vary the clock speed of the CPU to save power in times
of reduced load. However, Intel has added a constant TSC feature [45]
which keeps the rate at which the timestamp counter increments
constant independent of the CPU clock frequency.
To calculate the SMI duration in µs (SmiMicroseconds), we take SmiDelta
and divide by the CPU clock frequency (ClockFreq). We then multi-
ply this by the number of µs in a second (NumUsecsInSec) which is
1,000,000. Equation 4.2 shows this calculation.
SmiMicroseconds = (SmiDelta/ClockFreq) ∗ NumUsecsInSec (4.2)
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Step 3: Calculate SMIs per second. Beyond the time spent in a single SMI,
the other key aspect that impacts performance is the number of SMIs
per second. The total number of SMIs (TotalSmis) over a time interval
(SmisPerSec) can be calculated by a script taking a starting reading
of MSR_SMI_COUNT (SmiCountStart), sleeping for the desired du-
ration, e.g. 300 seconds, TimeDelta), taking an ending reading of
MSR_SMI_COUNT (SmiCountEnd), and subtracting SmiCountStart
from SmiCountEnd, then dividing by TimeDelta. Equations 4.3 and 4.5
shows this calculation.
TotalSmis = (SmiCountEnd− SmiCountStart) (4.3)
SmisPerSec = (TotalSmis)/TimeDelta (4.4)
SmisPerSec = (TotalSmis)/Time (4.5)
Once we have determined the number of SMIs per second and the
cost per SMI, we can calculate the total number of microseconds spent
in SMM in a given second. Equation 4.6 shows this calculation.
SmiCyclesPerSec = SmiMicroseconds ∗ SmisPerSec (4.6)
We can also calculate the percentage of CPU cycles spent in SMM
(PercentageSmiCycles) by taking the SmiCyclesPerSec and divide it by
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the number of CPU cycles per second (ClockFreq) as shown in Equa-
tion 4.7. This equation is useful for comparing the percentage of
workload degradation to the percentage of time spent in SMM.
PercentageSmiCycles = SmiCyclesPerSec/ClockFreq (4.7)
4.1.2 Ability to control time spent in SMM - Rcontrol
The performance methodology needs to address SMI duration and frequency
scenarios that allow: 1. Understanding the performance impacts of the cur-
rently proposed approaches such as HyperSentry and 2. Supporting scenarios
that would allow workload decomposition approaches to reduce the negative
impacts of prolonged time in SMM.
We describe these scheduling approaches:
1. Non-Decomposed scheduling (Long duration and Infrequent SMI schedul-
ing). This approach does not bound SMI processing times and can con-
sume times in the order of 35-40ms for HyperSentry and HyperCheck
2. Decomposed scheduling (Shorter duration and Frequent SMI). This is
our approach that decomposes large measurements into tasks that are
designed to allow meeting the SMI latency guidelines.
Beyond scheduling, there are impacts that impact how much time is spent
in SMM. These include factors such as CPU caching, CPU prefetchers, and
power-savings methods. CPU caching can impact SMM performance and thus
reduce or prolong time spent in SMM. CPU prefetchers can predictively fetch
data into SMM to reduce memory access times. Power savings mechanisms
can disable portions of the CPU to reduce power usage during idle times. As
it takes time to transition out of these lower power states, the time required to
enter SMM could be increased.
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4.1.3 Ability to validate SMI load - Rvalidate
As time spent in SMM is not directly observable by the operating system
and its tools, producing a methodology of properly accounting for the time
becomes necessary. Validating that the expected SMM duration and frequency
produced by the SMI scheduling approach accurately matches the expecta-
tions is required. Without a mechanism of validating these two factors, it is
not possible to determine the impacts on applications or operating system.
Additionally, one concern that we wanted to address with our methodology
was whether the SMI activities performed by the chosen SMI would perturb
the system beyond the amount of CPU cycles taken away.
4.2 Related Work
The two primary existing tools that can detect the time taken by a single SMI
(SmiDelta) and the number of SMIs over a time period (SmisPerSec) are Jon
Masters’ "simple SMI detector [71]" and "BIOSBITS [106]". The former work
detects loss of operating system control by hogging all of the CPU(s) for con-
figurable time intervals, looking to see if something stole time. . . ". BIOSBITS
has similar functionality and can "detect system management interrupts by
watching for large gaps in time between successive values of the time-stamp
counter." These approaches can be helpful to determine SMI costs but they
rely upon monopolizing the CPU in order to detect when control is lost, which
makes them unsuitable for performance measurement as this technique does
not allow also running an application benchmark. One additional capability
is an SMI counter on recent Intel CPUs called MSR_SMI_COUNT and it incre-
ments with every SMI that has occurred [45]. This counter can be sampled
over time to determine if SMIs are occurring and their frequency.
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For SMI generation, an SMI can typically be generated from a device
driver by writing a value to IO port 0xB2. However, this does not provide
a large amount of measurement flexibility as the SMI duration depends on
the BIOS codebase and system particulars. While the capability of generating
different SMIs existed via writes of different values to IO port 0XB2, it had
not been used for SMI generation to be equivalent to the durations of SMM
RIMMs.
4.3 Measurement Methodology Creation
At the outset of this work, we did not have any existing SMM-RIMMs to
examine. We did also not have access to BIOS code that would enable us to
build our own SMM-RIMM and measure its impacts on the system. For this
reason, we settled upon an approach that would inject SMIs that were already
enabled by the BIOS manufacturer but not turned on at runtime. Our steps
were as follows:
1. We examined the Intel chipset documentation [44] to identify potential
sources of SMIs that we could enable. We determined that there were a
number of SMIs that could be triggered by writing to different chipset
registers. This approach would allow us to generate a high rate of short
SMIs, which would accurately model a decomposed SMI scheduling
method. However, it did not allow us to inject SMIs that would be
equivalent to a Non-Decomposed scheduling method.
2. To address the limitation of the chipset SMI methodology, we inves-
tigated trying to trigger other SMIs that were enabled on the system
that were accessible via a device driver that would write a value to IO
Port 0xB2. Depending on the value written to the port, a different SMI
would fire. As each SMI had a pre-defined purpose, they each took a
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unique amount of time. At this stage, we were able to generate SMIs
of long durations and schedule them to repeat periodically, just as an
SMM-RIMM would do. However, we were concerned about side-effects
of running unknown SMIs. This uncertainty encouraged us to develop
our SMI validation approach to examine whether the SMI duration
directly correlated to its impact on predictable CPU-bound applications.
3. At this stage, we had a breakthrough as we got access and approval to
use a development system and add our own SMIs with specific dura-
tions. We implemented a busy-wait capability in SMM to consume the
desired amount of time. At this stage, we had a high degree of control
over SMI times and could generate them according to the frequencies we
needed. The only lacking element was that a busy-wait driver was not
performing the types of actions an SMM-RIMM would perform. A key
limitation of this approach was that the firmware was not open-source
and we could not share or publish detailed information about it.
4. In 2014, Intel released the Minnowboard single-board computer with
open-source UEFI firmware. This provided everything that we needed
to develop our own SMM-RIMM, measure its performance, and release
our prototype as open-source for the research community.
4.4 Technique 1: Chipset SMIs
Examining the various SMI generation sources in the chipset documenta-
tion, we identified two potential SMI generators: PERIODIC_SMI and the
SWSMI_TMR (Software SMI timer) and created a Linux device driver to en-
able these options. The periodic SMI hardware supported generation of one
SMI every [8, 16, 32, 64] seconds which we determined was too light an SMI
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load for our purposes given its infrequent triggering and short duration that
was within SMI latency guidelines. The SWSMI_TMR approach supported a
high frequency of SMIs per second. While these were shorter SMIs that were
within SMI latency guidelines, they well-represented a time-sliced approach
of SMM-RIMM scheduling.
TABLE 4.1: Chipset SMI Generation
Mechanism Chipset Register 1 Chipset Register 2 Measured Results
Periodic SMI SMI_EN,Periodic SMI Enable=1
GEN_PMCON_1
bits 1:0:
00 = 64 seconds
01 = 32 seconds
10 = 16 seconds
11 = 8 seconds
One SMI every
8,16,32,64
seconds
SW SMI Timer SMI_EN,SW SMI Timer Enable=1
GEN_PMCON_3
bits 7:6:
00 = 1.5ms ± 0.6ms
01 = 16 ms ± 4ms
10 = 32 ms ± 4ms
11 = 64 ms ± 4ms
One SMI every
2,16,32,62 ms
Table 4.1 provides additional detail on the chipset register bits set to enable
these SMIs. We selected the SWSMI_TMR feature and planned experiments
to characterize the amount of time spent in SMM at the varying frequen-
cies that the SWSMI_TMR mechanism supported (SmiCyclesPerSec). As the
mechanism has a little variability in the amount of SMIs generated (e.g. "1.5
ms ± 0.6 ms"), we first performed an experiment to determine the SMI rate
(SmisPerSec). We created a Linux shell script to count the number of SMIs
over a 300 second interval (SmisPerSec) with TimeDelta set to 300 seconds.
We set the SWSMI_TMR SMI generation frequency by adjusting bits 7:6 in
the GEN_PMCON_3 register, choosing the ‘00’ value that selected the "1.5
ms ± 0.6 ms" duration and then turned on SWSMI_TMR SMI generation
by setting bit 6 in SMI_EN. With SMI generation enabled, we ran our shell
script that took an initial sample of the MSR_SMI_COUNT (SmiCountStart)
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to determine the starting number of SMIs, slept for 300 seconds, and then
took an ending sample of MSR_SMI_COUNT (SmiCountEnd). We determined
that the mechanism was resulting in 500 SMIs/second (SmisPerSec= 500). We
repeated this process for the other three supported frequencies several times
to ensure that the achieved results were stable over time.
Now knowing the SMI frequency, we needed to determine the total
amount of CPU time taken away by the SMIs which would represent the time
spent in an SMM-RIMM (SmiCyclesPerSec). To determine this, we applied the
techniques of BIOSBITS [106] and the "Simple SMI Detector [71].” We added
functionality to our device driver to calculate this by doing the following
steps:
Step 1: Turn on the SWSMI_TMR with the chosen SMI generation frequency.
Step 2: Allow the user to write a value to our driver’s supported proc file
system interface to trigger the logic below in Step 3.
Step 3: Upon receiving the trigger, set the driver to busy wait in a tight
loop, storing CPU time-stamp counter results and the value of the
MSR_SMI_COUNT in a memory buffer.
Step 4: Allow the user to stop the busy waiting and print out the buffer’s
contents.
Step 5: Looks for large gaps between successive CPU time-stamp counter
results (e.g. > 100000 CPU cycles) that could represent SMIs and cross-
check with the MSR_SMI_COUNT value to verify that it showed the
counter increasing.
Step 6: Average the durations for each SMI and determine the number of
CPU cycles spent per SMI.
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With knowledge of the number of SMIs per second (SmisPerSec), the cost
per SMI (SmiMicroseconds), and the CPU frequency (ClockFreq), we had the
necessary information to calculate the percentage of CPU cycles spent in SMM
PercentageSmiCycles).
One benefit of the chipset approach is that SMI generation occurs com-
pletely out-of-band of the operating system which removes one source of
potential variability. Additionally, for an SMM-RIMM, hardware generation
of SMIs is preferable to software-based mechanisms as the latter have a de-
pendency on the (untrusted) operating system scheduler and kernel code.
The SWSMI_TMR approach is quite representative of the Decomposed SMI
scheduling approach in which longer-running operations are split into a
larger number of shorter-running tasks. The drawback with the SWSMI_TMR
approach was that it did not provide an ability to specify arbitrary SMI fre-
quencies (could not vary SmisPerSec) or generate longer SMIs than 0.11ms
(SmiMicroseconds) on our system. Also, the feature is not supported by all
motherboard BIOS implementations as it triggered a hang on some systems.
4.5 Technique 2: Blackbox SMI Generation
The primary drawback with the chipset-based SMI generation approach was
that it did not allow long SMIs (e.g. SmiMicroseconds ≥ 35-40 ms) that would
more closely match the system preemptions of HyperSentry and other SMM-
RIMMs. As we also needed to measure the impact of longer SMI preemptions,
we needed to complement the SWSMI_TMR technique with an approach that
would allow for longer time to be spent in SMM. As were still unable at this
time to modify the BIOS source, we began looking for ways to generate longer
SMIs.
Besides hardware SMI generation, there is another way to generate SMIs
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by writing values to a special IO Port called APM_CNT on Intel [45] and
"SMI Command Port” on AMD [2]. The port number is typically 0xB2. We
added functionality to our device driver to generate write arbitrary values
to the APM_CNT port and take a timestamp before the IO write instruction
(StartClock) and after it (EndClock) to determine the SMI duration, SmiDelta).
With this technique, we measured values from 0 to 0xFF. While some values
hung the system, other values reliably generated longer times in SMM ranging
from 1 to 1,061 ms on the Dell PowerEdge R410 server. The 35 ms duration,
in particular, was closely in the range of the durations that HyperCheck and
HyperSentry consumed. Figure 4.2 shows the Blackbox SMI results.
However, our key concern with this approach is that without knowing
more about what the SMI was actually doing, we could not rule out the possi-
bility of performance side effects. For example, if the SMI were to adjust the
CPU frequency, we would be introducing a side effect into our measurements.
For this reason, we utilized the technique discussed in Section 4.9 to provide
assurance that the Blackbox SMIs were not impacting performance in a way
beyond taking away the expected amount of time in SMM.
FIGURE 4.2: Long SMIs on Dell PowerEdge R410
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4.6 Technique 3: Modified BIOS
While techniques 1 and 2 allowed us to measure time-sliced and longer SMI
approaches, we still did not have precise control over our SMI durations.
Both approaches limited us to the existing SMI interfaces on the system.
For this reason, we obtained access to a development system in which we
could recompile the BIOS and add in our own SMI delays. This option is
generally not available to end-users on most systems. For the Modified BIOS
methodology, we modified our SMI handler to allow a user-configurable
amount of delay. In this approach we added twelve values that could be
written to the APM_CNT port to generate varying levels of SMI delays: (in
ms) 1.43, 5, 10, 20, 50, 99, 495, 990, 5k, 10k, 20k, 64k. When the SMI handler
received control, it would delay in a loop for the specified amount of CPU
cycles before returning control to the host software. In this way, all CPU
threads left the host software and stayed in SMM for the specified amount of
time.
The benefits of this approach were that it allowed us to precise calibrate
the amount of time to be spent in SMM in a way that was not possible with
the chipset and Black Box SMI scenarios. The primary drawback is that that
this approach simply busy-waited in SMM without performing any of the
actual SMM-RIMM operations. Additionally, at the time, this approach was
limited to those with ability to modify the BIOS source code which makes it
harder for the researchers without BIOS source to reproduce the results.
4.7 Technique 4: EPA-RIMM
With the release of the Minnowboard Max, a researcher with this platform
could replicate our Modified BIOS technique. To improve upon our Modified
BIOS technique, we created our own SMM-RIMM allowing precise controls
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over SMI durations, frequencies, and measurement operations. Unlike the
previous approaches which took time away in SMM to behave like an SMM-
RIMM, this approach actually performed actual SMM RIMM operations such
as hashing of host-side resources and accessing the saved register state from
the SMRAM Save State Map. With this approach, we enabled the SMI han-
dler to handle a new value written to the APM_CNT port that triggered a
measurement request. Along with this value, our device driver (Ring 0 Man-
ager) provided the address of a command structure that EPA-RIMM should
operate on. As we did with the black box and modified BIOS techniques,
we measured the amount of time required to process various measurement
operations trigger by SMIs. With the EPA-RIMM test system, we achieved
our strongest measurement technique as we were able to generate actual mea-
surement requests involving hashing and registers, along with characterizing
their behavior.
4.8 Technique Comparison
With four SMI generation techniques to draw upon, it is possible to test SMI
impacts on a variety of hardware. However, not every technique is testable
on every given platform. For example, the ability to recompile or modify the
BIOS is not possible on many production systems. Or a given system tested
with a Blackbox SMI technique may not have SMIs of the desired duration. In
Table 4.2, we summarize and compare the four techniques to show whether
they support time-sliced RIMM operation, longer SMIs, whether BIOS source
is required, compatibility issues, benefits, drawbacks, and when the technique
would be useful. Table 4.3 shows the systems we used for the development
of these techniques. Ultimately, for RIMM developers, EPA-RIMM surpasses
the capabilities of the other approaches as it performs actual SMM-RIMM
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operations with fine-grain controls. The SMI generation methodologies could
also be applied for other purposes including evaluating impacts of latency on
network devices. Figure 4.3 provides a flow chart that allows selecting the
appropriate SMI measurement technique.
TABLE 4.2: SMI Generation Technique Comparison
Technique Time-sliced?
SMIs
>1ms?
BIOS
Source
Req?
Benefits Drawbacks When to use
1. Chipset
SWSMI
_TMR
Y N N
Out of
band,
no BIOS
source,
time-sliced
Availability,
limited SMI
durations/
frequencies
Time-sliced
2. Blackbox
SMI Y Y N
Long
SMIs,
broadly
available
Could impact
performance,
limited SMI
durations
Long SMIs
w/o BIOS
source
3. Modified
BIOS Y Y Y
Arbitrary
duration
Requires
BIOS
source
When BIOS
source is
avail-able
4. EPA
RIMM Y Y Y
SMM-
RIMM
Requires
BIOS
source
When BIOS
source is
avail-able
FIGURE 4.3: SMI Measurement Technique Considerations
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TABLE 4.3: SMI Generation Techniques Testing
Technique Tested on Out of Band?
Chipset Intel DQ67SW Y
Blackbox SMI Intel DQ67SW/Dell PowerEdge R410 N
Modified BIOS Intel Nehalem Dev system N
EPA-RIMM Minnowboard Max Possible
FIGURE 4.4: Chipset SMI Evaluation
FIGURE 4.5: Blackbox SMI Evaluation
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4.9 Validating the SMI Load
For each approach, it was necessary to quantify the SMI impact. As described
in Sections 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, we were able to determine the duration of the
SMIs we generated. As we controlled the amount of SMIs generated per
second and knew the CPU frequency, we knew how many CPU cycles we
were consuming in SMM and the percentage of CPU cycles remaining to the
applications (100% - PercentageSmiCycles). At this point, we could perform
performance validation to ensure that our calculations were correct. For this
purpose, we selected two CPU-intensive microbenchmarks: OpenSSL [86]
and Distributed.net’s RC5-72 [95]. OpenSSL provides a built-in benchmark
utility to measure how many SHA hashing operations can be performed in
an interval of time. RC5-72 is a compute-intensive workload that brute-forces
cryptographic keys.
We established performance baselines by running the workloads without
our injected SMIs. We then injected our SMIs and measured the resulting
throughput. We compared the baseline throughput versus the throughput
with injected SMIs and determined how closely it matched (100% - Percent-
ageSmiCycles) impact. As we expected, for these heavy computational work-
loads, the time spent in SMM came directly out of the application’s throughput
as shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. The nature of these computational workloads
showed that they were unable to maintain their baseline throughput when
the CPU cycles they needed for computation were taken away. This presented
a useful property for validating the amount of time taken by our various SMI
generation techniques. Note that not all workloads have this property as
we show in Section 5.2.2 that some workloads are able to hide a portion of
the SMI overheads when SMIs occur during portions where the workload is
waiting.
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4.10 SMI Generation
To turn on or generate each of these SMIs, we needed to develop device
drivers for each tested operating system or hypervisor. The Blackbox SMI,
Modified BIOS SMIs, and EPA RIMM measurement requests used an OUT
CPU instruction executed from Ring 0. The chipset SWSMI_TMR methodol-
ogy also required Ring 0 privileges as we needed to adjust chipset registers.
We developed device drivers for: Xen 4.1.2, Linux (Ubuntu 12/Centos 6), and
Windows Server 2012, to trigger SMI delays. For Linux/Xen we used the ker-
nel work queues to schedule our software SMI once a second and also adjust
the necessary chipset bits for the SWSMI_TMR method. For Windows Server
2012, we used the kernel function IoStartTimer to schedule one SMI/second.
Our test setup additionally allows us to generate a single SMI on demand.
4.11 Task Provisioning
To meet EPA-RIMM’s bound on maximum time spent in a single SMI session,
accurate estimates over Task costs are essential. SMM’s lack of preemption
removes one source of non-determinism over Task cost. However, preemption
is not the only source of performance nondeterminism. To examine these two
impacts on Task cost estimates, we devised targeted experiments analyzing
the cache impacts. These experiments help establish an accurate upper bound
for Task cost.
The measurement setup used a Minnowboard Turbot with 1.46 GHz CPUs,
2 GB RAM, Ubuntu 14.04.5, Linux kernel 4.11.0.
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4.11.1 Cache and Prefetcher Impact Measurement Study
4.11.1.1 Measurement Design
We devised an experiment to examine Task cost variations due to CPU caching
mechanisms. The experiment consisted of three scenarios designed to gauge
the impact of CPU caching and prefetching performance optimizations.
For each scenario, we crafted a sequence of Bins containing fourteen 4K
hash input-sized Tasks. (Fourteen Tasks is the largest number of Tasks that
EPA-RIMM currently supports in a Bin.) We disabled CPU power-saving
mechanisms which would add another variable to this experiment.
Three measurement scenarios:
1. Identical virtual address: This scenario consists of repeated hash oper-
ations to the same virtual address. It is designed to evaluate the ideal
measurement case where the memory to be hashed is present in the
cache.
2. Sequential virtual address: This scenario consists of a sequence of in-
crementing virtual addresses to measure. It is designed to evaluate
whether the CPU prefetcher feature is able to result in increased hashing
performance due to speculatively reading in memory pages before they
are needed.
3. Random virtual address: This scenario consists of potentially a worst-
case measurement in which data is neither cached or potentially benefit-
ting from prefetching.
Table 4.4 provides the first Bin of the sequence. Subsequent Bins continue
the pattern.
Chapter 4. Creation of Methodology for SMI Performance Measurement 74
TABLE 4.4: Sample Bin
Task # Identical Sequential Random
1 ffffffff8100a000 ffffffff81000000 ffffffff81559000
2 ffffffff8100a000 ffffffff81001000 ffffffff8162f000
3 ffffffff8100a000 ffffffff81002000 ffffffff81531000
4 ffffffff8100a000 ffffffff81003000 ffffffff814d9000
5 ffffffff8100a000 ffffffff81004000 ffffffff814e6000
6 ffffffff8100a000 ffffffff81005000 ffffffff817a1000
7 ffffffff8100a000 ffffffff81006000 ffffffff813ba000
8 ffffffff8100a000 ffffffff81007000 ffffffff816eb000
9 ffffffff8100a000 ffffffff81008000 ffffffff81314000
10 ffffffff8100a000 ffffffff81009000 ffffffff81767000
11 ffffffff8100a000 ffffffff8100a000 ffffffff81295000
12 ffffffff8100a000 ffffffff8100b000 ffffffff81380000
13 ffffffff8100a000 ffffffff8100c000 ffffffff817b2000
14 ffffffff8100a000 ffffffff8100d000 ffffffff81763000
4.11.1.2 Identical Addresses
Examining the variation between 100 Bins in the identical memory address
hashing scenario shows that the hash costs appear quite regular with minimal
variation. Figure 4.6 shows the measurement results. Table 4.5 shows the
statistical summary. We observe that the average cost (0.1352ms) is quite close
to the minimum cost (0.1351ms) with only a standard deviation of 0.000098ms.
Figure 4.7 provides data showing the first eight Bins. The data shows
a pattern in which the first Task in the Bin experiences a higher cost than
subsequent Tasks in the Bin. This indicates that the first Task in the Bin
experiences a cache miss. Once the data is cached for the subsequent Tasks in
the Bin, they achieve lower measurement costs.
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TABLE 4.5: Identical Hash Scenario Cost Analysis
Identical
ms
Average 0.1352
Min 0.1351
Max 0.1360
Median 0.1352
StdDev 0.000098
FIGURE 4.6: Identical Address 100 Bins
FIGURE 4.7: Identical Address 8 Bins
4.11.1.3 Sequential Addresses
The sequential address scenario measurement results as shown in Figure 4.8
show that the scenario has costs that do not significantly vary from measure-
ment to measurement. However, examining a smaller section of data (first
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100 Bins) as shown in Figure 4.9 shows that the costs do not have the same
pattern as the identical measurement scenario. The first Task in the Bin is not
necessarily the most costly Task. Table 4.6 shows the statistical summary.
TABLE 4.6: Sequential Hash Scenario Cost Analysis
Sequential
ms
Average 0.1353
Min 0.1352
Max 0.1361
Median 0.1353
StdDev 0.000088
FIGURE 4.8: Sequential Address 100 Bins
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FIGURE 4.9: Sequential Address 8 Bins
4.11.1.4 Random Addresses
The random address scenario does not have obvious variation when viewing
100 Bins of data as shown in Figure 4.10. However, when examining a smaller
sub-section of the first eight Bins as shown in Figure 4.11, we observe that
the Task costs vary without a clear pattern. Thus, the caching effects do not
benefit these measurements and also the prefetcher is not able to measurably
improve the results. Table 4.7 shows the statistical summary.
FIGURE 4.10: Random Address 100 Bins
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FIGURE 4.11: Random Address 8 Bins
TABLE 4.7: Random Hash Scenario Cost Analysis
Random
ms
Average 0.1353
Min 0.1352
Max 0.1361
Median 0.1353
StdDev 0.000100
4.11.1.5 Analysis
Figure 4.12 shows the aggregate results of the Identical, Sequential, and
Random measurements. We observe that the identical measurements had the
lowest costs compared to the other scenarios. We also see that this scenario
has predictable cost spikes on the first Task of every Bin which indicates that
the address does not fall into the CPU cache. However, the identical scenario
is not a likely EPA-RIMM measurement scenario as EPA-RIMM would not be
frequently measuring a single address repeatedly. The Sequential scenario
does not benefit from CPU caching as the measured addresses vary. The
prefetcher does also not appear to help as the average, min, max, and median
times are equivalent to the random measurement cost, as shown in Table 4.8.
In a typical EPA-RIMM measurement scenario, the most likely scenarios
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are sequential or random, depending on the Backend Manager scheduling
logic. This study quantifies the expected performance of these two scheduling
approaches for memory measurements, showing that ultimately the amount
of deviation is not significant for EPA-RIMM performance.
FIGURE 4.12: Combined 4K Hash Input Size Data, 8 Bins
TABLE 4.8: Cost analysis
Identical Sequential Random
Average 0.1352 0.1353 0.1353
Min 0.1351 0.1352 0.1352
Max 0.1360 0.1361 0.1361
Median 0.1352 0.1353 0.1353
StdDev 0.000098 0.000088 0.000100
4.12 Conclusion
At the outset of this research, we identified a clear disconnect between the
prolonged duration of SMI-based measurements from proposed SMM-RIMMs
and the SMI latency guidelines. We believed that it may be possible to reduce
the amount of time spent in SMM by applying decomposition to SMM-RIMM
measurements to process them in fine-grained portions over a larger number
of measurements. These smaller measurements could be scheduled at an
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increased frequency. However, it was unclear what system impact that this
shorter but more frequent measurement approach would have.
Moreover, there were no established methodologies to compare this al-
ternate scheduling approach to the current state of the art. To resolve this
challenge, we developed methodologies for generating SMIs of varying dura-
tions and frequencies to analyze their resulting impact. Our methodology is
built upon three requirements: Rquantify, Rcontrol, and Rvalidate. Once able to
quantify the time spent in SMM, we demonstrated controlling the amount of
time spent in SMM (Rcontrol) by four SMI scheduling techniques. We then
validated the time spent in SMM (Rvalidate) by comparing the quantified time
in SMM against the expected degradation for two CPU-intensive workloads.
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SMI Preemption Performance Study
In this chapter, we characterize the impacts of SMIs on the system by using
our SMI measurement methodology. In our performance study, we varied
the durations and frequencies of SMIs to show the resulting impacts from
different SMI scheduling approaches. In Section 5.1, we examine the system
impacts of this time spent in SMM and we cover the resulting impacts on
applications in Section 5.2. We summarize the SMI latency study in Section 5.3.
5.1 System-level Effects
We begin in Section 5.1.1 by examining timing assumptions in the kernel and
device drivers. We show the symptoms of spending an excessive amount of
time in SMM in Section 5.1.2. We then examine the impacts of SMIs on timer
interrupts and the impact on CPU power C-states in Section 5.1.3. We cover
the impacts of SMIs on process accounting in Section 5.1.4. We summarize
the system-level effects in Section 5.1.5.
5.1.1 Timing Expectations in Code
The Linux kernel source code contains assumptions about SMI durations
in several places. For example, the function that calibrates the CPU’s TSC
during boot native_calibrate_tsc, uses the tsc_read_refs function which has
special handling of SMI disturbances. tsc_read_refs checks two close reads of
the CPU’s timestamp counter to ensure that they are less than the declared
SMI_THRESHOLD=50000 (CPU clocks) to avoid a scenario where an SMI
occurs between the two reads. If the system cannot obtain two close reads of
the TSC of a duration less than the SMI_THRESHOLD, it will try up to five
times before returning [55]. Prolonged or inopportune SMIs could result in a
situation where the TSC could not be used as the clocksource for timing due
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to an inability to properly calibrate it. Other clocksource calibration sections
of the Linux kernel feature similar concerns over the impact of an SMI hitting
during calibration including functions pit_calibrate_tsc and hpet_next_event.
USB audio relies upon careful synchronization to keep the audio playback
in sync. To better establish an upper bound for SMI durations, we developed a
measurement to study the impact of prolonged SMIs on a USB audio speaker
device. For this experiment, we used a pair of Logitech S-150 USB speakers
and a system running Centos 6.0 with a Linux 3.7.1 kernel. We booted into the
GUI and began playing a streaming audio file from YouTube. While playing
the audio file, we generated progressively longer SMIs using our modified
BIOS mechanism while checking the system log via the ‘dmesg’ command
after each SMI completed.
We observed a number of warnings with SMIs up to the 1000 ms (1 second)
range. At a SMI duration of 1000 ms, the audio completely stopped and the
driver reported an error in the system log. Table 5.1 shows these results. The
warnings we saw resulted from the snd_pcm_delay function which defines
the playback delay as "the overall latency from the write call to the final
DAC [94]." The code provides a warning when the delay estimate is off by
more than 2 ms. In this measurement, we find another example of software
with built-in timing assumptions that could be significantly altered by longer
SMM-RIMM measurements. We also note that the SMI durations described in
the HyperSentry and HyperCheck papers are in the range to cause warnings
from the ALSA sound sub-system.
5.1.2 Symptoms of Excessive Time Spent in SMM
During development of our SMM-RIMM development system, we encoun-
tered situations where we spent too long in a single SMI session. For example,
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TABLE 5.1: USB Audio Sensitivity to Prolonged SMI Delays
SMM time (ms) Warning
1.43 ALSA sound/usb/pcm.c:1213 delay:estimated 144, actual 0
5-999 ALSA sound/usb/pcm.c:1213 delay:estimated [336 to 384], actual 0
1000 ALSA sound/usb/endpoint.c:391cannot submit urb (err = -27)
with extensive serial output and a large hash operation, one of our preemp-
tions inadvertently lasted 247 seconds. The Linux operating system appeared
frozen during this duration, however, at the completion of the SMI, the sys-
tem continued operating, albeit with several warnings and errors. These
included: warnings from the Read Copy Update mechanism, warnings about
an unstable clocksource, a hardware interrupt timeout, and a disk I/O error.
Clearly this is far too long to spend in SMM, however, it is indicative of the
types of errors that can occur if excessive time is spent in a single SMI session.
It also demonstrates that even if a user is not using the system, exhaustive
checking within a single SMI can easily overwhelm timeout expectations in
the kernel and device drivers.
INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU {
INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU { 1}
0} (t=61790 jiffies g=545203 c=545202 q=0)
(t=61790 jiffies g=545203 c=545202 q=0)
. . .
Clocksource tsc unstable (delta = 243722605708 ns)
mmc2: Timeout waiting for hardware interrupt.
. . .
mmcblk0: timed out sending r/w cmd command, card status 0x900
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end\_request: I/O error, dev mmcblk0, sector 90111920
EXT4-fs warning (device mmcblk0p2): ext4_end_bio:317:
I/O error -5 writing to inode 3019625 (offset 0
size 0 starting block 11263991)
Buffer I/O error on device mmcblk0p2, logical block 11132662
Switched to clocksource acpi_pm
5.1.3 Timer Interrupt Effects
We originally began our investigation of the system effects of SMIs by focusing
on the Linux timer interrupt. Our rationale was that this interrupt effectively
drove a wide variety of system tasks ranging from process accounting to
setting timers. We were very interested to examine the effects of SMIs on this
critical kernel functionality as SMIs would take precedence over the timer
interrupts.
5.1.3.1 Timer Interrupt Background
Traditionally many important scheduling and statistical operations in the
Linux kernel happened on a regular timer tick interval, e.g. [100, 250, 300,
1000] times a second. For power savings reasons and reduced virtualization
overheads, the "tickless kernel" option has been added, allowing the kernel to
remain idle longer by avoiding unnecessary wake-ups. If the next scheduled
timer event would occur after the next periodic timer tick, the kernel would
reprogram "the per-CPU clock event device to this future event" allowing the
CPU to remain idle longer [34]. In both traditional and tickless operation,
our inspection of the Linux 3.1.4 kernel showed that once the kernel wakes,
it runs several key functions in do_timer which update the kernel’s internal
clock count (jiffy) and wall clock time, and calculate the load on the system.
(Refer to Figure 5.1.) Then it calls update_process_times which charges time
Chapter 5. SMI Preemption Performance Study 85
to executing processes, runs high resolution timers and raises SoftIRQs for
local timers, checks if the system is in a quiet state for RCU callbacks, does
printk statements, runs IRQ work, calls scheduler_tick and then runs timers
that are due [72]. The scheduler_tick function performs several important
tasks including updating scheduler timestamp data, updating timestamps for
processes on the run queue, updating CPU load statistics based on the run
queue, invoking the scheduler, updating performance events for the Linux
Performance Event subsystem, determining if a CPU is idle at the clock tick,
and load balancing tasks between CPU run queues. Intel technical documen-
tation notes "All interrupts normally handled by the operating system are
disabled upon entry into SMM [45]." This presents the possibility for an SMI
to perturb timer interrupts and consequently impact the important scheduling
operations in scheduler_tick as a side effect.
FIGURE 5.1: Timer Interrupt Code Flow
5.1.3.2 Kernel Instrumentation
To investigate the degree to which SMIs preempted timer interrupts, we
instrumented the Linux kernel do_timer and scheduler_tick functions. For
do_timer, we logged a trace point just after the timer interrupt occurs, record-
ing the total number of SMIs processed ("SMI count" obtained via a CPU MSR
read of MSR_SMI_COUNT) and the time of the entrance to the function from
RDTSC. For scheduler_tick, we logged the CPU number, the SMI count, and
Chapter 5. SMI Preemption Performance Study 86
the timestamp from RDTSC. We extracted our traces from the kernel with the
SystemTap utility [93]. In post-processing, we calculated the deltas between
successive handlings of the timer ticks. Our regular timer tick scenario has a
timer tick every millisecond. We generated SMIs using the chipset timer for
the short but frequent scenarios and the Blackbox SMI method for the hybrid
and long SMI scenarios. Our test system was an Intel DQ67SW board running
native Centos and the 3.1.4 Linux kernel. Because the timer interrupt takes
precedence over executing code, whether the CPU is idle or busy does not
impact the regularity of the regular timer ticks. For this reason, we depict only
the idle CPU data in this section. After establishing a baseline with no regular
SMIs, we measure the effect of short but frequent SMIs using the Chipset-
based SMI generation. Following this, we utilize a Blackbox SMI scenario of a
batch of eight 5ms SMIs, once a second to represent an SMM-RIMM that takes
40ms per second to do integrity measurements using a time-sliced approach.
5.1.3.3 Timer Interrupt Results: Non-virtualized Linux
To analyze the data, we narrow our focus to the deltas between successive in-
vocations of scheduler_tick to highlight SMI-caused delays. Numerous short
SMIs cause jitter in the timer interrupt handling. Since SMIs take precedence
over timer interrupts, the deltas between successive timer interrupts depart
from the expected 1ms. Deltas greater than 1ms occur due to an SMI firing
when a timer interrupt would have taken place. The delay in timer interrupt
handling results in the greater than 1 ms delta, that in turn results in the next
timer interrupt occurring after less than 1ms.
Table 5.2 shows a small sample of the jitter in the handling of timer inter-
rupts. This effect eventually dissipates, but occurs again as the timer interrupt
and SMI occurrences coincide. Even when regular SMIs are short, they can
happen to occur at precisely when the timer interrupt fires, resulting in a
Chapter 5. SMI Preemption Performance Study 87
period of irregular timer interrupts for the short but frequent SMI scenario.
Figure 5.2 depicts this effect.
For the Blackbox SMI scenario of a batch of eight 5ms SMIs a second,
when the batch concludes, execution returns back to the operating system
until another SMI occurs. In this scenario and a longer Blackbox SMI scenario
with a 104ms SMI, the privileged software suffers significant portions of time
where no forward progress can be made. These results (as shown in Figure 5.3)
show that both long and short SMIs can preempt the timer interrupt with
different patterns. The short but frequent scenario caused periods of jitter
in timer interrupt handling. The long SMI scenarios showed that user and
kernel tasks are completely frozen for extended periods of time and a number
of timer ticks were missed.
FIGURE 5.2: SMI Preemption of Timer Interrupt Handling
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FIGURE 5.3: Native OS measurements with regular timer ticks
and idle CPU
(a) (top left) Baseline (No SMIs)
(b) (top right) 0.11 ms SMI (500/sec)
(c) (bottom left) 5 ms SMI (8/sec)
(d) (bottom right) 104 ms SMI (1/sec)
TABLE 5.2: SMI Occurrences and Timer Interrupts
CPU# SMI Count Delta (ms) Location Notes
39,089 0.00 do_timer
0 39,090 0.08 scheduler_tick
1 39,090 0.00 scheduler_tick
39,090 0.92 do_timer <1ms
2 39,090 0.00 scheduler_tick
0 39,090 0.00 scheduler_tick
5 39,090 0.00 scheduler_tick
7 39,090 0.00 scheduler_tick
39,091 1.07 do_timer >1ms
6 39,091 0.00 scheduler_tick
0 39,091 0.00 scheduler_tick
7 39,091 0.00 scheduler_tick
39,091 0.92 do_timer <1ms
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5.1.3.4 Timer Interrupt Results: Xen Virtualization
To examine the effects of SMIs on timer interrupts in a virtualized environ-
ment, we repeated the measurements with a Xen HVM ("Hardware Virtual-
ized Machine") Linux guest running under Xen 4.1.2. The results show that
running a virtualized guest introduces a small degree of jitter in the regularity
of the handling of timer interrupts (Figure 5.4(a), and adding SMIs perturbs
the regularity further as shown in Figure 5.4(b)). For groups of long SMIs
(e.g. groups of eight 5 ms SMIs), the guest can experience a significantly
longer loss of control which coalesces multiple preemptions into one longer
one (Figure 5.4(c) and 5.4(d)). For example, the Xen HVM guest experiences
prolonged losses of control that exceed the 5 ms SMI in the range of 10 and 26
ms. We suspect that these increased delays are the effect of SMIs acting upon
the virtual machine manager’s scheduler which is resulting in the virtual
machine not handling the interrupt for a longer period of time and amplifying
the impact of longer SMIs in virtual environments.
5.1.3.5 Timer Interrupt and Turbostat Results: Tickless Linux Kernel
When the CPU is busy, the tickless kernel behaves like the regular timer tick,
since no ticks are "skipped." During idle periods, however, the tickless kernel
can experience large gaps between successive entries into the scheduler_tick
function (e.g. up to around 200ms based on our measurements). Therefore,
we focus here on the idle CPU case. We expect regular SMI activity to subvert
the tickless kernel’s energy savings, by waking up the CPU to enter SMM.
To test this, we gathered data on the processor C-state utilizations using
Turbostat [12]. Turbostat produces a log of what percentage of time the
processor threads were in a given C-state. We started Turbostat, let the system
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FIGURE 5.4: Virtualized measurements with regular timer ticks
(a) (top left) Baseline (No SMIs), Idle CPU
(b) (top right) 0.11 ms SMI (16/sec), Busy CPU
(c) (bottom left) 5 ms SMI (3/sec), Busy CPU
(d) (bottom right) 5 ms SMI (8/sec), Busy CPU
idle for several seconds, then enabled SMIs, waited a few seconds, disabled
SMIs, and ended Turbostat.
In Figure 5.5(a), we show the baseline case for the tickless kernel without
SMIs. The timing of the scheduler_tick entries varies widely as the kernel
avoids unnecessary wake-ups to achieve power savings. Figure 5.5(b) shows
the results for 500 SMIs/second. It is not readily apparent from the graph if
a timer interrupt has been delayed or the kernel was simply idle for a long
period of time. To look more closely, we must examine the raw trace data
(see Table 5.3.) This shows that the kernel sleeps through the SMI activity as
indicated by the increasing SMI count during long periods of kernel idleness.
The tickless kernel adaptive timer mechanism is unaware of SMIs and while
the kernel is idle, the CPUs transition in and out of SMM processing SMIs.
Fortunately, the Linux kernel (since version 2.6.19) has a mechanism to
avoid missing jiffy updates due to lost timer ticks by determining how many
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timer ticks were missed (ticks) and incrementing the jiffy count accordingly
in do_timer. Without such a mechanism, jiffy updates would be lost. The
results of our instrumentation (Table 5.4) show that the do_timer function
increments the ticks value after receiving control following an SMI. When an
SMI preempts the kernel for five ms, the kernel determines that five timer ticks
were missed and sets the ticks value accordingly and adds that value to the
jiffies count. When our group of eight SMIs concludes, our instrumentation
shows the SMI count staying steady and the ticks value returning to one as
the SMIs subside. The kernel remained idle through the SMIs, however the
CPU was actively processing SMIs. If we limited our analysis to our kernel
instrumentation, we would miss a large amount of activity on the system.
The kernel instrumentation correctly indicates that there were long periods
of idle in the kernel which traditionally would correlate to the CPUs ability
to transition into deeper sleep states. However, with SMM-RIMMs, regular
SMIs are also occurring which would keep the CPU active. Figures 5.6 and 5.7
show that SMIs bring the CPU out of the lowest power C6 state and into the
higher power-consuming C0 and C1 states. The short but frequent scenario
results in more time spent in higher power C-states than the hybrid scenario
that has longer SMIs.
FIGURE 5.5: Virtualized measurements with tickless kernel, idle
CPU
(a) (left) Baseline (No SMIs)
(b) (right) 0.11 ms SMI (500/sec)
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FIGURE 5.6: 500x0.11ms SMIs/second
FIGURE 5.7: 8x5ms SMIs/second
TABLE 5.3: Tickless Kernel and 500 SMIs/second
Trace Point# SMI Count scheduler_tick delta (ms)
0 23,351 40
1 23,382 62
2 23,433 102
5.1.3.6 Timer Tick Conclusions
Our examination of disruptions to the regularity of the scheduler_tick shows
several important effects. In some cases with short but frequent scheduling,
SMIs can resonate with the timer interrupt resulting in extended periods of
time where the timer interrupt handling may occur late relative to a regular
time tick. This may result in timer interrupt handlers closer together or
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TABLE 5.4: do_Timer Ticks Mechanism, the trace after the ellip-
sis begins to recover from the batch of SMis
Trace Point# SMI Count Ticks Delta (ms)
0 19,082 1 1.00
1 19,083 5 5.21
2 19,084 5 5.15
... ... ... ...
3 19,090 1 0.63
4 19,090 1 1.00
further apart than traditionally done. Additionally, with the longer SMI
scheduling option, SMIs that exceed the length of the timer interrupt will
cause timer interrupts to be missed. However, the kernel can keep its internal
jiffy count accurate. With long SMIs, there can be long periods of time between
entries into the process scheduling function. Virtualized environments may
experience longer delays as multiple shorter delays coalesce into longer delays.
Applications may experience longer wait times since the OS scheduler cannot
run.
In the case of an idle tickless kernel, determining if a timer interrupt was
delayed or lost due to an SMI is not as straightforward. Our results show
that the kernel remained idle while SMIs were occurring which is expected
since the kernel is unaware of the loss of control due to SMIs. The C-state
analysis showed that while the kernel was idle, the CPU’s power utilization
was affected by the SMI activity. The short but frequent SMI scheduling
scenario resulted in the CPU running in higher power C-states due to frequent
wakeups from SMIs that circumvent the power-saving processor modes.
5.1.4 Process Accounting
In the course of our OpenSSL measurements on a system using the 2.6.32
Linux kernel, we noticed an unexpected phenomenon: When we increased
the duration of the SMIs using our modified BIOS, the reported throughput
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did not decrease correspondingly but instead remained constant as shown
in Figure 5.8. Achieving the same performance regardless of whether SMIs
were occurring was not a reasonable result. We also noticed that OpenSSL’s
reported computation time decreased as we generated longer SMIs. Ana-
lyzing the method of calculating the workload throughput showed that it
reported throughput in bytes processed per second by determining the num-
ber of computations performed and the length of time required. The OpenSSL
benchmark set up a signal (SIGALRM) for three seconds in the future and
performed computations until the signal arrived. When we ran the workload
with a 2.6.32 kernel and 100 ms SMIs, the kernel reported that the compu-
tations took 2.74 seconds. When no SMIs occurred, the kernel reported the
time as 3 seconds, although the reported throughput paradoxically remained
constant to the non-SMI case.
Our measurements using a more recent kernel (3.7.6) showed different
behavior that closely matched our calculations over the amount of expected
throughput decline. This configuration reported that the OpenSSL benchmark
was computing for approximately the full 3 seconds both when 100 ms SMIs
were enabled and when they were disabled and showed degraded throughput
with SMIs. Figure 5.9 depicts the scaling of times billed to the application for
varying durations of SMIs for the two kernel versions.
To root cause the discrepancy, we instrumented the two Linux kernels
to log the flow of time-keeping data used by the times and accompanying
functions. We also added a trace point in the OpenSSL application to capture
the time when the signal handler function was called in the application and
two trace points before and after the computations began in the benchmark.
Our examination of OpenSSL showed that it used the Linux kernel’s times
function which reports the amount of user time, system time, child user time,
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child system time used by a process.
We started SystemTap [93] to monitor key variables in the kernel functions
responsible for the reported process time statistics:
1. do_sys_times
2. thread_group_times
3. thread_group_cputime
4. task_sched_runtime
5. do_task_delta_exec
6. scale_utime
We then started an OpenSSL benchmark run using "openssl speed sha512",
with SystemTap. This test allowed us to compare the reported amount of time
billed to the process with the trace points gathered in the application using
the CPU’s TSC.
The results show that the SIGALRM signal was received after three sec-
onds in both kernel versions. For the 2.6.32 kernel, this highlighted the
discrepancy between the amount of application time as measured by the TSC
and the kernel. One kernel function explained the discrepancy: scale_utime.
This is used to reduce over or under-counting of user or system time due to
the point in time when the user or system task was actually interrupted. The
code scales the operating system timer tick-based values against the sched-
uler’s record of total runtime. With a 100 ms SMI per second, this function
increased the billed user time by 10% which compensated for the loss of time
spent in SMM, while for the no SMI scenario, the user time was not scaled
accordingly. Table 5.5 shows the scaling calculation for the first three second
OpenSSL measurement. As the 2.6.32 kernel did not call this function in the
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do_sys_times code path, the user time was not adjusted to include the 10% of
time spent in SMM leaving the billed process times lower in the 2.6.32 kernel.
FIGURE 5.8: Throughput Scaling
FIGURE 5.9: Billed Seconds
5.1.5 System-Level Effects Summary
Our results raise the question of how the operating system should account for
process times when there is prolonged SMI activity on the system: include
any SMI times with the billed process time using the times mechanism, or
leave this time out of the billed amount? There are benefits and drawbacks
to both approaches. Reporting time inclusive of SMI times has the drawback
of charging applications for time spent outside of their process which could
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TABLE 5.5: User Time Scaling In Scale_utime 3.7.6 kernel
Variable Notes ScalingNo SMIs
Scaling
100 ms
SMI
1 per sec
utime Unscaled User Time 3,003 2,708
rtime Scheduler’s sum_exec_time 3,008 3,002
total User + System 3,009 2,709
[Scaled user time] (rtime * utime) / total 3,002 3,000
penalize some applications more than others depending on when the SMIs
happened to occur. In our study, this resulted in all three seconds being
attributed via the times mechanism to a process without discarding the por-
tion of the time spent in SMM. The exclusion of SMI times in process time
accounting can lead to discrepancies as well. In the case of OpenSSL running
on the 2.6.32 kernel, the workload concluded after three seconds based on the
CPU’s TSC, however the process only believed that it had used 2.74 seconds
when 100 ms SMIs were active. When SMIs were infrequent and had short
durations, their effect on process accounting could essentially be overlooked.
For environments that are sensitive to accurate billing of time to users such as
cloud providers, new mechanisms are required to more accurately account
for the amount of time consumed by long SMIs. However, resolving the
fundamental issues in process time accounting will require kernel changes
and possible SMM-RIMM involvement.
Our analysis of system level SMM effects shows several negative impacts
from prolonged SMM time. While certain sections of the Linux kernel have
special handling for SMI occurrences, other sections could have differing
behavior upon experiencing prolonged SMI durations. Software advances
such as tickless kernels, while implemented for other reasons, increase the
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tolerance of SMM preemptions. Our detailed results demonstrate that sys-
tems can spend longer in SMM than current guidelines, however, there are
problems that arise at durations below those contemplated for SMM-RIMMs.
We showed that SMIs cause periods of timer interrupt jitter in the short but
frequent scenario and extended periods of delays for the longer SMI scenarios.
These impacts delay handling of timer interrupts and postpone work on all
cores until the SMI completes. Additionally, in an environment where power
savings are of increasing importance, SMM-RIMMs would bring a reduction
in the amount of time CPUs can remain in low power states. In an extreme
SMI preemption, we showed a device driver that failed because it interpreted
the delay as unresponsive hardware.
5.2 Application Effects
Because even slight delays can have a perceptible impact on applications,
we designed a study to investigate the impact of prolonged SMIs on several
types of workloads. The correlation of application and noise granularity [10]
is quite relevant to the SMI-based perturbation investigation as SMIs could
be long or short, frequent or infrequent, occur regularly or irregularly.
5.2.1 Kernel Compilation
Linux kernel compilation involves several key aspects of platform perfor-
mance including CPU operations, disk I/O, and memory accesses. We used
Xen 4.2.1 with a Centos 6.3 Domain 0 and a Centos 6.3 HVM guest with one
virtual CPU and two GB of RAM. The results in Figure 5.10 show increases
in total compilation time that very closely match the level of SMM preemp-
tion. For example, taking 10% of the CPU cycles away (100 ms SMI scenario)
resulted in a 10.8% increase in the duration of the kernel compilation.
Chapter 5. SMI Preemption Performance Study 99
FIGURE 5.10: Kernel Compilation Performance for Linux/Xen
5.2.2 Microbenchmarks
To examine system performance impacts on a broader set of system activities,
we ran two sets of benchmarks, one for Xen’s Domain 0 (Xen 4.1.2) and one
for a Centos 6.0 hardware-virtualized guest. We compared how throughput
scaled against the baseline for varying levels of SMIs using our modified BIOS
technique. For our workloads, we used RC5-72 [95], a compute-intensive
workload that brute-forces cryptographic keys (tested on Domain 0 only);
Netperf 2.5 for TCP transmit [85] using a gigabit Ethernet device; and XDD
for 128KB sequential disk reads using an Intel X25-M SSD [115].
The left-most bar in Figure 5.11, Figure 5.12, and Figure 5.13 shows the
percentage of CPU time available to the system after subtracting the amount
of time spent in SMM per second. The individual benchmarks all experienced
throughput degradations that closely match the amount of CPU cycles taken
away for SMIs. With these workloads and long SMIs, SMM latency cannot be
hidden by the application as it comes at the cost of performing I/O operations
or computations.
By comparison, short but frequent SMI scheduling can maintain baseline
throughput for some workloads even as the amount of available CPU time
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decreases. SMI usages that are able to interleave SMIs with I/O processing
may be able to avoid the full penalty of the SMI by processing their SMM
work in multiple smaller units. These results indicate that a time-sliced SMM-
RIMM can allow workloads that do not exclusively perform computations to
avoid a portion of the performance degradation that would otherwise occur
for (non-heavy compute) applications.
FIGURE 5.11: Xen Dom0, Long SMIs
FIGURE 5.12: Xen VT Guest I/O, Long SMIs
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FIGURE 5.13: Xen VT Guest Short SMIs
5.2.3 Latency-sensitive Application
As the USB testing indicated, latency-sensitive applications can be problematic
for SMM-RIMMs. To investigate this further we used Windows Server 2012
and the Unreal Tournament 3 benchmark utility (UTBench) to measure game
frame rates. We used our modified BIOS technique for these tests and show
the results in Table 5.6.
Although the average frame rates were above 50 fps for all durations but
the 495 ms SMI, at SMI durations of 20 ms and higher the frame rates dipped
below 30 frames per second, which is in the range of the user’s perception. The
finer-grained analysis shows that 20 ms delays only dropped below 30 frames
per second 0.92% of the time which we did not notice subjectively however at
50ms delays, the system achieved below 30 frames per second 5.99% of the
time which was visually apparent. This latency-sensitive application showed
clear sensitivities between the 20 and 50 ms SMI durations.
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TABLE 5.6: Unreal Tournament 3 Frame Rate Binning
MS
SMI 0-5 5-10
10
-
15
15
-
20
20
-
25
25
-
30
30
-
35
35
-
40
40
-
45
45
-
50
50
-
55
55
-
60
60+
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
1.43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.08 99.91
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.16 0.15 99.60
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.87 0.12 0.14 0.02 98.79
20 0 0 0 0 0 0.92 1.59 0.37 0.17 0.05 0 0 96.90
50 0 0 0 5.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 94.00
100 0 10.83 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 89.17
495 50.24 0 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 49.64
5.2.4 Application Conclusions
Our results show that application level impacts from SMM time vary based
on the characteristics of the application as well as SMI scheduling. Some
usages (e.g. compilation) experience degraded throughput while others such
as Unreal Tournament and audio playback, are particularly sensitive to long
duration SMIs as the user experience is severely degraded. Some applications
(like TCP transmit in Figure 5.13) are able to hide a portion of the SMI delays
as these applications would still need to wait for other operations to complete.
We note that the latency sensitive applications we examined suffered user-
perceptible impacts at some of the SMI durations proposed for SMM-RIMMs.
The measurement study provided insights into whether available head-
room exists to allow increasing the SMI delays slightly above the latency
guideline. The ability to support modest increases in SMI duration over the
guideline forms a useful tuning knob to allow additional measurement or
longer measurements to be performed under time of attack. This approach
is analogous to the turbo feature on modern x86 CPUs that allows one or
more CPU cores to briefly run at a higher CPU frequency to accomplish more
work while available thermal budget exists [66]. This analysis provides a
measurement-baseline for an empirical bound on SMI latency, that provides
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a practical upper bound on SMI latency in which no significant issues have
been observed. We term this bound, LimitSmiEmpirical in contrast to the BITS
guideline [106] which we term LimitSMIBITS.
5.3 Conclusions
This measurement study gave us the initial performance feasibility analysis to
better understand the tradeoffs between single long SMI preemptions utilized
by contemporary SMM-RIMMs and the time-sliced approach that we propose.
Figure 5.14 summarizes the results. The use of SMM-RIMMs causes host
software and applications to experience unexpected preemptions, however,
our performance measurements show that keeping these preemptions to
a shorter degree can greatly reduce negative impacts. For example, this
can avoid breaking timing assumptions in the operating system that impact
correctness and reduce the impact on latency-sensitive applications.
There are also signs that operating systems can be more tolerant to lost
timer ticks than in previous years as the Linux kernel can recover from the ef-
fects of lost ticks. Our results suggest that RIMM developers should carefully
consider how system preemptions should be accounted for, particularly in
cloud environments where users pay a financial cost for CPU time used.
Impacts on power utilization will depend on the level of CPU activity. If
the CPUs are idle, measurement SMIs would bring the CPUs out of more idle
states. However, on active servers, the CPUs will likely already be in less idle
modes which should not significantly impact the consumption.
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FIGURE 5.14: SMI Performance Impact Summary
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EPA-RIMM Design Requirements
As we research building a performance-aware and extensible SMM-RIMM,
we constrain our approach based on eight design requirements. An early
SMM-RIMM, HyperSentry, provided five key design requirements for their
approach addressing protection of the measurement agent and its results.
These requirements [7] (Stealthy Invocation, Verifiable Behavior, Determin-
istic Execution, In-context Privileged Measurement, and Attestable Output)
represent a useful starting foundation for SMM-RIMMs, however, we iden-
tify three key gaps: Extensible measurements, performance efficiency, and
the need to constrain the measurement agent. The lack of extensible mea-
surements reduces the overall effectiveness of the SMM-RIMM approach
as attackers could readily shift their tactics to compromising unmonitored
resources. It also could result in the SMM-RIMM being unable to respond to
new attacks which significantly reduces the value of the approach. For the
performance efficiency gap, there are several implications of a lack of focus
on the amount of work to be taken in SMM. First, dramatically exceeding
expectations over time spent in SMM can result in system stability and cor-
rectness issues based on our performance studies [23], rendering the approach
ill-suited for practical use. Second, the set of integrity measurements to be
performed may grow over time in response to new threats and accomplishing
all measurements in a single SMM session quickly becomes infeasible. In
recent years, concerns over the power of SMM have grown and efforts arisen
to constrain its resource access. Thus, an SMM-RIMM should now be con-
structed with the principle of least privilege. This new requirement prescribes
providing the measurement agent with the minimum access to perform its
inspections without growing the agent’s access unnecessarily.
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EPA-RIMM supports the five original design requirements with modifica-
tions due to architectural differences (Sections 6.1 through Section 6.5) and
contributes three new requirements addressing extensibility, performance,
and a constrained measurement agent in Section 6.6, Section 6.7, and Sec-
tion 6.8. We provide our design requirement conclusions in Section 6.9.
6.1 Requirement 1 - Stealthy Invocation
SMM-RIMMs endeavor to catch malicious code by surprise. Thus, a key
design requirement is that an attacker in the monitored operating system
or hypervisor should not be able to detect that a measurement is about to
take place. If the measurements of an SMM-RIMM were to be detected by
a compromised hypervisor, it could be possible for malicious code in the
hypervisor to hide attack traces before an integrity measurement occurred.
HyperSentry implements a "Stealthy Invocation" mechanism to cover this
requirement [7]. Utilizing an SMI to trigger a measurement can aid the
element of surprise, particularly if the SMI generation is done from hardware
(e.g. chipset or out-of-band controller) without awareness of host software.
However, care still must be taken that malicious software is not able to derive
when a measurement is scheduled to occur or observe indications that an SMI
is pending, as discussed in Section 3.3.7. In general, SMM aids the stealthy
invocation requirement as control transfers to SMM can be accomplished via
asynchronous methods (e.g. hardware-generated SMIs) that do not require
the host CPU to trigger the measurement.
6.2 Requirement 2 - Verifiable Behavior
The verifiable behavior requirement prescribes that the "code base of the
measurement agent, along with its input data, should be measured and
verified before it is invoked [7]." As HyperSentry utilizes a measurement agent
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in the hypervisor to gain the benefit of deeper insight into the hypervisor
state, the measurement agent is at a significant degree of risk as it resides in
the same privilege level as the code that it is monitoring. Thus, HyperSentry’s
agent integrity must be verified before it is invoked to ensure that it has not
been compromised. Here, HyperSentry and EPA-RIMM differ in their trust
assumptions. HyperSentry places their measurement agent in an untrusted
location, e.g. a potentially malicious hypervisor to simplify the task of getting
insights into the currently operating hypervisor state. EPA-RIMM places the
measurement agent within a hardware-protected region, SMRAM, to better
armor the measurement agent and uses a provisioning phase to direct the
runtime measurements. While SMRAM has been compromised before [53,
14, 15, 20], it has a higher bar to compromise than hypervisor code due to
additional hardware protections and higher attack complexity.
6.3 Requirement 3 - Deterministic Execution
HyperSentry defines a "Deterministic Execution" requirement in which the
measurement agent should not be "changeable nor interruptible" after it is
invoked [7]. This property is supported by the use of SMM as its processing
is not interruptible and hardware protections such as BIOS flash protections
and SMM Range Registers (SMRR) protect SMM code from being changed.
HyperSentry measurements have a two-step process in which entry into
trusted SMM code first occurs, the measurement agent in the hypervisor is
measured (e.g. as described in Section 3.3.7) and then control transfers to
the measurement agent in an uninterruptible manner. Contemporary com-
puter systems support varying degrees of privilege as previously shown in
Figure 6.1 with SMM as the most privileged level compared to hypervisors,
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operating system kernels, and applications. This provides a "strong isola-
tion [5]" between the RIMM and the monitored environment which prevents
changing or interrupting the measurement agent. Having strong isolation is
beneficial from the security perspective but poses challenges for the ability of
the RIMM to understand the internal workings of the less-privileged layer
that it is monitoring.
FIGURE 6.1: x86 Privilege Levels
6.4 Requirement 4 - In-Context Privileged Measurement
HyperSentry notes that for In-Context Privileged Measurement that the mea-
surement agent should be privileged "and in the right context to access the
hypervisor’s code and data, and to gain full access to the CPU’s state [7]."
While an SMM-RIMM has the privilege to look deeply within the monitored
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environment, the challenge becomes how to interpret what it observes, as
SMM does not natively understand internal operating system or hypervisor
data structures. SMM would not know whether the host software is Windows
8, Windows 10, Linux, or Xen. Compounding the challenge, operating sys-
tems or hypervisors utilize internal data structures that differ from each other
and vary between revisions. For example, Xen features a "Grant Table" data
structure that controls which memory pages a virtual machine is allowed to
map. As this data structure is Xen-specific, SMM is not aware of its existence.
SMM is also not aware that Xen supports two different versions of the Grant
Table data structure [97] but would need to understand the layout of the
appropriate version in order to properly measure it.
Previous SMM-RIMMs have dealt with this challenge in several different
ways. SPECTRE built in operating system-specific knowledge into their SMM
measurement agent [119]. To identify physical memory addresses for SMM
to measure, SPECTRE utilized an observation that in Linux and Windows,
virtual addresses above addresses 0xC0000000 and 0x80000000, respectively
are considered kernel space. To find the physical memory address, an offset
is subtracted from the virtual address. SPECTRE employs a similar method
to find the location of the Kernel Processor Control Region (KPCR) which
controls a sequence of data structures that control processes and threads in
order to measure it. The authors note that this data structure resides at virtual
address 0xFFDFF000 and rely upon known memory offsets to parse the data
structure.
The issue with this approach is that it assumes a kernel data structure
layout that can vary depending on version. Also kernel address space ran-
domization (KASLR) breaks these assumptions as code can be located at
different addresses each boot. Thus, this method of hard-coding addresses
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and offsets is brittle and would require BIOS updates to update SPECTRE’s
assumptions. HyperSentry resolved this tension by placing their measure-
ment agent within the hypervisor. This allows the agent to directly leverage
hypervisor data structures and layouts in its measurements. EPA-RIMM
keeps the measurement agent within SMM and utilizes information gleaned
from a provisioning phase to direct the measurements. Changes in layout
and offsets can be accounted for in the data structures that the EPA-RIMM
measurement agent receives.
6.5 Requirement 5 - Attestable Output
It is important that the output of an SMM-RIMM be trustable. If the SMM-
RIMM were to output a result but host software were to tamper with the
output, attacks would go unnoticed. For this reason, it is essential for an SMM-
RIMM to output its results such that they can be verified at the receiving end.
This includes using signing, encryption, and message authentication checks.
These mechanisms would provide the ability to detect malicious tampering
with in-transit results. Similarly, if malicious host software were to prevent
the SMM-RIMM from outputting any data at all, this could be detectable by
the RIMM recipient not receiving any of the expected reports.
HyperSentry builds trust into the RIMM’s output by leveraging a public
and private key pair to be used in verifying that the output was not forged.
This mechanism places the private key in SMM’s protected SMRAM region
and extends the public key to a PCR (register) on the system’s TPM. Before
transmitting its results, the SMM-RIMM signs the measurements with its
private key. A remote user can choose whether to accept the results based
on whether the data was signed by HyperSentry’s private key. Additionally,
the use of a nonce can guarantee freshness of results to avoid replay attacks
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in which a previous valid but stale measurement is provided. With this
mechanism, assurance over the integrity of the data can be provided by the
RIMM.
6.6 New Requirement 6 - Extensible Measurements
Current SMM-RIMMs lack the ability to vary the amount of runtime checking
based on performance needs or changes in the current threat environment
which reduces effectiveness. Thus, we propose a new requirement for SMM-
RIMMs prescribing the need for extensible measurements. Providing a pro-
grammatic API allows a new set of measurements to be pushed out to the
SMM-RIMMs as new checks are designed. This capability allows the RIMM’s
checks to be updated as often as desired without needing to replace firmware
code, allowing for a more adaptive and effective mechanism. The benefit
of SMM-RIMMs can be greatly enhanced with communication between the
SMM-RIMM instances. When attacks are detected on one SMM-RIMM in-
stance, this information can be shared with other participating SMM-RIMMs
to help prevent attacks from spreading. It can also enable more targeted
inspections by focusing SMM-RIMMs on platform resources that have been
compromised on one of the instances.
6.7 New Requirement 7 - Performance-aware
An ideal RIMM design would provide quick detection of attacks at a perfor-
mance overhead that is imperceptible to the user. The more quickly an attack
is detected, the more useful the RIMM mechanism is. The intensity of RIMM
inspections has two key variables: measurement frequency and duration.
A very frequent scheduling of a RIMM could have a low or a high system
impact depending on measurement duration. Similarly, an inspection with a
longer duration may be less impactful to the user if it were to only run once a
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day. Thus, these two parameters provide tuning knobs that can be calibrated
based on differing tolerances. There are practical upper limits, though, to how
long the CPU threads can remain in SMM in a single session as some software
has specific timing expectations which can impact correctness. Significant
performance impacts can occur with prolonged check durations. Therefore,
it becomes infeasible to consider approaches that conduct extensive checks
within one atomic measurement session and greatly exceed the established
SMI latency guidelines.
Given this limitation, it is necessary to consider time-slicing RIMM oper-
ations such that they can occur more frequently and consume less time in a
single RIMM measurement session. This time-sliced approach is the most
promising mechanism that can accomplish complex integrity measurements
over a longer period of time with fewer negative impacts.
6.8 New Requirement 8 - Constrained Measurement Agent
SMM code has traditionally been granted access to all of memory and registers.
SMM-RIMMs have adopted this design model and had access to all system
state to perform their measurements. However, in response to growing
concerns over attacks on SMM, efforts have arisen to reduce the accesses of
SMM code on contemporary platforms. The Intel STM provides one such
mechanism that allows policies to be created to remove a set of accesses from
the SMI handler. Given current industry trends, we propose the use of a
constrained measurement agent as a requirement for SMM-RIMMs.
6.9 Conclusions
SMM-RIMMs were originally formulated in a time when awareness of the
performance impacts of SMM were not understood and granting SMM full
access to the system’s resources was common-place. Additionally, the concept
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of extending the set of measured resources was not conceived. Our design
requirements address these key limitations to enable SMM-RIMMs in the
contemporary environments, while supporting the previously formulated
requirements of stealthy invocations, verifiable behavior, deterministic exe-
cution, In-Content privileged measurement, and attestable output. We add
three new requirements: 1. Extensible measurements to better vary the set of
monitored resources during inspections, 2. Performance-awareness to balance
the need for checking with system performance constraints, 3. Constrained
measurement agent to reduce the risk of an SMM-based measurement agent
compromising the system.
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Architecture
In this section, we provide an overview of EPA-RIMM’s architecture. There
are three key abstractions in EPA-RIMM: Checks, Tasks, and Bins. A Check
(Section 7.1) is a description of an integrity measurement with parameters to
guide its execution. If a Check detects an unacceptable result (e.g. a changed
result in a presumed static resource), EPA-RIMM generates an alert. At
runtime, Checks are decomposed into partial resource measurements called
Tasks (Section 7.2), to meet expectations for SMI latency. Tasks are scheduled
in Bins (Section 7.3) to bound the work performed in one SMI session. Bin
size is defined as the sum of the execution times of the Tasks it contains.
The EPA-RIMM software architecture comprises the Diagnosis Manager
(Section 7.4), the Backend Manager (Section 7.5), the Oracle (Section 7.6), the
Host Communications Manager (Section 7.7) and the Inspector (Section 7.8).
Section 7.9 provides our security analysis of the EPA-RIMM architecture. We
provide conclusions on the EPA-RIMM architecture in Section 7.10.
7.1 EPA-RIMM Checks
EPA-RIMM’s Checks consist of measurements over resource types including
memory and registers. EPA-RIMM’s architecture envisions the ability to add
a variety of new Checks in response to emerging attacks.
Each Check contains a command along with its arguments and a priority.
Checks allow the Administrator to specify particular measurements over sets
of memory regions, Control Registers, and Model-Specific Registers (MSRs).
Sample Checks include the: "Kernel Code Section Range", "Hypervisor Code
Section Range" Check that measures the host software kernel code sections to
identify code injections, the "Interrupt Descriptor Table" Check that measures
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the contents of the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT), the "Interrupt Descriptor
Table Register" (IDTR) Check that verifies that the IDTR register value has
not changed, the "Global Descriptor Table" (GDT) Check that measures the
Global Descriptor Table to determine if it has changed. Other Checks measure
specific MSRs or CPU control registers, for example, to determine if the Write
Protect bit on CR0 was cleared or the Supervisor Mode Execution Protection
(SMEP) on CR4 were disabled by a rootkit. Figure 7.1 shows several sample
Checks.
FIGURE 7.1: Checks
7.1.1 Check Definition
The EPA-RIMM Administrator specifies Checks from the Check definition
template. Table 7.1 shows the fields supported by Checks and their decom-
posed expression, Tasks. Each Check and Task have an ID# for reference.
The Command is an instruction to the Inspector that specifies the category
of measurement to perform, e.g. Measure Virtual Memory, Measure Physi-
cal Memory, Measure Register, or Measure MSR. The Operand field allows
specifying which Register or MSR should be measured (for Register or MSR
measurements.) The Memory Address field directs the SMM Inspector to begin
a memory measurement at the specified Memory Address and the Length
fields specifies the length of the measurement. The Priority field provides guid-
ance over when the measurement should be scheduled, with higher-priority
measurements performed before lower-priority measurements. The Hash
field provides the hash result for the measurement based on provisioning.
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TABLE 7.1: Check and Task Descriptions
Check Task Description
Id# Unique Id
Command Measurement
Operand Command Arg
Memory Address Starting Address
Length Measurement Size
Priority
Hash Value to Compare
7.1.2 Measurement Commands
EPA-RIMM supports several measurement commands to identify the pres-
ence of rootkits including: Measure Memory Range, Sample Memory Range,
Measure Control Registers, Measure Model-Specific Registers.
7.1.2.1 Command: Measure Memory Range
The Measure Memory Range command allows the Administrator to completely
measure the specified memory range. The goal of this check is to detect
unexpected changes in presumed static memory regions, for example: kernel
or hypervisor code sections, read-only data structures, or any memory region
which is not expected to change.
This command supports the following options:
1. Virtual or physical memory range: Start address
2. Measurement size (number of bytes)
7.1.2.2 Command: Sample Memory Range
The Sample Memory Range command measures a statistical portion of a mem-
ory range. This allows leveraging spatial locality for measurements. In
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contrast to the Memory Range command, the Memory Range Sampling com-
mand performs sampling over a memory range. The command supports
measurement densities from 1% to 100% of the full range. This Check has the
potential of reducing the overall number of EPA-RIMM measurements. We
gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Bruce Irvin who provided the
initial vision for this Check.
This command supports the following options:
1. Virtual or physical memory range: Start address
2. Measurement size (number of bytes)
3. Measurement Density (range from 1% to 100%)
4. Sampling algorithm (random)
7.1.2.3 Command: Measure Control Registers
The Measure Control Register command is designed to detect changes that
rootkits may make to these privileged registers, for example, turning off write
protection for kernel code. This command supports the following options
over the supported set of CPU Control Registers:
1. Control Register: CR0, CR3, CR4
2. Measurement size (4 or 8 bytes)
7.1.2.4 Command: Measure Model-Specific Registers (MSRs)
This command supports the following options over supported MSRs:
1. MSR Index
2. Measurement size (4 or 8 bytes)
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7.2 Tasks
EPA-RIMM Tasks are a key component for limiting the amount of time spent
in a single SMM session. Checks are decomposed into Tasks with the goal of
accomplishing them over a period of time. This approach performs less work
in a single SMI session, however, allows completing the entire measurement
over a sequence of measurements. Each Task contains a priority that is
inherited from the Check and also a cost. Figure 7.2 shows the decomposition
of several Checks into Tasks.
FIGURE 7.2: Tasks
7.3 Bins
Bins are collections of one or more Tasks for processing in a single SMI session.
In Figure 7.3, the Bin cost is set to a maximum of 100µs which allows three
Tasks.
FIGURE 7.3: Bin
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7.4 Diagnosis Manager
The Diagnosis Manager (DM) orchestrates the runtime integrity measure-
ments on a separate node from the monitored node. It initiates the Checks,
and interprets the measurement results. A single DM may be responsible
for one or more monitored nodes. The DM sends and receives information
about attack discoveries from across the EPA-RIMM framework to help guide
detection on other monitored nodes. This allows dynamically adjusting the
priority of Checks to search for detected issues on other nodes.
7.4.1 DM Provisioning
The DM is initialized with a set of specific Checks. The currently supported
EPA-RIMM commands and their parameters are: Register (CR0, CR31, CR4,
IDTR, GDTR), Mem (Address, Length), and MSR (MSR Number). Checks
that measure large memory regions could exceed desired SMI session times
and need decomposition. To determine a suitable granularity, EPA-RIMM
measures the cost per byte of various hash sizes during the provisioning
phase, then uses this data with the Check’s Decomposition Target to fine-tune
the amount of work performed in a task. Checks involving Control Registers
or MSRs cannot be decomposed and thus consist of a single Task.
7.4.2 DM Runtime
The DM sends Checks to the Backend Manager. Each Check returns a result
of unchanged or changed, indicating whether the measurement matches
the comparison value. Changed results cause the DM to raise an alert.
EPA-RIMM’s provisioning phase and Check data structures provided the
fundamental basis of directing the measurement operations. By basing the
1CR3 is dynamic and can change.
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measurements on provisioned data from the monitored node and allowing
measurement specification from the DM, we remove the requirement to put
this logic into SMM code itself. This also guides the Inspector’s comprehen-
sion of host software which resolves the semantic gap between SMM and host
software.
7.4.3 Measurement Triggers
EPA-RIMM measurement triggers provide a means of reducing the amount
of measurements required to determine if a given security hypothesis is true
or false. We provide a description over how to specify measurement triggers
in Section 7.4.3.1 and describe two measurement triggers in Section 7.4.3.2
and Section 7.4.3.3.
7.4.3.1 Specifying Measurement Triggers
Measurement triggers evaluate security hypothesis in a procedural manner
to reduce the number of measurements required to evaluate the hypothesis,
for example, performing lighter-weight measurements before heavier ones.
This allows detecting compromises with reduced SMM overheads. A trigger
may have two types of actions:
1. Independent Action: This action does not have a dependency on the
previous action.
2. Dependent Action: This action is only run if the previous action returns
a changed result.
A trigger with only independent actions is indicative of security inspec-
tions that require checking all avenues of compromise for a given resource.
For example, an IDT rootkit could be accomplished by either a change of the
IDTR or one of the IDT entries. As one change is not dependent on the other,
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both resources must be checked. However, to allow for earliest detection at
minimal measurement cost, the IDTR register measurement is performed first
as a detection of a change would provide an alert at minimal cost.
Triggers with only dependent actions imply a logical ordering of succes-
sive measurements that lead to an advanced security diagnosis. For example,
with a kernel code compromise with completely persistent changes, the CR0
write-protect bit must be disabled before the kernel code can be modified.
However, a detection of a changed CR0 register does not guarantee that the
code sections were modified and thus, the code sections must be measured to
complete the diagnosis.
7.4.3.2 Example Measurement Trigger: Kernel Code Sections Unchanged
- Persistent CR0 and kernel code changes
HypKernelFunctionsTampering hypothesizes that signs of kernel code tamper-
ing are evident. Evaluation of the hypothesis begins with a light-weight mea-
surement. If this measurement indicates a changed result, then the hypothesis
has been verified without involving additional measurements. However, if
the measurement does not indicate a changed measurement, then further mea-
surements must be done. As an example, the following steps allow evaluation
of this hypothesis:
1. Control Register 0 Write Protect bit changed.
If True, signs of tampering are present and no further measurements are
required to evaluate this hypothesis.
If False, proceed to next measurement.
2. Kernel code sections are changed. This measurement requires hashing
all of the kernel code sections in smaller Task sizes which is a more
Chapter 7. Architecture 122
expensive operation than the Control Register measurement.
If True, signs of tampering are present and no further measurements are
required to evaluate the hypothesis.
If False, there are no additional enabled measurements and the hypoth-
esis is evaluated as False.
Figure 7.4 shows the flow.
FIGURE 7.4: Persistent Kernel Code Section and CR0 Trigger.
Purple boxes are dependent actions.
7.4.3.3 Interrupt Descriptor Table Unchanged
Figure 7.5 provides the flow for the IDT trigger. This trigger begins with a
light-weight measurement of the IDT register (IDTR). If this measurement
indicates a change, the Trigger completes without incurring the cost of the
IDT measurement.
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However, if the IDTR check indicates no change, it is still possible that
the attacker has modified the IDT itself. As the IDT can be modified without
changing the IDTR, this action is independent of the previous action. If
the IDT table has changed, the trigger completes with a change detected,
otherwise, it completes with no change detected.
FIGURE 7.5: Interrupt Descriptor Table Trigger. Green boxes are
independent actions.
7.5 Backend Manager
The Backend Manager (BEM) manages the performance aspects of EPA-RIMM
and provides measurement requests to the monitored systems. It resides on
a separate node from the monitored node. It receives Checks from the Diag-
nosis Manager and decomposes them into smaller Tasks to avoid prolonged
SMM session times. The granularity of the decomposition is specified by the
Decomposition Target parameter. (See Table 7.2.) The BEM schedules Tasks
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by filling Bins based on a target Bin size. It signs, creates a MAC (Message
Authentication Code), encrypts each Bin, and then provides it to the Host
Communications Manager which interfaces with the SMM-based Inspector.
The BEM waits to receive the Inspector’s Results back. It decrypts the Results
and checks the signature and MAC to ensure that they came from the proper
Inspector and were not tampered with in-transit. The BEM merges results of
all the Tasks for each Check into a single Result and sends it to the DM.
Check decomposition reduces system impacts, allowing larger, more fre-
quent, and less predictable measurements. This approach trades atomic
measurements for partial results over time. Scrubbing attacks are challenges
for SMM-based runtime integrity mechanisms [7], and frequent measure-
ments may reduce transient malware’s time window to operate. Malware
that installed itself and later tried to remove itself could be detected via EPA-
RIMM re-measurements. Check decomposition involves an overall efficiency
and space trade-off as smaller amounts of work processed per SMI result in
more SMIs in total. Additionally, a larger number of Tasks requires more
storage space on the BEM. Thus, there is a trade-off between SMM latency
and overall measurement efficiency.
TABLE 7.2: Decomposition and Bin Size Parameters
Value Configured at Applies to...
Target Bin Size Runtime Current Bin Size
Max Bin Size Provisioning Bin Size Limit
Decomp. Target Provisioning Task Granularity
7.5.1 BEM Provisioning
The BEM is provisioned with the appropriate keys for signing and encryption.
The BEM’s Task performance estimations are set based on an initial perfor-
mance measurement so that the EPA-RIMM can begin runtime operation
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with an appropriately sized amount of work in a Bin. Since there is no pre-
emption of SMM code, platform-specific performance prediction is accurate.
Initial measurements that will be re-checked over time can be gathered in the
provisioning phase in an offline environment (preferred) or upon the first
measurement of a resource. Storing the measurement hashes in the BEM
avoids scalability issues related to limited SMRAM.
7.5.2 BEM Runtime
Because the system experiences an overhead transitioning to SMM and back,
minimizing the number of SMIs is a consideration. Since each SMI transfers
one Bin, efficiently filling the Bin reduces the number of SMIs and conse-
quently the amount of time spent transitioning to and from SMM. We use a
priority queue for Bin packing, so Tasks are not scheduled in strict priority
order; a lower priority Task might be selected to "fill" a Bin in place of larger
higher priority Tasks. Priorities are adaptive; Tasks are assigned an initial
priority based on their parent Check, but priorities change at runtime, for
example, with aging. The BEM may increase or decrease the Bin size within
set bounds. The BEM may also increase or decrease the SMI frequency upon
direction from the DM.
7.6 Oracle
The Oracle is responsible for maintaining the provisioned hashes. It resides
on a separate node from the monitored node. This allows abstracting the
machine-specific parameters from the BEM. At runtime, the BEM will request
the provisioned hashes from the Oracle to provide to the Inspector to allow
comparing the current measurement against the provisioned hash.
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7.7 Host Communications Manager
The Host Communications Manager (HCM) resides within the monitored
system and provides an interface between the Inspector and the BEM. As
SMM does not feature a dedicated network stack, an interface needs to be
enabled for communication with it. The HCM mechanism should be out-of-
band of the OS, such as the BMC (Baseboard Management Controller) [7].
In-band mechanisms (e.g. Ring 3 application and kernel module) should not
be used as they are vulnerable to malware. For example, if a HCM process
were to be killed by malware, the measurement would stop. While the BEM
could detect a lack of response and trigger an alert, there is a subtler attack
that is possible. Malicious code could recognize that a measurement request
is imminent, clean its traces, and then let the measurement proceed. The
HCM receives Bins from the BEM and provides them to the Inspector when
it triggers its operation via an SMI. The HCM also receives Results from the
Inspector which it returns to the BEM.
7.8 Inspector
The Inspector performs the measurements from SMM, noting differences
compared to the comparison measurement. The Inspector is compiled into
the BIOS and is initiated via an SMI. It has the ability to view the interrupted
host-side CPU register state, MSR values, and allowable regions of the host-
side memory space. The Inspector also monitors the measurement cost in
terms of time and returns the cost to the BEM so that it can adaptively tune the
Bin size. The Inspector checks the Bin’s Message Authentication Code (MAC)
creates a new MAC for the outgoing Results to ensure in-transit integrity.
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7.8.1 Inspector Provisioning
The Inspector must be provisioned with encryption and signing keys for its
communications with the BEM. EPA-RIMM does not prescribe a particular
key provisioning method and leaves the implementation up to the imple-
menter. EPA-RIMM is compatible with TPM-based key provisioning or a
Diffie-Hellman key exchange using public keys embedded in the firmware.
7.8.2 Inspector Runtime
The Inspector will be invoked by an SMI that specifies the Bin for the Inspector.
The Inspector returns the Results as shown in Table 7.3.
TABLE 7.3: Results Description
Results Entry Source
Check ID# BEM
Task ID# BEM
Result Inspector
Measured Hash Inspector
Measurement Cost Inspector
Inspector Signature Inspector
Results Integrity Measurement Inspector
7.8.3 Complete Architecture Flow
Figure 7.6 provides a complete example of the EPA-RIMM architecture. In this
example, we show three Checks: A, B, and C with different costs and priorities.
The Diagnosis Manager sends these Checks to the Backend Manager which
decomposes them into Tasks using a Task Decomposition Target of 75µs and
places them into a priority queue. The Backend Manager then forms Bins
with no more than 100µs. The Backend Manager then signs and encrypts the
Bins and provides to the Host Communications Manager which passes the
Bin to the Inspector via an SMI. The Inspector processes the Tasks in the Bin
and observes a difference in Check A - Task 0 which it returns back through
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FIGURE 7.6: A complete example of EPA-RIMM’s active mon-
itoring phase. In this example, the same Bin is provided to all
monitored nodes, but in a heterogeneous environment the Bins
and the hash costs could differ between nodes. We show the
BEM and the Inspector as residing on separate machines, but
there is no requirement for this separation.
the Host Communications Manager to the Backend Manager. The Backend
Manager consolidates the results and provides to the Diagnosis Manager.
7.9 Security Analysis
In this section, we describe our assumptions and analyze potential threats
against EPA-RIMM. We consider attacks against SMM and EPA-RIMM com-
ponents and on requests and results, side channels, initial measurements,
infrastructure compromise and denial of service, crypto/signing attacks, and
transient evasion attacks.
Research Question 1: How to design a more secure measurement agent?
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7.9.1 Assumptions
We assume that initial measurements can be gathered during a provision-
ing process and that OS updates that change monitored resources trigger a
re-provisioning. We also assume that SMRAM is well-protected and lever-
ages available hardware protections including SPI protections over the BIOS
chip and proper SMRR configuration. The CHIPSEC tool can be used to
verify proper platform SMM configuration [68]. EPA-RIMM also assumes
the presence of an out-of-band network interface to allow communication
of measurements requests and results. We assume the out-of-band interface
is not malicious. EPA-RIMM targets scenarios where an attacker has gained
control over the operating system or hypervisor at runtime. This can include
code injection into these privileged layers.
7.9.2 Inspector
The Inspector, residing within SMM, may be targeted by the attacker. One
potential attack is a confused deputy attack in which the attacker attempts
to trick the Inspector into overwriting SMRAM memory or other privileged
memory. The Inspector should check input buffers to ensure that they do
not reside within the SMRR. The Inspector should also communicate directly
with the BEM and not write data into OS-controlled memory. Attacks on
EPA-RIMM’s Inspector could attempt to forge a measurement request from
a malicious BEM in order to gain additional insights into operation of the
system. For this reason, it is important that the Inspector and BEM properly
authenticate with each other. The Inspector and BEM also use encryption for
their communications to prevent eavesdropping or tampering. The nonce
prevents replay attacks in which previous measurements are passed off as
current measurements. The Inspector should not return more information
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than is required to determine an unwanted change has occurred. By returning
hashes instead of actual measurement values, the Inspector helps limit its
potential usefulness as a side channel.
7.9.3 Initial Measurements and EPA-RIMM launch
Initial measurements should be provisioned in an offline environment to
avoid compromised values appearing as pristine values. In homogeneous
environments with identical kernel and OS versions, it may be possible to
gather an initial measurement on a representative node for comparison other
identically-configured nodes. New kernel versions that come with an op-
erating system update would require re-provisioning due to new memory
layouts. Once the host software launches with a trusted boot, EPA-RIMM can
begin servicing measurement requests over the out-of-band HCM interface.
7.9.4 Infrastructure Compromise and Denial of Service
If a Denial of Service were to affect the DM or BEM, the flow of measurement
requests would slow or cease. Monitoring of the flow of EPA-RIMM measure-
ments would be necessary to identify this type of attack. If the DM were to
be compromised, it would be possible to misdirect EPA-RIMM to monitor
an unrelated set of resources while an attack executes or share false reports
of attack detection. For this reason, the EPA-RIMM Administrator should
monitor and investigate the threat intelligence exchanged by EPA-RIMM and
also audit the Checks that are being performed for unexpected changes. A
compromise of the BEM could expose the hash database. However, this is of
limited use as it contains hashes instead of memory contents.
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A denial of service attack against the measurement agent cannot be com-
pletely avoided. For scenarios where improper Bins are provided, process-
ing time can be minimized by aborting processing of the Bin once a prob-
lem with decryption or signature is identified. Administrators or supervi-
sor software could monitor the number of SMIs processed by reading the
MSR_SMI_COUNT or an STM-based SMI counter periodically to determine
if a high rate of SMIs is occurring. For the scenario in which the attacker can
construct valid Bins, the Inspector is provisioned with a maximum limit for
memory measurements to avoid spending excessive time in an SMI session.
The EPA-RIMM administrator specifies the limit based on benchmarks for
the system that produce a hash cost per byte metric. This will not completely
thwart a denial of service attack but will reduce a degree of its effects. The
measurement agent could also consult the MSR_SMI_COUNT and if it detects
a higher rate of SMIs than allowed by provisioning, could abort further Bin
processing, returning errors to the Backend Manager which would trigger an
alert.
There are two key aspects to address for minimizing SMM-based denial
of service attacks: 1. Duration of SMI, 2. Frequency of SMIs. For EPA-RIMM,
SMI duration is primarily determined by the measurement size. An attacker
who succeeds in requesting an overly large measurement could consume
large amounts of time in SMM, preventing the system from performing other
work. Likewise, an attacker who specifies a flood of measurements could also
cause the system to spend significant amounts of time in SMM. Note: while
EPA-RIMM can take safeguards against being used as a denial of service
mechanism, SMM-based denial of service attacks are always present as any
attacker with Ring 0 privileges can generate an arbitrary SMI.
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To address the duration issue, the EPA-RIMM provisioning phase per-
forms hash measurements starting from powers of 210 until the measurement
results exceed LimitSmiEmpirical . The measurement agent records the maxi-
mum hash size that was below
LimitSmiEmpirical and rejects measurements with lengths that exceed this.
EPA-RIMM addressed the SMI flood attack by allowing a maximum num-
ber of inspections per minute. The measurement agent increments a counter
with each measurement request and checks the counter value against the
maximum-allowed value specified during provisioning. Measurement re-
quest frequencies that exceed the allowable maximum value are rejected.
Attackers who try to invoke false positives by changing resources on
a monitored node to trigger a flood of alerts, would succeed in triggering
these alerts but would not evade notice that monitored resources had been
successfully changed.
7.9.5 Transient Evasion Techniques
All snapshot-based periodic inspections have the potential to miss attack
detection if signs of the attack were not present at the measurement inter-
val. EPA-RIMM, unlike other SMM RIMMs, can be used to measure more
frequently, in smaller portions to reduce the amount of time between periodic
measurements. Additionally, varying the set of measured items dynamically
at runtime leads to less predictable measurements which complicates the
attacker’s task.
7.9.6 Stealth
It is difficult for SMM RIMMs to be completely stealthy and EPA-RIMM is
no exception. A motivated attacker could leverage timing information to
ascertain losses of control. The developers of a stealthy SMM-based debugger,
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MALT, note that while they were able to adjust various system timers in
SMM to hide their operation, a dedicated attacker could send an encrypted
message to a remote timing server to get accurate sense of time [118]. For
these reasons, while SMM-RIMMs operate independently from host software,
complete stealth appears infeasible.
7.9.7 Host-side Memory Visibility
Most SMM-RIMMs grant privileges beyond what is absolutely required by
their measurement agent. By utilizing the SMI Transfer Monitor (STM), the
principle of least privilege could be applied to the measurement agent [110,
84]. The STM is a thin SMM-based hypervisor that virtualizes SMI handlers
in their own virtual machine and applies a protection policy over this virtual
machine to constrain their accesses to platform resources.
We implemented a set of STM policies to restrict the measurement agent’s
access to the allowed set of resources. As the measurement agent does not
need to modify host memory but only read the memory for the purpose
of hashing, host memory writes are prohibited to the measurement agent.
To allow the measurement agent to return results via a memory write, the
EPA-RIMM architecture can leverage the UEFI Communications Buffer which
provides a BIOS-reserved memory region for communications [116]. EPA-
RIMM does not need to modify MSRs or IO Ports and can thus read-only
access to measured resources allows the measurement agent to have a suitable
level of access. EPA-RIMM requires host memory read access where it would
otherwise not be required. Thus, there is a necessary trade-off in the goals of:
1. Restricting SMI handler access to host resources and 2. Providing SMM-
based runtime integrity measurement. SMM policies that provide increased
rootkit detection at minimal impact to SMM security represent an overall
improvement in system security.
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7.9.8 KASLR
The kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR) feature would re-
quire special handling with EPA-RIMM measurements as the kernel addresses
would be randomized. One option for supporting KASLR would be to gen-
erate new provisioned values upon initial boot. This allows KASLR to be
enabled in a method that is compatible with EPA-RIMM. At present, the
future of KASLR is unclear [36]. There have been several recent attacks on
the KASLR feature using page faults, prefetch, Intel TSX, and Branch Target
Buffers and several mitigations proposed [41, 37, 51, 28].
7.9.9 Spectre/Meltdown
In recent months, the Spectre and Meltdown attacks [64, 57] have received
significant coverage. Some of these attacks are applicable to SMM. Intel
has provided guidance about software remediations for the attacks [43] and
also has released CPUs with upgraded hardware-based fixes. The Bounds
Check Bypass (CVE-2017-5753) uses speculative execution following branch
instructions. For this vulnerability, adding LFENCE instructions before a
bounds check can mitigate the attack. Intel notes that "Overapplication of
LFENCE can compromise performance [43]. As a goal of EPA-RIMM is to
bound the time spent in SMM, this mitigation reduces the available amount of
SMM time for EPA-RIMM processing. Thus, a careful consideration of where
LFENCE operations may be required would be necessary to mitigate the side-
channel attack and maintain acceptable EPA-RIMM performance. Another
attack, Branch Target Injection, leverages indirect branch predictors to control
which instructions are speculatively executed after a near indirect branch
predictor. Intel has announced two remediations, the first of which provides
control over which indirect branch speculations are allowed. The second
Chapter 7. Architecture 135
creates a "retpoline" which substitutes near jump and call instructions with an
alternate code sequence that invokes a direct call. This approach may result in
a reduced performance overhead for the mitigation. EPA-RIMM developers
should analyze the impact of these two remediations on the Inspector to
determine the appropriate balance between side-channel protections and
Inspector performance.
7.9.10 Attacks on Measurement Agent Communications
EPA-RIMM achieved protections for confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity
by means of encrypted, signed, and authenticated communications. Encryp-
tion over the communications protects against malicious inspection of the
contents as each message is not able to be parsed by an attacker without the
proper key.
Falsified communications can be remedied by signing measurements and
results to ensure they originated from the proper entities. While EPA-RIMM
does not prescribe a particular signature mechanism, RSA provides a compat-
ible implementation. RSA cryptography leverages public and private keys
to encrypt messages for a specific target. During provisioning, the measure-
ment agent conveys its public key to the Backend Manager and receives the
Backend Manager’s public key. Each entity is responsible for maintaining
the secrecy of their private keys. The measurement agent stores its private
key in SMRAM which is unavailable to code in the operating system or hy-
pervisor. The Backend Manager may store its key in the Trusted Platform
Module (TPM), a hardware-protected chip that is commonly used to store
keys. The Backend Manager uses its private key to encrypt messages for a
particular measurement agent and the measurement agent utilizes its private
key to decrypt the message from the Backend Manager. The reverse flow of
measurement results uses the same mechanism.
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EPA-RIMM addressed the possibility of spoofed messages using a signa-
ture check. Messages that are received without a proper signature can be
rejected by either the measurement agent or the Backend Manager. Listing 7.1
shows detection by the measurement agent of a spoofed sender.
LISTING 7.1: Signature example
Correct s ignature : 4 d414e4147455231323334 . . .
Spoofed s ignature : 55444333221100AABBCCDD . . .
ERROR: BEM signature mismatch !
To protect against a communications tampering attack, EPA-RIMM lever-
ages an HMAC over measurement requests and results to obtain confidence
over message integrity [58, 11]. HMAC uses an encryption key and hash
algorithm to verify the data integrity and authentication of a message. The
data integrity check can detect a change in the measurement request or results
after initial transmission of the message.
While encryption provides protection against an attacker being able to
discover the contents of a measurement request or result, it does not provide
full protection against an attacker that modifies a portion of the data, e.g.
the message integrity. For this reason, an HMAC provides the ability to
detect message tampering. Listing 7.2 shows an example of an HMAC being
constructed over the contents of an unmodified communication and then
rechecked after an attacker modifies part of the message. The tampering
results in a different HMAC which the measurement agent can then be aware
of.
LISTING 7.2: HMAC example
HMAC over unmodified message :
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7 b8dd1535678ce49728292a6c582e702
07 e4844bcf954b7685fbe48771837486
HMAC over modified message :
83368892920 c4148cbc7281b35b8c24b
24 a87185c957ffb513401463fd004f8d
"ERROR: HMAC d i f f e r s ! "
To address replay attacks where an attacker tries to replay copies of previ-
ous measurement requests or results, a nonce provides the ability to sequence
communications such that each message has a unique sequence number and
attempts to pass off old messages as new messages can be detected. EPA-
RIMM’s communications include a nonce to ensure measurement liveness.
For each Bin that the Backend Manager creates, it generates a unique
nonce and a unique identifier for the Bin. It associates the nonce with the Bin
identifier in its internal memory. If the Backend Manager were to receive a
Result for a given Bin with an improper nonce, it would discard the Result
and would raise an alert that it received an incorrect nonce value, which may
be indicative of an attack on EPA-RIMM.
EPA-RIMM leverages encryption over measurement requests and results
to protect against an adversary who endeavors to view the contents of these
messages. Applying cryptography incurs performance costs within a limited
time budget in SMM, which necessitates selecting performance-efficient cryp-
tography mechanisms. EPA-RIMM does not prescribe a specific cryptography
implementation, however, there are implications based on which method
is selected. One approach is to use public and private key cryptography to
establish a secure channel in which an AES symmetric key can be exchanged.
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Encryption provides a critical capability in hiding the contents of EPA-
RIMM measurements from an attacker. Listing 7.3 shows the contents of
an intercepted measurement result from the measurement agent. The fields
are not useful to the attacker as the attacker cannot derive the results of the
EPA-RIMM measurement.
LISTING 7.3: Encrypted measurement result
IV 0 x1672d3b32e7 0 x1672d3b3342
Command 027 fe03e3445e1be9
Operand 0 x82fc469e9d38c16a
V i r t u a l Address 0 x9d3a395f7820d12e
Phys Address 0 x39355208988e5bf9
Length 0 x9e2d8af570319ead
Resul t 0 x 3 a f 9 3 0 f b f 4 0 7 5 f 0 f
Nonce 0 xe3222c1fdb601ca0
Cost 5 d133a485c3e5cca
Task UUID 3 b245fa1173c6740
Reserved1 46094808 c2bc3445
Hash : 3b4da65d 8bdc39ed 220 d60fa . . .
Manager Signature : f f01ccd7c82a64a37e3ef9ca672 . . .
I n s p e c t o r Signature : f f9e49af fc8468859e78abbced2 . . .
HMAC 6 fdb27f61196ec55a931589a645 . . .
7.9.11 Use of EPA-RIMM as a side channel
EPA-RIMM limits the amount of useful data to an attacker by reporting hashes
instead of raw values from the system. This prevents attackers from observing
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register values, memory contents, and MSR values that might increase an
attacker’s understanding of the actual system state.
EPA-RIMM measurements consist of a flow of hash values for resources
measured. An attacker who succeeds in compromising the Backend Manager
and endeavors to learn useful measurement details from the system being
monitored would only have access to hash values from the system, as shown
in Figure 7.7. As hashes consist of a mathematical one-way operation that
does not allow reconstructing the initial values, attackers will not gain useful
information from the data.
FIGURE 7.7: Hash samples
7.10 Conclusions
The EPA-RIMM architecture provides a means of meeting the design require-
ments described in Section 6. EPA-RIMM allows the specification of Checks
which the Backend Manager decomposes into Tasks to bound the amount of
work performed in a single SMI session. Bins represent the complete set of
work to be performed by a CPU thread in a single SMI session.
To resolve the SMM-RIMM semantic gap and remove the need to store
context in SMM, we identified a set of measurement primitives to detect a
variety of known rootkit and ransomware techniques, namely: virtual and
physical memory ranges, CPU control registers, and MSRs. These fundamen-
tal building blocks for integrity measurements are able to detect a variety of
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contemporary host software rootkits and ransomwares. For future extensi-
bility, the API can support new primitives by specifying the new parameters
and adding the corresponding measurement code in the Inspector. This can
all be accomplished without requiring broader changes in the EPA-RIMM
architecture.
Measurement Triggers provide the means to perform advanced security
diagnosis in a logical method by performing light-weight measurements prior
to heavier measurements. Dependent trigger actions provide a means of
avoiding heavier measurements until lighter-weight measurements demon-
strate the need for this additional work. By applying the use of measurement
triggers, we employed a targeted approach towards analyzing potential at-
tack scenarios which reduced the amount of checking required. This allowed
evaluation of security hypothesis with reduced measurement cost.
Beyond limiting the time spent in a single SMI session, we needed to
address the overall performance impacts of repeated SMM-RIMM measure-
ments to lessen the system impact. We investigated whether a hypotheses
model developed in the performance analysis field (Paradyn) can be applied
to EPA-RIMM’s security inspections [80]. In this model, lighter-weight mea-
surements are performed first to evaluate whether a potential hypothesis can
explain performance problems. If lighter-weight measurements indicate a po-
tential performance problem, then more invasive and costlier measurements
are performed. This technique had not yet been applied to SMM-RIMMs.
SMM-RIMMs need to balance the amount of inspections they perform with
their impact on the system. In the ideal case, each security-sensitive resource
could be checked at every CPU clock tick, presenting no opportunity for an
attacker to escape detection. However, this would result in a system that was
unusable for practical purposes. Thus, the SMM-RIMM needs to provide
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effective detection at a reasonable performance trade-off. We investigated
whether this approach can also be used in EPA-RIMM to provide effective
rootkit detection at reduced performance cost.
The security of the EPA-RIMM architecture is very important as vulner-
abilities in its SMM code would present significant concern. A key method
for dealing with this concern is to run the Inspector inside a virtual machine
to constrain its accesses [110]. This allows applying the principle of least
privilege to the measurement agent. By storing hashes instead of raw values,
EPA-RIMM reduces the amount of actionable information an attacker can
glean from the measurements. The EPA-RIMM architecture provides a usable
example of an SMM-based RIMM that balances performance, the principle of
least privilege, and effectiveness which is unique among other SMM-RIMMs.
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EPA-RIMM Prototype
In this section, we describe our EPA-RIMM prototype including its various
software modules. We leverage open-hardware platforms with open-source
UEFI implementations for this prototype. We cover attack detection with the
prototype and its impact on application performance.
8.1 Prototype Overview
To test our design, we developed a prototype which implements the necessary
portion of the EPA-RIMM architecture. Our prototype systems do not have
an out-of-band communication mechanism, therefore we demonstrate the
functionality using an in-band mechanism. This is sufficient for the research
prototype since it does not share the security requirements of a production
system. We implemented four separate modules: the BEM, an in-band HCM
(consisting of the "Frontend Manager" (FEM) and "Ring 0 Manager" (R0M)
modules), and the Inspector. The BEM runs on a network server while the
other components reside on the monitored system. The initial prototype
does not implement the Diagnosis Manager although an updated software
stack adds a basic version of this component. The prototype is available at:
https://github.com/PPerfLab/EPARIMM-Release.1
8.1.1 Hardware
We enabled our prototype on two open-hardware systems: The Minnowboard
Turbot and the UP Squared ("UP2") board. Both boards leverage the x86
CPU architecture, feature open-source UEFI firmware, and provide support
flashing modified firmware. Both boards have less computational resources
1The BEM used in this dissertation is available for internal testing and benchmarking,
however, is not released in this github. An updated BEM has been released.
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than a typical server platform that EPA-RIMM would be running on. The
Turbot features a dual core Intel Atom e3826 processor with a base clock of
1.46 GHz and 2 GB RAM [49]. The UP2 board has a more recent Intel Pentium
N4200 CPU with a base clock of 1.1 GHz and 8 GB of RAM. Both boards
feature onboard Ethernet and support an attached solid-state disk (SSD). We
use Ubuntu 14.04 64bit with a 4.11 kernel on these systems.
8.1.2 Firmware
We modified the SMI handler in the respective UEFI source for the Turbot
and UP2 boards by creating a DXE_SMM_DRIVER which registers a new
software SMI using the EFI_SMM_SW_DISPATCH_PROTOCOL. We inte-
grated OpenSSL 1.1.0e support into the Inspector for SHA256 hashing for
measurements, AES256-CBC for encryption, and HMAC SHA256 for integrity.
We configure the SMM page tables to allow the necessary access to host mem-
ory to allow memory measurements, receiving measurement requests, and
sending measurement results.
8.2 Prototype Modules
8.2.1 BEM
Our BEM is the primary interface to running EPA-RIMM measurements on
the prototype. We created a script to identify relevant sections of the kernel
code to measure, e.g. code sections and read-only data sections and create
fixed-size Tasks for the BEM. We also provide an interface for the user to
configure which control registers and which MSRs to measure.
Once the Tasks are entered into the BEM, it establishes a priority queue
for the measurement Tasks and groups them into Bins based on a first-fit
algorithm. The BEM sets up a network socket connection with a set of FEMs
(one per monitored system). As each monitored system may process Tasks
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at different rates, the number of Tasks that fit in a given Bin size may vary
across systems.
The BEM supports a wide variety of testing options:
1. Run Duration Options: Run forever, run for X Bins, run for X priority
queue refills, re-run previously measurements tasks (yes or no), send
Bins for a timed duration.
2. Bin transmission parameters: Random delay between Bins (yes or no),
maximum random delay between Bins, duration of delay between Bins.
3. Bin Encryption enabled (yes or no), Result decryption enabled (yes or
no)
4. HMAC creation enabled (yes or no), HMAC comparison enabled (yes
or no)
5. Measurement targets: Measure [Memory, Control Registers, MSRs]
(yes or no), Measure IDTR and IDT (yes or no), sample memory range
enabled (yes or no), sample granularity (bytes), sample density (percent-
age)
6. Maximum Bin size
8.2.2 HCM
We implemented the HCM prototype with a FEM and Ring 0 Manager. The
FEM receives the signed and encrypted Bin from the BEM and writes it to a
/proc interface that is registered by the Ring 0 Manager. After each Bin has
been processed, the FEM retrieves the Results from the /proc interface and
send them to the BEM. The Ring 0 Manager (Linux kernel module) receives
the Bin from the FEM via the write to the /proc interface. The Ring 0 Manager
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then records the virtual memory location of the Bin in a CPU register. After
this, it triggers the measurement SMI by writing a pre-arranged value to port
0xB2.
8.2.3 Inspector
The Inspector registers an SMI that will receive measurement requests. Upon
receiving the SMI, the Inspector will locate the Bin in memory, converting the
virtual memory address of the Bin to physical. The Inspector checks to ensure
that the Bin is not within SMRAM memory to avoid overwriting SMRAM
memory. The Inspector decrypts the Bin, checks the signature, verifies the
provided HMAC, and performs the specified measurements. To prepare
the results, the Inspector generates an HMAC over their contents, and then
encrypts and signs the Results data. It then copies the Results out to the Ring
0 Manager.
For the provisioning phase, the Inspector computes hash values for the
specified operation (MSR, CPU register, or memory region) and writes the
hash value back into the Results data structure. For subsequent measurements,
the Inspector receives the initial hash value from the BEM for comparison.
The Inspector gathers performance metrics on each measurement to deter-
mine the cost of hash, encryption, HMAC, among its other operations. This
allows the BEM to refine its cost estimates over time with a rolling average to
more precisely bound the amount of time spent in SMM.
The Inspector also incorporates an automatically-generated MSR whitelist
which lists the acceptable set of MSRs to monitor. This whitelist prevents the
specification of non-supported MSRs on the CPU which would trigger an
exception.
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8.3 Attack Detection Using the Prototype
In this section, we show the Checks that can detect the rootkit and ransomware
techniques described in Table 1.1. As we do not have access to the actual
rootkits and ransomwares, we implemented compromises of the types of
resources that they changed.
1. IDT Hooking:
IDTR: Check command = Measure Register
Operand = IDTR.
IDT: Check command = Measure Virtual Memory
Address = IDT address (obtained from provisioned IDTR)
2. CR4.SMEP Disable: Check command = Measure Register
Operand = CR4
3. Kernel Code Injection: We first determine the kernel code sections from
/proc/kallsyms.
ffffffff81000000 T _stext
...
ffffffff81c031d1 T _etext
The resulting Check is:
Command = Measure Virtual Memory
Address = 0xffffffff81000000
Chapter 8. EPA-RIMM Prototype 147
Length = 0xc031d1.
4. System Call Hooking: We determine the location of the System Call
Table from the /proc/kallsyms:
ffffffff81e00220 R sys_call_table
ffffffff81e01340 r
Check command = Measure Virtual Memory
Address = 0xffffffff81e00220
Length = 0x1220
5. Xen Code Injection and Xen Malicious Exception Handler: Similar to
Linux, Xen produces a file (xen-syms) that maps kernel symbols to
virtual addresses. The range can be determined from the beginning
(_stext) to the end, e.g. _einittext.
ffff82d080200000 T _stext
...
ffff82d08063b64d T _einittext
Check command = Measure Virtual Memory
Address = 0xffff82d080200000
Length = 0x43B64D
8.3.1 Transient Attack Detection
In this section, we analyze EPA-RIMM’s ability to detect transient attacks in
Section 8.3.1. While transient attacks are not the target of EPA-RIMM, we
examine EPA-RIMM’s ability to detect transient attacks.
A common attack on SMM-RIMMs is called a scrubbing (or evasion)
attack [81, 112]. If attackers can predict when a measurement is about to be
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performed, the attackers can clean up traces of their attack such that when
the measurement later occurs, the traces of the attack are no longer present.
After the measurement, the attackers can again place their attack hooks.
We considered the following scenario in which an attacker places their
IDTR attack for a short sub-second duration (either 0.1 or 0.5 secs) before
removing it. The attacker waits a randomized duration (between 0 and
30 seconds) between transient attacks and attempts them repeatedly over
an extended period of time. EPA-RIMM is loaded with an IDTR Check
that it will schedule according to varying frequencies described in Table 8.1.
Figures 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4 show the detailed inspection reports for scenarios
1-4, respectively, with green depicting a measurement with no change detected
and red indicating a successful detection of compromise.
The results show successful detection of all attack scenarios, although in
Scenario 3, only four of 1610 attacks were detected. However, even one
successful detection would raise an administrator alert. In practice, there
would likely be additional EPA-RIMM measurements on the queue which
would reduce the frequency of the IDTR measurement which would reduce
the detection percentage. An attacker, though, could not guarantee a complete
lack of detection as they cannot rule out a measurement occurring while the
attack was placed.
As EPA-RIMM focuses on persistent rootkits, it does not completely ad-
dress the transient attack detection issue common to all SMM-RIMMs that
perform periodic measurements. However, it can address a variety of tran-
sient attack scenarios. The chance of transient attack detection is determined
by the frequency of measurements, whether the changed resource is present
in the set of enabled measurements, and measurement processing rate. Our
results show that EPA-RIMM can detect some instances of transient attacks.
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TABLE 8.1: Transient Attack Detection
Scenario AWait(s) HPlace(s) MFreq(1 per Ns) TAttacks TAttackD
1 0..30 0.5 10 1127 51
2 0..30 0.1 10 3398 37
3 0..30 0.1 30 1610 4
4 0..30 0.1 1..10 (Random) 1693 52
Legend
AWait: Attacker wait randomized threshold (secs)
HPlace: Hack placement duration (secs)
MFreq: EPA-RIMM Measurement Frequency (1 per N secs)
TAttacks: Number of transient attacks placed
TAttackD: Number of transient attacks detected
FIGURE 8.1: 0.5s compromise placement (HPlace)
1 measurement per 10 secs (MFreq)
FIGURE 8.2: 0.1s compromise placement (HPlace)
1 measurement per 10 secs (MFreq)
FIGURE 8.3: 0.1s compromise placement (HPlace)
1 measurement per 30 secs (MFreq)
FIGURE 8.4: 0.1s compromise placement (HPlace)
1 measurement per 1 to 10 secs (randomized) (MFreq)
8.4 Impacts on Application Performance
To measure EPA-RIMM’s impact on application performance, we compared
benchmark performance on the Minnowboard Turbot for four scenarios:
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Baseline (no SMIs); Light with two 0.5KB memory hashes per second, Medium
with four 0.5KB memory hashes per second; and eight 0.5KB memory hashes
per second. We ran the Phoronix Cachebench, pybench, C-Ray, and ffmpeg
benchmarks [91] and compared the throughput achieved against the no-
measurement baseline. (See Figures 8.5 and 8.6.) Cachebench exercises the
memory and cache - we selected the read operation; Pybench shows the
system’s python performance; C-Ray performs multi-threaded CPU floating
point operations; and ffmpeg performs multi-threaded audio/video encoding.
We observed performance degradation roughly proportional to the amount of
CPU cycles spent in SMM for the single-threaded Cachebench and pybench
workloads. The multi-threaded workloads, C-Ray and ffmpeg, show greater
performance degradation which indicates the cumulative impact of loss of
CPU cycles across a larger number of CPUs.
FIGURE 8.5: Application Impacts Linux
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FIGURE 8.6: Application Impacts Xen
8.5 Discussion
The EPA-RIMM prototype demonstrates a functional UEFI-based EPA-RIMM
measurement on two commodity open-hardware platforms: Minnowboard
Turbot and UP2 boards. EPA-RIMM has also been ported by John Fastabend to
use coreboot firmware [24]. With new open-hardware platforms that support
coreboot [60, 96], this presents additional deployment options. Our open-
source release of the EPA-RIMM software stack represents the first publicly-
available SMM-RIMM prototype. Our prototype demonstrates detection of
attacks involving changes to CPU control registers, kernel and hypervisor
code injection, as well as the possibility of detecting some transient malware.
To evaluate EPA-RIMM’s ability to provide the SMM measurement agent
with enough context to detect rootkit and ransomware techniques, we de-
veloped simulated attacks that performed the same resource compromises
as done in recent examples of these types of malware. EPA-RIMM detected
these compromises by leveraging its provisioning phase and measurement
API.
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The BEM provides a wide variety of test options that enabled a wide vari-
ety of test scenarios, including measurements over the cost of cryptography
operations, SMI processing costs, and varying Bin and Task sizes. The In-
spector supports the flexible measurement description API and allows rootkit
detection without building state into SMRAM. The HCM provides an example
of the necessary communications between the Inspector and the BEM, serving
as a pass-through for encrypted data flowing between these two endpoints.
The resulting application impacts of EPA-RIMM demonstrate that the
resulting performance is dependent on the size and frequency of the EPA-
RIMM measurements, representing a useful tuning knob. If EPA-RIMM
administrators want to minimize the impact on a latency-sensitive system,
system impacts can be greatly reduced by adjusting these knobs. However, if
the infrastructure is under attack, these knobs present the means to perform
deeper inspections to identify issues sooner.
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Task Scheduling in EPA-RIMM
Each EPA-RIMM measurement incurs an SMI entry and exit cost. This mo-
tivates a need to make effective use of the time spent in SMM as these fixed
costs are incurred for any measurement. Additionally, with a large measure-
ment queue, maintaining a high measurement throughput is important to
ensure that the Checks that the Diagnosis Manager added are processed in a
timely manner.
EPA-RIMM’s Backend Manager plays a key role in effectively allocating
sets of work to be performed in each SMM session. As new Checks can
arrive at any point in time, the precise set of Tasks to form Bins over is not
known at the outset of the simulator operation. Thus, the Backend Manager
must perform an online Bin formation without knowledge of what Tasks may
may arrive in the future. If available Bin capacity is not effectively used, the
overheads of entering and exiting SMM will be incurred but fewer measure-
ments will be performed, hurting efficiency. This results in increased system
performance degradation and slower progress through the measurement
queue.
Bin size and Bin frequency also play a key role in the effectiveness of pro-
cessing a large set of measurements. Increasing both of these results in faster
processing of the measurement queue, however, this results in additional
system overhead. The question of how to prevent starvation of older Tasks
on the queue when new Tasks arrive also merits investigation. To facilitate
an understanding of these questions, we developed a simulator, RIMM-SIM.
This simulator allows varying key adjustable parameters to explore schedul-
ing efficiency, speed of measurement processing, and prevention of Task
starvation.
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As different EPA-RIMM deployments could measure different resources,
it is possible that the incoming Checks arriving at the Backend Manager
may fall into various sizes. For example, memory hashes of small data
structures might take minimal time whereas measurements over the entire
Linux kernel could be decomposed into larger Task sizes where one Task
consumes all of the available Bin capacity. For this reason, we evaluate two
scenarios for Checks arriving at the Backend Manager: Uniform distribution
and a normal distribution. The uniform distribution option allows examining
the impacts of a wide variety of incoming Tasks where their costs do not
cluster around a median value. We envision that there may also be scenarios
where measurement sizes may cluster around a mean value and thus we also
evaluate a normal distribution.
In Section 9.1, we provide background information for the Knapsack Prob-
lem, First Come First Serve, and a Priority queue with optional backfilling and
aging features. In Section 9.2, we provide the results of our experiments that
investigate the performance of the First Come First Serve and Priority Queue
with backfilling and aging options. We discuss our results in Section 9.3.
9.1 Scheduling Approaches
We begin with the the Knapsack Problem, the cover the First Come First Serve
algorithm, the Priority queue, and priority queues with backfilling and aging.
9.1.1 Knapsack Problem
The classic "0/1" Knapsack Problem [92] consists of a knapsack that can hold
a capacity of W (weight), a set of items from 1 to N with weights wi to wN
and values vi to vN. The goal is to choose an optimal subset of items with
a weight no greater than W and the highest-possible value. The classic 0/1
Knapsack Problem is NP-Complete [17]. Applying this to EPA-RIMM Bin
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formation, the maximum weight, W, can be set to maximum Bin size. The
weights are the measurement costs and the values are the Task priorities.
In contrast, the fractional Knapsack Problem allows dividing items into
fractions which could allow better utilization of the available capacity. How-
ever, this variant is not applicable to EPA-RIMM as a finite set of hash values
is gathered during EPA-RIMM’s provisioning phase and measuring reduced
sizes in an attempt to better fill a Bin would result in different hash values
that cannot be evaluated.
9.1.2 First Come First Serve
The First Come First Serve ("FCFS") algorithm is a basic algorithm that selects
processes based on their order of arrival. Applied to to EPA-RIMM’s Backend
Manager, the Backend Manager would add Tasks from newly arrived Checks
to the end of the queue and fill the Bins with Tasks from the front of the queue.
This approach does not select tasks deeper in the queue to fill a Bin, even if
there would be space for them.
For an example, Figure 9.1 begins in Step 1 with five Tasks on the queue,
each with a cost of 33µs. In Step 2, Bin 0 is formed with four 33µs Tasks that
together consist of 132µs. As the maximum Bin cost is 150µs, this does not
allow the remaining 33µs Task to be included in this Bin. In Step 3, a new set
of Tasks (cost is 91µs for each Task) arrives on the queue and is placed at the
end. In Step 4, Bin 1 is formed with a 33µs and a 91µs Task. Step 5 shows the
resulting priority queue after this Bin formation.
The benefits of this approach are that the method is simple to implement
and is not prone to starvation due to processing tasks in order of arrival. A
key drawback of the approach is that it can result in less optimally-filled Bins
due to an inability to consider Tasks after the head of the queue for inclusion
in the Bin.
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FIGURE 9.1: Bin formation with First Come First Serve
Figure 9.2 shows an example of a problematic scenario for FCFS. In Step
1, there are four Tasks on the queue with costs of 130, 50, 20, and 20µs,
respectively. In Step 2, Bin 0 is formed with one Task of cost 130. We observe
that the third or fourth Task in the queue with a cost of 20 would completely
consume the remaining Bin capacity, however, the algorithm is not able to
select either of these Tasks, thus leaving 20µs of Bin capacity unused. In Step
3, new Tasks arrive on the queue with costs of 100 and 80, respectively. In
Step 4, the first two Tasks are selected for the Bin, collectively consuming 70µs
of Bin capacity. The fourth Task of cost 80 in the queue would completely
consume the remaining Bin capacity. However, it is not able to be selected.
Thus Bin 1 is unable to use 80µs of the Bin capacity. These limitations in the
First Come First Serve algorithm present clear limitations for EPA-RIMM as it
can result in significant amounts of Bin capacity being unused.
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FIGURE 9.2: Problematic Case - First Come First Serve
9.1.3 Priority Queue
In contrast to the FCFS, the Priority Queue adds a priority mechanism to
order tasks in the queue. The Priority Queue maintains a sorted list of Tasks
in priority order and chooses the first N highest priority Tasks that will fit
in the Bin. However, just as with FCFS, this method does not allow looking
deeper into the queue to identify lower-priority Tasks that would help fill the
Bin.
Figure 9.3 shows a priority queue. In this example, in Step 1, five Tasks of
cost 33µs are added to the queue with a priority of 10. In Step 1, the first four
Tasks are selected to form a Bin as they are the highest-priority Tasks that fit
within the Bin. In Step 3, a new Check arrives with priority 11 and its Tasks
are added to the head of the queue as they are now the highest priority Tasks.
In Step 4, a new Bin is formed with a single 91µs Task at priority 11. While
the 33µs Task at priority 10 would fit in the Bin, it is not considered. Step 5
shows the resulting queue.
Chapter 9. Task Scheduling in EPA-RIMM 158
FIGURE 9.3: Priority Queue
9.1.4 Priority Queue with Backfilling
Backfilling is a method to allow looking deeper into the queue to select lower-
priority Tasks to make better use of available scheduler capacity [61]. Applied
to a priority queue, backfilling would provide the ability to consider a lower
priority Task to better fill the Bin. This has the potential to resolve a key
limitation in a Priority Queue without backfilling.
In Figure 9.4, we revisit the example previously shown in Figure 9.2,
however, this time with backfilling enabled. This time, in Step 2, the Backend
Manager is able to select the third task in the queue with a cost of 20µs to fill
the Bin. We observe in Step 3 that the length of the queue is smaller due to
processing the 20µs Task in Step 2. In Step 4, the Backend Manager is able
to fill Bin 1 with an 80µs Task. Step 5 also has a smaller queue size due to
making fuller use of the available Bin capacity.
While backfilling provides an additional opportunity to fill Bins to a higher
capacity, it requires more Task cost comparisons to be made in the Backend
Manager than if backfilling were disabled. Additionally, it does not address
starvation of Tasks on the queue.
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FIGURE 9.4: Applying Backfilling for fuller Bin Capacities
9.1.5 Priority Queue with Aging
While the backfilling helps produce fuller Bins, it can be experience Task
starvation. Starvation can occur when newly arrived higher priority Tasks
take precedence over older Tasks. To address this issue, aging provides a
method of increasing the priority of older Tasks on the queue so that their
priority eventually rises to a level where they will be prioritized [103].
Figure 9.5 shows an example of how aging helps avoid Task starvation.
In Step 1, the priority queue consists of three Tasks with a 150µs cost and a
priority of 10. In Step 2, the first Task is selected which completely fills the
Bin. In Step 3, aging is first applied to existing Tasks on the queue. Then two
new Tasks arrive with a cost of 100 and 50µs and a priority of 10. In Step 4, a
new Bin is formed with the highest priority Task from the first set of Tasks
added to the queue. In Step 5, aging is again applied to existing Tasks on the
queue and the last remaining Task from the initial set of Tasks has the highest
priority (12) of any Task on the queue.
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FIGURE 9.5: Priority Queue with Aging
9.2 Experiments
9.2.1 Simulation Parameters
9.2.1.1 Check Arrival Rates, Sizes, and Priorities
The arrival rate of Checks on the Backend Manager depends on the Diagnosis
Manager’s decisions to enqueue Checks based on a schedule or trigger mech-
anism. Additionally, the sizes and priorities will vary based on the resources
being measured and the Diagnosis Manager’s priority to accomplish the
Checks. While the Backend Manager can support arbitrary Task durations,
for the purpose of RIMM-SIM, we analyze two key Task distributions:
1. Uniform distribution of random-sized Tasks: This represents a scenario
with a wide variety of Tasks in which any Task size is as likely to occur
as any other Task size. Practical scenarios in which this could result
could include monitoring a variety of read-only data structures that
could each be of arbitrary sizes.
2. Normal distribution of random-sized Tasks: This represents a scenario
where the majority of Task sizes will cluster around an average value
with a selected standard deviation. Practical scenarios in which this
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could occur would include scenarios where the size of monitored re-
sources tends to fall within a particular range although deviations from
this range are possible. For example, the Diagnosis Manager has se-
lected a set of large fixed sized resources to monitor (e.g. fixed-sized
kernel code sections along with a smaller assortment of resources that
are smaller and larger in size.)
For each of these scenarios, we bound the Tasks sizes to meet practical
EPA-RIMM constraints, for example, the Tasks must be greater than zero
as there is no scenario in which a Task would have a cost of zero. We also
constrain the Task sizes to be no greater than the Bin size, otherwise, they
would require decomposition which does not add a meaningful benefit to
this simulation. Thus, we examine truncated distributions that meet these
practical constraints.
9.2.1.2 Inputs
RIMM-SIM supports a variety of simulation parameters to allow precise
control over the desired scenario. Table 9.1 provides the parameters along
with a description.
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TABLE 9.1: Simulator Inputs
Input Description
Simulation Duration How many seconds to simulate
BEM CPU Frequency CPU cycles per second
Number of Tasks in Check How many Tasks in a newly arrived Check
Check Arrivals per second Number of new Checks, per second
Bins per second Bins formed/processed per second
Set of Tasks with total cost of Check Specific checks each with a total cost in µs
Maximum Bin size Maximum number of µs worth of work in Bin
Task decomposition target (“TDT”) Default Task cost (in µs)
Max Tasks per Bin Limit for how many Tasks can be in a Bin
Default Task priority The default priority of a new Task
Random Task Priority enable
If enabled, assign a random priority to new
Tasks
Random Task Priority max With random Task priority, the max Task priority
Aging enable A knob to enable aging
Random simulation seed enabled A knob to randomize the simulation
Seed number
If simulation seed is not random, the random
seed
Backfill enable A knob to enable backfill
New Tasks lowest priority enable Set new Tasks at lowest priority
9.2.1.3 Outputs
RIMM-SIM outputs a variety of useful statistics at the conclusion of the
simulation. These metrics are shown in Table 9.2.
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TABLE 9.2: Simulator Outputs
Output Description
Total number of Tasks processed The amount of processed Tasks
Total number of Bins processed The amount of processed Bins
Number of Check arrivals Number of Checks added to queue
Check completion duration Simulation cycles to complete all Tasks in a Check
Avg. queue time per Task Avg. cycles in the queue for all processed Tasks
Max Task queue time The max time a processed Task was on the queue
Avg., Max, Min Bin Size The amount of µs of work packed into the Bin
Avg. Tasks in Bin The Avg. number of Tasks across all Bins
Cumulative Task Age Total age of all Tasks on the queue
Oldest Task Age The age of the oldest Task on the queue
Number of waiting Tasks The total number of Tasks waiting on queue
Per-Bin history report List of all Bins and their Tasks
Average % of Bin capacity filled Percentage of Bin capacity used across all Bins
9.2.1.4 Simulator Internal Details
Before beginning RIMM-SIM, the user specifies the appropriate input settings
as described in Section 9.2.1.2. The main simulation loop calculates two key
events: Bin Formation and Task Arrivals. The timing of these depends on the
number of Check Arrivals per second and Bins per second.
A new set of Tasks is added to the queue when the simulation cycles
reaches the calculated time for Task Arrival. Depending on the simulation
scenario, this is accomplished in the following ways:
1. First Come First Serve: This scenario places new Tasks at the end of
the queue, all Tasks have identical priorities, and there is no backfill or
aging capability enabled.
2. Priority Queue: This scenario places new Tasks in a priority order, Tasks
can have different priorities. Backfill and aging can be independently
enabled.
When the simulation cycles reaches the time scheduled for new Bin for-
mation, a new Bin is created. Depending on the Bin formation algorithm:
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1. First Come First Serve: The Backend Manager selects the first N Tasks
that will fit within the Bin, disregarding later Tasks in the queue that
might be used to more fully fill the Bin. The method will consider the
Bin filled when the next Task under consideration does not fit in the Bin.
2. Priority Queue without backfilling: This method will proceed through
the queue in priority order and select Tasks that fit within the Bin. Once
a Task is found that does not fit within the Bin, the Bin is considered
closed.
3. Priority Queue with backfilling: This method will scan through the
ordered list of waiting Tasks, choosing the highest priority Tasks that fit
in the Bin. The algorithm has the ability to select a lower priority Task if
it helps fill the remaining Bin capacity.
Once the Bin is formed, the Bin is sent and marked as completed. Then
the next simulation event is calculated, e.g. Task Arrival or Bin Formation.
If aging is enabled, the priority of each Task on the queue is incremented
by one. The simulator then jumps to the next event and begins back in the
main simulation loop. Statistics are gathered during execution to record the
necessary outputs.
9.2.1.5 Evaluation of EPA-RIMM Scenarios
A variety of EPA-RIMM measurement scenarios are possible to occur in a real
deployment. These could include:
1. Light-weight Checking: This scenario performs a comparatively small
number of Checks on a less-frequent basis. Examples of this consist of:
A portion of the Linux kernel code section measurements, once every 24
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hours. In this scenario, no Task has a higher priority than another and
the Check arrival rate is roughly one Check arriving per day.
2. Heavy Checking: This scenario performs rigorous checking including
DM-selected subsets of Linux kernel code sections and read-only data
sections, the IDT/IDTR, the GDT/GDTR, Control Registers, 30 MSRs,
and reschedules these Checks as they are completed.
9.2.1.6 Bin Processing Rate vs Task Arrival Rate
RIMM-SIM allows a detailed analysis of the Bin processing rate compared
to the Task arrival rate. It provides the ability to control the Bin size, Bin
formation frequency, and the Task arrival rate to evaluate this important
factor that controls the length of the measurement queue. The length of the
EPA-RIMM measurement queue will vary based on three factors:
1. The rate that new Checks arrive at the Backend Manager. This is con-
trolled by the Diagnosis Manager as it selects which Checks to send to
the Backend Manager. In the light measurement scenario, the queue
length could drain to zero as the Bin processing outpaces the Check
arrival rate. However, in the heavy measurement scenario, the queue
will receive an infusion of new Checks regularly which introduces the
need to ensure that certain resource measurements are not starved for
processing as new Checks arrive.
2. The rate that the Backend Manager sends Bins for processing: The
Backend Manager will form Bins at the chosen rate. More Bins formed
and transmitted per second results in additional measurements being
performed, however, each Bin also incurs a cost in SMM and too many
Bins per second hampers application performance so the Bin formation
frequency cannot grow beyond a specified limit. The light measurement
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scenario does not require frequent Bins to accomplish its measurements
whereas a heavy scenario may need to schedule Bins more frequently to
effectively handle the incoming rate of Checks.
3. The amount of work that the Backend Manager packs into the Bins:
Adding additional Tasks to a Bin allows more work to be accomplished,
however, this prolongs the amount of time in SMM, thus the size of
the Bins cannot grow beyond a specified threshold. A light scenario
does not need to increase the Bin size to accommodate the measurement
load while the heavy scenario may need to increase the Bin size to make
adequate progress through the measurement load.
9.2.1.7 Task Size Distributions
For the truncated uniform distributions in this section, we take random
numbers in the range of 1 to 100 for 100µs Bin Size scenarios, 1 to 700 for
700µs Bin Size scenarios, and 1 to 1400 for 1400µs scenarios.
For the truncated normal distributions in this section, we take random
numbers from a normal distribution with a statistical mean of 50µs and a
standard deviation of 28.856 for the 100 Bin Size scenario. As we do not have
empirical data over Task sizes from actual deployments, we approximate by
calculating the mean and standard deviation from a set of random numbers
from 1 to 100 (Bin Size). For the 700µs Bin Size scenario, we utilize a mean of
350 with a standard deviation of 201.67. For the 1400µs Bin Size scenario, we
use a mean of 701 and standard deviation of 405 using the same method.
9.2.2 First Come First Serve
9.2.2.1 Measurement Design
In this simulation, we set the parameters according as shown in Table 9.3
to evaluate the FCFS approach in terms of scheduling, Task ages, and the
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number of waiting Tasks.
TABLE 9.3: First Come First Serve Config
Parameter Setting
Simulation Seconds 60
BEM CPU Frequency 3,000,000,000
Bins/sec 12
Check Arrivals/sec 10
Number of Tasks in Check 5
Max Task Size 100µs
Bin Size 100µs
Backfill Enabled No
Aging Enable No
Random Priority New Checks No
Random Size New Checks Yes
New Tasks Lowest Priority Yes
Random Priority for New Tasks No
9.2.2.2 FCFS Results
To introduce this simulation, we begin by examining the Bin Size results
of one random simulation, before examining larger sets of simulation runs.
We first gathered the results of the Bin sizes with the FCFS approach with
truncated uniform and normal distributions in the range of 1 to 100µs.
1. Truncated Uniform Task Distribution: Figure 9.6 shows the Bin sizes.
We observe that the amount of work in the Bins averages 76.7µs with a
minimum of 22µs and a standard deviation of 15.4µs.
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FIGURE 9.6: Bin Size Detail - Truncated Uniform Distribution,
FCFS
TABLE 9.4: FCFS Results - Truncated Uniform Distribution
Result Value
Avg. Tasks/Bin 1.51 Tasks
Oldest Task Age 114,660,000,000 cycles
Cumulative Task Age 109,724,400,000,000 cycles
Num. Waiting Tasks 1909.8 Tasks
Avg. Work / Bin 77.8µs
2. Truncated Normal distribution: In this simulation, we observe that the
amount of work in the Bins averages 73.6µs with a minimum of 35µs.
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FIGURE 9.7: Bin Size Detail - Truncated Normal Distribution,
FCFS
TABLE 9.5: FCFS Results - Truncated Normal Distribution
Result Value
Avg. Tasks/Bin 1.51 Tasks
Oldest Task Age 114,660,000,000 cycles
Cumulative Task Age 109,653,360,000,000 cycles
Num. Waiting Tasks 1,909 Tasks
Avg. Work / Bin 73.4µs
For the light scenario, maximizing the usage of available Bin capacity is
less critical and a simpler Backend Manager algorithm such as FCFS would
be adequate. However, in the heavy scenario, the achieved Bin usage around
77µs out of 100µs is not ideal, which motives the need to investigate alternate
approaches.
9.2.3 Priority Queue
In this set of simulation measurements, we analyze a priority queue with
several options: Priority Queue ("PQ", with no backfilling or aging), Priority
Queue with backfilling ("PQB"), Priority Queue with aging ("PQA"), and a
Priority Queue with backfilling and aging ("PQBA"). We compare our results
in two key areas to FCFS: Bin capacity and Task aging.
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9.2.3.1 Measurement Design
In this simulation, we set the parameters as shown in Table 9.6.
TABLE 9.6: Priority Queue Configs
Parameter PQ PQB PQA PQBA
Simulation Seconds 60
BEM CPU Frequency 3,000,000,000
Bins/sec 12
Check Arrivals/sec 10
Number of Tasks in Check 5
Max Task Size 100µs
Bin Size 100µs
Backfill Enabled No Yes No Yes
Aging Enable No No Yes Yes
Random Priority New Checks Yes
Random Size New Checks Yes
New Tasks Lowest Priority No
Random Priority for New Tasks Yes
9.2.3.2 Results for PQ, PQB, PQA, PQBA configurations
Figure 9.8 provides the uniform distribution results and Figure 9.9 provides
the normal distribution results. These figures are normalized to the Backfill
off, Aging off scenario. Table 9.7 and Table 9.8 provide the raw values.
Examining the average Tasks per Bin and average Work per Bin metrics,
we observe that the backfill-enabled configurations have significantly higher
average Tasks per Bin and Work per Bin. Aging does not help in this regard.
Examining the Oldest Task Age metric, we see that aging is the mechanism
that is responsible for improving this metric and the combined backfill and
aging scenario leverages the aging priority mechanism and the fuller Bins
to work through the measurement queue more rapidly. This allows the
oldest Task’s age to drop. Similarly, the Cumulative Task Age metric shows
the best performance in the combined backfilling and aging scenario as the
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combinations of aging and backfill allow prioritizing older Tasks and working
through these Tasks more rapidly.
One metric that at first appears to be an outlier is that the combined backfill
and aging-enabled scenario does not outperform the "Backfill Enabled, Aging
Disabled" scenario in the Number of Waiting Tasks and Average Tasks per
Bin metrics. However, as the Average Work per Bin metric is higher for the
combined backfill and aging enabled scenario, this signifies that larger Tasks
have been selected in the combined scenario.
For the heavy scenario, the results of backfilling and aging are encouraging.
The backfilling capability helps utilize between 93µs and 96.7µs of the 100µs
Bin capacity compared to between 73.1µs and 77.5µs when backfilling was
disabled. It also reduces the amount of waiting Tasks. Adding an aging
capability reduces the age of the oldest Task. For the light measurement
scenario, these improvements may not be required, however, for the heavy
scenario, the improvements are significant.
TABLE 9.7: Backfill and Aging Results, Truncated Uniform Dis-
tributions
Backfill Aging
Avg.
Tasks
/Bin
Oldest
Task
Age
Cumul.
Task
Age
Num.
Waiting
Tasks
Avg.
µs
Work/Bin
Off Off 1.52 1.792E+11 1.655E+14 1909 75.8
Off On 1.55 1.135E+11 1.067E+14 1883 77.5
On Off 2.38 1.789E+11 1.078E+14 1287 94.3
On On 2.20 1.013E+11 6.703E+13 1416 96.7
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TABLE 9.8: Backfill and Aging Results, Truncated Normal Dis-
tributions
Backfill Aging
Avg.
Tasks
/Bin
Oldest
Task
Age
Cumul.
Task
Age
Num.
Waiting
Tasks
Avg.
µs
Work/Bin
Off Off 1.50 1.798E+11 1.673E+14 1919 73.1
Off On 1.49 1.163E+11 1.118E+14 1928 73.7
On Off 2.30 1.795E+11 1.140E+14 1343 93.5
On On 2.15 1.002E+11 6.797E+13 1449 96.0
FIGURE 9.8: Comparison normalized to "Backfill Disabled, Ag-
ing Disabled" configuration - Truncated Uniform Distribution
FIGURE 9.9: Comparison normalized to "Backfill Disabled, Ag-
ing Disabled" configuration - Truncated Normal Distribution
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To examine Bin size in more detail for the PQB configuration, Figure 9.10
and Figure 9.11 show the truncated uniform and normal distributions, respec-
tively. We observe that in contrast to the FCFS results, the average Bin sizes
have increased (94.6µs (truncated uniform) and 94.9µs (truncated normal)
for these two priority queue-based simulations) in contrast to the 77.8µs and
73.4µs results from the FCFS approach.
Figure 9.12 and Figure 9.13 compare PQB to FCFS. We observe that the
average Tasks per Bin and average work per Bin have increased significantly
with the PQB. This increased measurement throughput, however, does not
address the age of the oldest Task.
FIGURE 9.10: Bin Size Detail - Priority Queue with Backfilling -
Truncated Uniform Distribution
FIGURE 9.11: Bin Size Detail - Priority Queue with Backfilling -
Normal Distribution
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FIGURE 9.12: Priority Queue with Backfilling vs FCFS - Trun-
cated Uniform Distribution
FIGURE 9.13: Priority Queue with Backfilling vs FCFS - Trun-
cated Normal Distribution
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9.2.3.3 Discussion
Comparing the results of FCFS and the Priority Queue with backfilling, we
conclude that the latter fills the Bins closer to the target Bin size and provides
faster processing of the measurement queue by reducing the number of wait-
ing Tasks. The Priority Queue effectiveness was close to the maximum (e.g.
filling 95µs out of 100µs). This indicates that moving to a Knapsack solv-
ing approach may not provide meaningful results that merit the additional
complexity.
The Priority Queue with aging showed the ability to reduce the age of
Tasks on the queue which helps avoid starvation. It is important to note
that aging does not significantly impact the throughput-related metrics such
as average work per Bin, number of waiting Tasks, or average number of
Tasks/Bin as it is designed to facilitate the choice of older Tasks as opposed
to filling Bins more fully. In the light measurement scenario, aging is not
necessarily required as the lower Check arrival rate is not likely to result in
Task starvation. In the heavy measurement scenario, the aging capability
would help reduce the risk of older Tasks experiencing starvation as new
Checks arrive.
The simulator shows that combining aging and backfilling improves both
the Bin size as well as reduces the age of Tasks on the queue. This method
resulted in fuller Bin sizes and avoiding starvation on the queue. While
backfilling and aging can incur additional overheads on the BEM, excessive
performance impacts can be mitigated by enforcing a limit on the maximum
queue length or increasing the measurement throughput.
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9.2.4 Bin Size Scaling
The Bin size (amount of µs of work in the Bin) is a key performance factor for
EPA-RIMM. In this RIMM-SIM scenario, we analyze the impact of scaling the
size of the Bin using 100, 700, and 1400µs Bin sizes with:
1. The maximum Task size equal to the Bin size which represents a scenario
in which the measurements are allowed to scale upwards with the Bin
size, allowing more checking in a single Task.
2. The maximum Task size set to 100µs which represents the scenario when
smaller measurements were provisioned and in a time of threat, more
of these smaller measurements can be readily run.
For each configuration, we examine the resulting impact on the number of
Tasks/Bin, the oldest Task’s age, the cumulative age of all Tasks on the queue,
the number of waiting Tasks, and the average work per Bin.
9.2.4.1 Measurement Design
We list the simulator parameters used in Table 9.9 and the Bin Size distribu-
tions described in Section 9.2.1.7.
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TABLE 9.9: Bin Size Scaling Config
Parameter Setting
Simulation Seconds 60
BEM CPU Frequency 3,000,000,000
Bins/sec 12
Check Arrivals/sec 70
Number of Tasks in Check 5
Max Task Size Config 1: Bin sizeConfig 2: 100µs
Bin Size 100, 700, 1400µs
Backfill Enabled Yes
Aging Enable Yes
Random Size New Checks Yes
New Tasks Lowest Priority No
Random Priority New Checks Yes
9.2.4.2 Bin Size Scaling Results - Config 1: Max Task Size = Bin Size
Figure 9.14 and Figure 9.15 provide the results, normalized to the 100µs
configuration. In these results, we see the average Tasks per Bin, oldest Task
age, cumulative Task age, and number of waiting Tasks hold constant as the
Bin holds larger Tasks. The average work per Bin increases significantly as
larger Tasks are processed.
The results show that Bin size is a useful knob to perform larger Tasks
which incorporate more checking. However, it is a knob that needs to be used
carefully to not preempt the system for a prolonged amount of time which
would result in negative system impacts.
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FIGURE 9.14: Impact of Bin size scaling, normalized to 100µs
configuration, Uniform Distribution
FIGURE 9.15: Impact of Bin size scaling, normalized to 100µs
configuration, Normal Distribution
9.2.4.3 Bin Size Scaling Results - Config 2: Max Task Size = 100µs
In this scenario, smaller (≤100µs) hashes are performed and the larger Bin
sizes allow incorporating more of them in a Bin. The practical benefit of this
scenario is that a single SHA hash value for each Task needs to be gathered as
opposed to requiring new SHA hashes to support up to 700 or 1400µs worth
of work.
The results, as shown in Figure 9.16 and Figure 9.17 show that the average
number of Tasks/Bin and average work/Bin increase with the Bin size as this
scenario allows running more Tasks in the Bin. Additionally, the age of the
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oldest Task drops as does the cumulative Task age. The number of waiting
Tasks also drops as more Bin capacity is available to process them.
This scenario shows its value in the heavy measurement case. To ac-
commodate the high rate of Checks arriving, the ability to increase the Bin
size allows faster progress through the measurement queue. The choice of
whether to utilize Config 1 (Task max size scales with Bin Size) or Config 2
(Task max sizes set to the lowest Bin size) depends on the tolerance to create
and maintain provisioned values over larger resources that can be used when
required. If the expectation is that increasing the Bin size is a rare occurrence,
Config 2 is adequate and avoids the need to generate and maintain a separate
set of provisioned values. Config 1 provides the ability to perform larger
measurements as required to get results more readily.
FIGURE 9.16: Impact of Bin size scaling, normalized to 100µs
configuration, Uniform Distribution, Max Task Size 100µs
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FIGURE 9.17: Impact of Bin size scaling, normalized to 100µs
configuration, Normal Distribution„ Max Task Size 100µs
9.2.5 Bin Frequency Scaling
Bin frequency (e.g. Bins per second) represents another important knob for
accomplish more measurements in less wall-clock time, besides increasing
the Bin size. In this simulation run, we examine the impact of Bin frequencies
of 12, 48, 96 a second while holding Bin size and Check arrival rate constant.
9.2.5.1 Measurement Design
Table 9.10 provides the simulation parameters.
TABLE 9.10: Bin Frequency Scaling Config
Parameter Setting
Simulation Seconds 60
BEM CPU Frequency 3,000,000,000
Bins/sec 12,48,96
Check Arrivals/sec 70
Number of Tasks in Check 5
Max Task Size 100µs
Bin Size 100µs
Backfill Enabled Yes
Aging Enable Yes
Random Size New Checks Yes
New Tasks Lowest Priority No
Random Priority New Checks Yes
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9.2.5.2 Bin Frequency Results
The results in Figure 9.18 and Figure 9.19 show that the increased Bin fre-
quencies successfully drop the age of the oldest Task on the queue and the
total age of all of the Tasks on the queue at the end of the simulation. The
number of waiting Tasks also drops as the increased Bin frequency allows
faster progression through Tasks on the queue. The results also show a drop in
the number of Tasks per Bin however Work per Bin remains roughly constant.
This indicates that the increased Bins are taking larger Tasks in the measure-
ment queue. The Tasks per Bin and Work per Bin results are dependent on
the makeup of the items in the measurement queue. Each Bin incurs a set
cost as the CPU cores are completely consumed by the SMI processing, thus
12, 48, 96 Bins with a cost of 150µs each (accounting for SMI entry and exit
costs) would consume 0.18%, 0.72%, and 1.44% of the available CPU cycles.
Workloads that perform high computation would benefit from less frequent
Bin/second rates.
The choice of how to set the Bin frequency and size depends on a few
considerations:
1. The cost of SMI entry and exit. If these factors are high, then larger
Bins would be more efficient than increasing Bin frequency as the SMI
entry/exit costs are incurred on a per-Bin basis.
2. Tolerance to provision hashes of different sizes, e.g. if gathering a set of
hashes that fit within 100, 700, and 1400µs Bins is acceptable, then these
larger sizes can allow more checking to occur in a single measurement.
However, if only one set of provisioned values is needed, utilizing the
smallest common denominator of Task size (e.g up to 100µs Task size)
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would be preferable and performing more of these measurements in a
single Bin would allow more checking to occur in the Bin.
3. Sensitivity to SMI latency: If the software on the monitored system is
more sensitive to prolonged SMI latencies, more frequent Bins would be
preferable to larger Bins as the more frequent (but shorter) disruptions
would delay latency-sensitive code for a shorter duration.
The heavy measurement scenario would benefit from the Bin frequency
scaling to allow faster progression through the measurement queue. However,
this knob needs to be balanced against the above considerations.
FIGURE 9.18: Bin Frequency Scaling Comparison normalized to
"12 Bins/sec" configuration
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FIGURE 9.19: Bin Frequency Scaling Comparison normalized to
"12 Bins/sec" configuration
9.2.6 Check Arrival Rate
The Check Arrival Rate represents how quickly Tasks from newly-arrived
Checks are added to the queue. This factor has queue management impli-
cations. If the Check Arrival Rate is lower than the Bin processing rate, the
measurement queue drains over time and when it is empty, no new Bins
would be formed. If the Check Arrival Rate exceeds the Bin processing rate,
then the queue length grows. A larger measurement queue requires more
work on the Backend Manager to implement backfilling and aging as there
are more Tasks to consider for inclusion and also update aging for.
9.2.6.1 Measurement Design
In this simulation run, we vary the arrival rate of new Checks using rates of
200, 400, 800 Checks a second. We fix the Bin size at 100µs and Bin frequency
at 96 Bins/second. The number of Tasks in a Check is fixed at five. Table 9.11
provides the configuration settings for this run.
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TABLE 9.11: Check Arrival Config
Parameter Setting
Simulation Seconds 60
BEM CPU Frequency 3,000,000,000
Bins/sec 96
Check Arrivals/sec 200, 400, 800
Number of Tasks in Check 5
Max Task Size 100µs
Bin Size 100µs
Backfill Enabled Yes
Aging Enable Yes
Random Priority New Checks Yes
Random Size New Checks Yes
9.2.6.2 Check Arrival Rate Results
In Figure 9.20 and Figure 9.21, we observe that the fixed rate of Bin processing
is insufficient to prevent increases in the age of Tasks on the queue as both
the age of the oldest Task on the queue and the cumulative age of Tasks on
the queue increase significantly. Similarly the number of waiting Tasks also
increases as Bins cannot be formed quickly enough or large enough to process
them given the configuration constraints.
One mitigation technique for this scenario of frequent Check arrivals that
outpace Bin processing rates, is to increase the Bin size and/or frequency.
However, due to system impact concerns, there are limits to how much these
knobs can be adjusted upwards. The BEM could also be enhanced to monitor
the Check Arrival Rate and the Bin processing rate to provide feedback to the
DM to reduce the Check Arrival Rate.
The light scenario will not be affected by the rate of Check arrivals as
they are relatively infrequent. However, the heavy scenario will result in a
high Check arrival rate. To the degree possible, the BEM can increase the Bin
size and frequency to handle the incoming rate of Checks, however, a rate
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that is too large to be feasibly support will need to be throttled otherwise the
monitored system is not able to perform its required work.
FIGURE 9.20: Check Arrival Rate impact on Task Age and Num-
ber of Waiting Tasks, [200,400, and 800 Checks/sec], Truncated
Uniform Distribution
FIGURE 9.21: Check Arrival Rate impact on Task Age and Num-
ber of Waiting Tasks, [200,400, and 800 Checks/sec], Truncated
Normal Distribution
9.3 Discussion
RIMM-SIM provides a controlled simulation environment to allow examining
the impact of different Scheduling mechanisms such as First Come First Serve,
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a Priority Queue, a Priority Queue with backfilling, a Priority Queue with
aging, and a Priority Queue with aging and backfilling.
For our analysis, we looked at two Task distributions: uniform and normal.
Ultimately, the results of the two distributions did not differ significantly.
However, the analysis from each distribution provides finer-grained data for
scenarios where: 1. There is little ability to predict the size of incoming Tasks,
as is the case with the uniform distribution, and 2: The Tasks cluster around a
statistical mean.
We observed that the FCFS and Priority Queue without backfilling resulted
in smaller Bin sizes than the Priority Queue with backfilling. However, a
Priority Queue with backfilling approach alone did not address the Task
starvation problem. For that, we enabled aging which provided measurable
impacts in reducing the cumulative age of Tasks on the queue and the age of
the oldest Task. In both the light and heavy scenarios, the Priority Queue with
backfilling and aging achieved high Bin utilization without starvation. This
less-complex solution, compared to knapsack, helps reduce the computational
requirements on the Backend Manager.
Even with this scheduling approach, varying the knobs of Bin Frequency
and Bin size may be required. These parameters when adjusted upwards
allow more work to be accomplished, however, at the cost of increased system
performance. The choice of larger Bins vs more frequent Bins depends on
SMI entry and exit, ability to tolerate prolonged SMIs, and desire to provision
and maintain larger provisioned measurements. The goal of making faster
progress through the measurement queue must be tempered with the goal to
maintain adequate system performance. The rate of Check arrivals also needs
to be balanced against the Bin processing rate as the measurement queue can
grow if Check arrivals outpace Bin processing and drain completely if Bin
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processing outpaces Check arrivals over time.
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EPA-RIMM Bench
The performance of EPA-RIMM implementations will differ on various sys-
tems. Without a tool to measure and compare performance across systems,
it is difficult to determine their system impact and potential benefits from
improving aspects of their overheads.
This section describes the creation of the first benchmark for an SMM-
RIMM, EPA-RIMM Bench. This benchmark provides the ability to compare
the performance on different systems for actions that are representative of
EPA-RIMM. The performance achieved can very significantly due to impor-
tant variables including SMI entry and exit costs, CPU hashing performance,
CPU support for acceleration of cryptographic operations, and the crypto-
graphic library used. In Section 10.1, we provide an introduction to EPA-
RIMM Bench. We provide a description of our performance model that guides
EPA-RIMM Bench in Section 10.2. In Section 10.3, we describe the design of
the benchmark and we share benchmark results in Section 10.4. We discuss
our benchmark results in Section 10.5.
10.1 Introduction
Runtime integrity measurement performance may differ significantly on vari-
ous systems due to a variety of factors. These factors can include hardware
differences, firmware, the measurement agent, and the set of measured re-
sources.
Hardware can play a significant role in EPA-RIMM performance. Server
systems with higher CPU thread counts can extract additional measurement
performance by leveraging parallelism [24]. Architectural improvements in
CPUs, for example, crypto acceleration such as AES-NI [38], can improve
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encryption. Similarly, Intel’s SHA extensions can also improve hashing perfor-
mance [47]. Firmware is another important factor that impacts performance.
The SMI entry and exit costs can very due to firmware revision or codebase.
UEFI’s CPU rendezvous for threads entering SMM could incur greater over-
heads on CPUs with a high number of CPU threads. The size of the hash
operation also impacts the time spent in SMM.
The measurement implementation also influences performance. Imple-
mentations that reduce measurement agent costs can likewise reduce the
amount of time spent in SMM. These reductions could come from stream-
lining the measurement agent’s code itself or by switching to more efficient
hashing or encryption algorithms. The measurement scheduling also presents
an important performance knob. As each SMI transition incurs a performance
cost, this factor can result in additional CPU load.
Ultimately, EPA-RIMM developers benefit from a detailed understanding
of the performance overheads of their hardware, firmware, measurement
scheduling mechanism, and Inspector. EPA-RIMM Bench quantifies the entire
time required for measurements along with detailed breakdowns over the
factors that contribute to the performance achieved.
10.2 Performance Modeling
To allow understanding the overheads of the EPA-RIMM measurements, we
created a performance model methodology that allows expressing the various
SMM-based measurement overheads from the point of SMI interruption to
the return from SMM to the operating system. Itemizing the costs of SMI
processing by category allows the ability to substitute parameters based
on different system particulars or a hypothetical CPU and comprehend the
impact on measurements.
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10.2.1 EPA-RIMM Performance Model
Tm is the total measurement time consisting of transition times into and out
of SMM as well as the time spent in the Inspector as shown in Equation 10.1.
Figure 10.1 provides a graphical representation of the flow.
Tm = Tentry + Twork + Texit (10.1)
FIGURE 10.1: EPA-RIMM Round Trip Time Components.
Tentry is the context switch time to enter the SMI Inspector. Texit is the time
to transition out of SMM. Tentry and Texit are influenced from the platform
and firmware.
Twork is the total time to accomplish the measurement which consists
of Bin decryption (Tdecrypt), a measurement hash (Thash), Results encryption
(Tencrypt), HMAC comparison (THMAC_compare), HMAC creation (THMAC_create),
verifying the Bin signature (Tsignature_verify), creating the Results signature
(Tsignature_create) and other overheads (Tother) consisting of all other Inspector
overheads such as data copies, memory comparisons, and security checks
over Bin placement.) Equation 10.2 shows these components.
(10.2)Twork = Tdecrypt + Tencrypt + Thash + THMAC_compare
+ THMAC_Create + Tsignature_veri f y + Tother
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Given a threshold Tmax for total time in SMM, our upper bound for Twork
is shown in Equation 10.3:
UpperBoundO f Twork = Tmax − Tentry − Texit (10.3)
10.3 Benchmark Design
This section describes the implementation of EPA-RIMM Bench and how it
obtains the necessary metrics to report.
10.3.1 Generating a workload
EPA-RIMM Bench performs memory hashes of varying sizes e.g. 0x100,
0x1000, 0x10000 bytes. The user is able to specify larger hash measurements
if desired. The benchmark gathers and averages the costs of the EPA-RIMM
performance model and reports their values for the given CPU and hash size.
10.3.2 Measuring Times
EPA-RIMM Bench leverages timestamps before and after SMI generation to
calculate Tm which contains the entire cost of the SMI measurement.
We calculate Tentry by measuring the time from the SMI generation to
the CPU arrival in the Inspector. We calculate Texit as the minimum of the
time from the Inspector’s exit to returning to the HCM. For additional ac-
curacy over Texit, we expose an optional knob to disable interrupts around
the SMI generation to avoid including any interrupt processing in the time
measurement. As interrupts can be processed directly after exiting from
SMM, their processing can result in the ending timestamp for the measure-
ment being delayed. In some scenarios, this knob can result in some system
instabilities, therefore, it may not be usable on all configurations. EPA-RIMM
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Bench reports whether interrupts were disabled during the run for proper
comparison.
EPA-RIMM Bench leverages time stamp counters in the Inspector placed
at the beginning of the encryption, decryption, and hashing operations and at
the end of the operations. The time to perform these operations is calculated
by subtracting the starting timestamp from the ending timestamp. The times-
tamps are returned in the Results data structure. As encryption is used, there
is one complication that needed to be resolved: two of the timestamps occur
after the Results data structure is encrypted by the Inspector and writing the
data to the encrypted data structure would corrupt the data. To resolve this
complication, we store the cost of the encryption and the ending timestamp
of the Inspector in the global memory of the Inspector. We then return these
two values in the Result data structure in the subsequent EPA-RIMM mea-
surement session. We take advantage of being able to write into the Results
data structure before it is encrypted. EPA-RIMM Bench’s post-processing
scripts sort all collected timestamp which properly places the timestamps in
the proper chronological order.
10.4 Benchmark Results
In this section, we provide the results from two systems on EPA-RIMM Bench.
The first system is the dual-core Minnowboard Turbot and the second system
is the UP2 board.
For the UP2 board, we examine both one and four core-enabled scenarios.
Running one core on the UP2 board allows for a higher frequency core (2.5
GHz) as the available processor power and thermal budget can be entirely
used by a single core. It also incurs less cache contention due to a single CPU
having access to the cache. Running four cores on the UP2 board limits the
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CPU frequency to 1.66 GHz and incurs cache sharing. As the EPA-RIMM
Inspector is single-threaded, having additional CPU cores does not benefit
the Inspector’s measurement times and can incur SMM rendezvous times as
all CPUs are collected in SMM before invoking the Inspector.
10.4.1 Hash Input Size Scaling
We begin by analyzing the impact of scaling the hash input size for three sizes:
0x200, 0x1000, and 0x10000 bytes for each configuration. Figure 10.2 shows
the results. The UP2 1 core measurement takes the least amount of time. As
the UP2 board features a more powerful CPU using Intel’s Goldmont CPU
architecture compared to an older Intel Silvermont architecture used on the
Turbot, the results indicate the potential benefit from higher performance
CPUs. None of the configurations achieve the (LimitSMIBITS). All configu-
rations meet the more relaxed (LimitSMIEmpirical) bound for the 0x200 and
0x1000 measurements. But, as the hash input size grows to 0x1000 bytes, only
the UP2 1 core configuration meets this bound.
FIGURE 10.2: EPA-RIMM Bench - Bin Costs
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10.4.2 Bin Cost Breakdown
From EPA-RIMM Bench’s tracing capability, we observe in Figure 10.3 that
the 1CPU UP2 config has a reduced HMAC, encrypt and decrypt, and hash-
ing costs which suggests that the additional frequency and lack of cache
contention provide measurement improvements for EPA-RIMM. The slower
Minnowboard Turbot has higher costs across all trace points except Tentry.
FIGURE 10.3: 0x200 Hash Input Size - Bin Cost Breakdown
(a) (Top left) 1 Core UP2 @2.5GHz
(b) (Top right) 4 Core UP2 @1.66 GHz
(c) (Bottom) 2 Core Turbot @1.46 GHz
For the 0x1000 hash input size as shown in Figure 10.4, while the hash
costs grew, the other overheads remain constant compared to the 0x200 byte
measurement. As the encrypt, decrypt, and HMAC operations are over the
Bin, the sizes do not grow with the size of the measurement. The Tentry and
Texit costs also do not vary with the size of the measurement.
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FIGURE 10.4: 0x1000 Hash Input Size - Bin Cost Breakdown
(a) (Top left) 1 Core UP2 @2.5GHz
(b) (Top right) 4 Core UP2 @1.66 GHz
(c) (Bottom) 2 Core Turbot @1.46 GHz
For the 0x10000 hash input size as shown in Figure 10.5, this measurement
continues the trend of hash costs overwhelming all other components. As
hash costs are the only cost that scales with hash input sizes, the other portions
of the Bin cost remain fixed.
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FIGURE 10.5: 0x10000 Hash Input Size - Bin Cost Breakdown
(a) (Top left) 1 Core UP2 @2.5GHz
(b) (Top right) 4 Core UP2 @1.66 GHz
(c) (Bottom) 2 Core Turbot @1.46 GHz
10.5 Discussion
EPA-RIMM Bench provides the ability to compare important performance
characteristics of EPA-RIMM operations across different systems. This allows
determining if a given configuration can support a hash size within the chosen
SMI latency bounds. It also provides a detailed cost breakdown for the time
spent in SMM and transitions to and from SMM. We extend the underlying
data into a performance model for SMM-RIMMs providing the ability to
examine key parameters and results.
The results show that while generational improvements among CPU ver-
sions increase the performance, none of the tested EPA-RIMM configurations
hit the more stringent LimitSMIBITS limit. All of the tested configurations
could hit the less stringent LimitSMIEmpirical for the 0x200 and 0x1000 hash
input sizes. As hash input sizes grow, they consume the majority of EPA-
RIMM’s SMM overhead as the other costs are fixed. The performance model
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that underpins EPA-RIMM Bench allows quantification of the various over-
heads and can serve as the basis of estimations for the potential impact in
improvements or degradations in any of the listed categories.
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Conclusions
At the outset of this work, there was no awareness of concerns over SMI
latency and SMM-RIMMs or published studies of system impact when SMI
latency. To address this limitation, we devised four methods of generating
suitable SMI loads and created methods of quantifying the resulting system
impacts. This work has resulted in: 1. Recognition that our work was "the
first to experimentally expose the performance implications of Intel’s System
Management Mode (SMM) [35]", leading to a broader awareness of concerns
over SMI latency and 2. SMI latency concerns addressed by HP for their
SureStart SMM monitoring software, citing our work [18].
We had the early observation that the SMI latency guideline (LimitSMIBITS
did not leave a large amount of time for system inspections. This motivated
us to determine where the breaking point was for our test systems. With
this study, we found that there was additional headroom ( LimitSmiEmpirical)
above the guideline to perform measurements as long as we did not ex-
ceed this upper limit. While raising awareness of SMI latency concerns for
SMM-RIMMs was impactful, we were encouraged by reviewer feedback to
build upon these insights to actually address the SMI latency concerns for
SMM-RIMMs.
This feedback encouraged us to build upon the insights and methodologies
we had created to address the performance issue for SMM-RIMMs. Another
factor proved motivational for our work: the SMM landscape had changed
since the outset of this work. With growing concerns over broad SMM access
to the system, previously-developed SMM-RIMMs were not in sync with
current trends. This encouraged us to take a fresh look at several other
persistent limitations for SMM-RIMMs that worked against our ultimate goal
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of demonstrating a usable SMM-RIMM with capabilities to address security,
extensibility, and performance concerns.
11.1 Summary
Constructing an effective and performance aware SMM-based RIMM requires
careful consideration of many aspects including privilege of the measurement
agent, handling a semantic gap, addressing SMI latency, scheduling a poten-
tially large queue of measurements, and enabling extensible measurements.
Providing a publicly-available implementation helps researchers build upon
this framework.
Addressing the requirements required careful analysis and design to avoid
conflicts. For example, the quickest way to proceed through the measure-
ment queue would be to run all measurements immediately as they arrive.
However, this would incur unacceptable SMI latencies and system impacts.
Enabling extensible measurements must be done without reducing the secu-
rity of the measurement agent as a new interface is opened.
Leveraging more rigorous cryptography and hash algorithms could result
in enhanced resilience to certain attacks, however, this would also increase
the time required to operate in SMM. The use of an STM also constrains the
SMM measurement agent to prevent it from operating with higher privileges
than neccessary. Improving the security design was necessary to satisfy "C1:
SMM-RIMM Security".
Proposed SMM-RIMMs did not feature ways to vary the specific mea-
surements to be performed at each inspection. EPA-RIMM’s measurement
API allows dynamically varying the set of monitored resources to reduce the
ability of rootkits to adapt to static measurements. We added support for
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fundamental runtime integrity measurement commands that provide build-
ing blocks to effectively detect rootkits. By allowing specification of one or
more of these measurement commands in a single measurement session and
varying the operand, varied sets of measurements can be accomplished. EPA-
RIMM’s provisioning phase provides guidance to the SMM measurement
agent and does not require building details of system state in to SMM which
addresses the semantic gap ("C2: SMM and OS Semantic Gap") between SMM
and its lack of knowledge about an operating system’s internal layout.
With our EPA-RIMM architecture, we were able to demonstrate successful
detection of classes of operating system and hypervisor-based rootkits at
reasonable performance impacts. Additionally, the mechanism we developed
to decompose large measurements into smaller measurements to achieve
performance targets also facilitated a useful tuning knob where the amount of
measurements could be increased or decreased dynamically based on policy
or preference. Check decomposition is key to addressing "C3: SMM-RIMM
Performance".
We did not expect that our method of decomposing large measurements
would also naturally lead to facilitate extensible measurements. By allow-
ing Tasks to precisely specify the measurement to be performed, their data
structure could be readily extended with new commands and operands to per-
form new measurements with minimal effort across the EPA-RIMM software
stack. The Check description API resolves "C4: SMM-RIMM Measurement
Variability".
To verify that our design and approach works on actual systems, we
constructed the EPA-RIMM prototype on two open hardware platforms where
we have the ability to modify the firmware source code. On this prototype,
we demonstrated successful detection of kernel and Xen hypervisor code
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injection, interrupt descriptor table hooking, supervisor mode execution
prevention disabling, and system call hooking. To provide a reference example
of a functional SMM-RIMM software stack, we released our prototype as
open source source, constituting the first publicly available SMM-RIMM. This
resolves "C5: SMM-RIMM Code Availability".
The ability to run actual rootkit detections from our prototype demon-
strated the detection effectiveness as well as provided a configurable testbed
to evaluate the performance of the approach. This showed us that our modest
hardware, we were able to perform these detections within LimitSmiEmpirical.
Faster processors, optimized firmware implementations, and increased en-
cryption performance may give the ability to read the more stringent limit
(LimitSMIBITS).
To provide a mechanism for understanding the impacts of performance-
sensitive EPA-RIMM flows, we developed EPA-RIMM Bench which incor-
porates a performance model and benchmarking capability. With the per-
formance model, we can determine the precise impact of improvements or
degradations in portions of these flows. The EPA-RIMM Bench tool provides
the ability to quantify these portions of the flow on different hardware to
allow empirical measurements over the entire EPA-RIMM flow.
A large set of measurements on the queue requires effective scheduling.
Our simulation results show that adding aging to entries on the queue re-
duces the age of Tasks on the queue, helping prioritize older Tasks before
newer Tasks. In circumstances where dependent actions can be identified (e.g.
responses to changes in the CR0 register). Triggers can reduce the amount of
checking needed by performing operations that could otherwise be avoided.
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Making fuller use of available Bin capacity avoids unnecessary SMM tran-
sitions. Our simulation results examining the impact of backfilling demon-
strate that backfilling significantly increased Bin utilization. We found that
the Priority Queue with backfilling and aging results in additive benefits
that results in fuller Bins and reduced Task age on the queue. While lighter
measurement scenarios may not need these capabilities, they provide major
improvements for heavy measurement scenarios.
11.2 Future Work
There are several key areas for future work pertaining to EPA-RIMM. The
first of these is exploring methods to parallelize the SMM-based measure-
ments. UEFI SMM code does not yet support multi-threading. This results in
measurements only being processed on a single CPU while other CPUs wait
for it to complete. This significantly constrains the measurement throughput.
While multi-threading does not directly help with SMI latency of a single
measurement, it would multiply the performance of the measurement agent’s
processing of the measurement queue.
A second area for future work is making EPA-RIMM compatible with
moving target defenses. The moving target defense approach attempts to
complicate the work of an attacker by changing the system configuration
at runtime. It can, for example, move kernel code in memory, change IP
addresses periodically, in an effort to complicate the work of an attacker.
EPA-RIMM currently assumes a static environment in which the system
resources are not constantly shifting. Enabling EPA-RIMM for this class of
systems could be accomplished by employing behavioral rootkit detections,
e.g. leveraging performance counters. These methods that characterize how
code operates as opposed to where it operates from would help respond to
Chapter 11. Conclusions 203
this new mechanism.
The third area for future work is fully integrating telemetry into EPA-
RIMM. EPA-RIMM’s Diagnosis Manager is well situated to direct flows of
measurements across an infrastructure. Detections of issues on one or more
nodes could help drive detections of these issues on other nodes. This capa-
bility would reduce the ability of an attacker to spread an attack. Telemetry
could also be used to enable new Checks based on emerging threat indicators.
This could result in more effective checking and increase the responsiveness
of the framework as successful detections of attacks on some nodes could
guide checking on other nodes.
There are also three potential developments that could significantly im-
prove EPA-RIMM’s effectiveness. First, one of the largest portions of EPA-
RIMM processing are the SMI entry and exit times. CPU optimizations that
allow entry and exit into SMM to occur in reduced time would make it more
feasible to use SMM as a protected execution environment. This could po-
tentially enable innovative new usages that could readily be enabled via
firmware updates.
Second, current chipsets support SMI timers that can trigger SMIs on a
regular cadence. Such a timer could trigger measurements, however, there are
two key limitations. First, the predictable nature of these triggers would allow
rootkits to conduct a transient evasion. Thus, a randomized timer would
be necessary to counter-act this attack. Second, current chipset SMI triggers
can be disabled by non-SMM Ring 0 code. Improvements to lock this SMI
generation source would provide a more resilient measurement trigger.
Third, communication methods that pass through the operating system
present challenges for stealthy communication with a measurement agent.
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While some SMM-RIMMs have leveraged out-of-band communication mech-
anisms to retrieve results and trigger measurements, these mechanisms have
not been entirely stealthy or required porting network drivers to run in SMM
which increases the attack surface. An improved mechanism that natively
provides cryptographic support would streamline communications with the
Inspector and reduce the overheads for security-related SMM usages.
11.3 Conclusions
From our measurements and analysis, we conclude that constructing a perform-
ance-aware, effective, and extensible SMM-RIMM is possible. Our initial
SMM performance measurements provided confidence that decomposing
large measurements would allow SMM-based integrity measurements to
be accomplished over an interval of time within SMI latency bounds. This
enables deeper inspections over an interval than could be performed in a
single SMI session. The extensible framework also allows new inspections to
be created that respond to future rootkits. The framework could incorporate
a broad variety of inspections that extend beyond hashes to new detection
techniques. Broader deployments of EPA-RIMM would provide an effective
new detection mechanism that can detect stealthy rootkits. Enabling this
new class of detection mechanisms provides a new capability to defenders
to reduce the time to detect malicious code and reduce its ability to operate
unnoticed.
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